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Abstract: 
The central argument of this thesis maintains that the reasons why Muslim women elect to veil 
various parts of their bodies are not clear-cut or homogenous, but instead cover a spectrum of 
religious convictions, social motivation, and cultural impetus.  It is therefore possible to argue that 
the West’s arguments for, and justifications of, the prohibition of veiling lack universal validity. The 
thesis will explore and consider some of the reasons for veiling offered by Muslim women, with 
reference to recent case law, academic debate, published anecdotes and blogs.  Additionally, it will 
offer detailed examinations of recent legal developments and the present socio-legal position in 
both the UK and France. The author identified these neighbouring jurisdictions, both with growing 
Muslim populations, as having some noteworthy contrasts in their approaches to the Islamic veil, 
presumably brought about in part by their differing constitutions: whilst France banned the wearing 
of face veils in 2011, the UK is yet to follow suit despite pressure from certain political organisations 
and their supporters.  In particular, the in-depth exploration of the UK cases will illustrate some of 
the difficulties the UK legal system has encountered with disputes over the wearing of religious 
items, and Islamic garments in particular. Testing of the validity of the thesis will be made through a 
comparison and critical analysis of these findings and of the reasoning offered by the legislatures of 
the UK and France for their respective positions on veiling. 
 
The thesis further argues that the prohibition of veiling is problematic and undesirable in twenty-
first century Europe, unnecessary in democratic societies, serves to polarise (or further polarise) 
Western and Muslim populations, and is harmful to the rights and interests of Muslim women. A 
critical analysis of case law, academic commentary, and media reporting will illustrate that such 
prohibitions have served to exacerbate tensions between Western and Muslim populations and 
promote a lack of tolerance and understanding of veiling among Westerners. This will further 
demonstrate the thesis that prohibition of veiling without a full understanding of the practice is 
highly inadvisable in our increasingly multicultural society. 
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Chapter 1: The history and practice of veiling and the concept of hijab 
Introduction 
One of the key tenets of Islam is the practice of hijab, or modesty in both behaviour and dress. This 
chapter will outline the spectrum of its extent, limitations, and the different interpretations of the 
concept, and will examine extracts from the Koran which refer to the concept of hijab in dress. It will 
then consider the custom of veiling the face as a distinct category of hijab, discussing its origins, the 
evolution in both method and connotation, and the current position of the practice. An assessment 
will be made of evidence that veiling the face is not a uniquely Islamic tradition, and in fact was 
carried out in Western Europe until relatively recently. Finally, it will discuss the ways in which other 
religions, with primary reference to Christianity, endorse modesty in dress for their followers, 
demonstrating that the concept is not a uniquely Islamic construct. In this way, the chapter will 
demonstrate that veiling of the face has a rich and nuanced history, a variety of meanings, and great 
personal significance to its practitioners, meaning that attempts to ban the practice by lawmakers 
with limited understanding and inaccurate perceptions of the practice are inadvisable.  
 
What is hijab? 
The word ‘hijab’ itself has several meanings dependent on context. Its literal Arabic meaning is 
‘screen’ or ‘curtain’. In the West, probably the most familiar definition is the actual name for the 
scarf that many Muslim women wear to cover their hair, head, neck and chest. This scarf is also 
known as a khimar or simply a headscarf.  More broadly, hijab can also refer to the overall method 
and style of dress utilised by Muslims to conform to the standard of modesty they perceive as 
fundamental to their religious practice. Additionally, hijab can be defined as an abstract concept, as 
set down in extracts from the Koran, requiring modesty in dress, behaviour and thought in order to 
achieve true piety. El Guindi notes that, ‘[i]n Western feminist discourse, “veil” is politically charged 
with connotations of the inferior “other”, implying and assuming a subordination and inferiority of 
the Muslim woman.’1  Further, she points out that the Arabic language does not contain a single 
catch-all term for ‘veil’: instead, there are a multitude of different words and phrases, each with 
different meanings and genders.2 Within the confines of Islam, veiling is both subtly nuanced and 
highly complex. For the purposes of brevity and clarity, this thesis will use the term ‘veil’ or ‘veiled’ 
                                                          
1 El Guindi, Fadwa, Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance, Berg, Oxford 1999, p152 
2 Ibid, p7 
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at times to describe a Muslim woman dressed in observance of hijab, with the intention only of 
distinguishing the style from Western-style outfits. 
All adherents to the Islamic faith, both male and female, are expected to cover their awrah, or 
intimate parts. As an absolute minimum, it is required that when out in public, men will wear 
clothing that covers the body from navel to knee. Women are expected to cover themselves from 
shoulder to knee with an additional covering for their hair. There are a number of ways to observe 
hijab, many of which are attributed to the varying interpretation of certain verses of the Koran. The 
relevant verses are as follows: 
Surah 24:31: And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard 
their modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what must 
ordinarily appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display 
their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, their husband’s fathers, their sons, their 
husband’s sons, their brothers or their brothers’ sons, or their sisters’ sons, or their women, 
or the slaves whom their right hand possess, or male servants free of physical needs, or small 
children who have no sense of the shame of sex, and that they should not strike their feet in 
order to draw attention to their hidden ornaments. 
This verse outlines the categories of relatives in front of whom a woman need not cover her awrah, 
and clearly emphasises the importance of both dressing and behaving in a modest, humble manner. 
It should be noted that the only specific dress requirement given here is to ‘draw the veil over the 
bosom’, which could translate in the twenty-first century to anything from not wearing tops that 
show too much of the upper chest or cleavage, to covering the area with a jilbab or abaya and then 
wearing a niqab, which generally hangs from just beneath the eyes to the upper chest. There is 
debate amongst the various branches and communities of Islam as to which regions, precisely, of a 
woman’s body are required to be covered by direction of this Surah, resulting in the varying styles of 
dress worn by Muslim women globally. 
Surah 33:59: O Prophet!  Tell thy wives and daughters, and the believing women, that they 
should cast their outer garments over their persons (when abroad): that is most convenient 
that they should be known (as such) and not molested. 
This verse implies that it is advisable for women to cover themselves when out and about, both to 
protect them from unwanted contact from strangers and to denote themselves as Muslims. This 
goes some way in demonstrating the importance of dress to the Muslim identity: it is an outward 
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symbol, a statement, of belonging. A recent Belgian study3 explored Muslim women’s experiences in 
Western Europe when going about their daily business veiled: sadly, this study indicated that 
distinctly ‘Islamic’ garments, including the niqab, seem to attract as much unwanted attention as 
they discourage. Women reported instances of other citizens questioning or challenging their right 
to veil, making threatening or racist remarks to them, spitting at them and even tearing their veils 
away. It seems strange that, in an era where individuality and self-expression are so highly prized, 
this particular form of expression is condemned to the point of assaulting wearers in the street. 
Hadith (recorded sayings of Mohammed): Aisha (the prophet’s wife): Asma entered upon 
the Apostle of Allah (God) wearing thin clothes. The Apostle of Allah turned his attention 
from her. He said ‘O Asma, when a woman reaches the age of menstruation, it does not suit 
her that displays parts of her body except this and this, and he pointed to his face and hands. 
This verse specifically addresses the change in dress that is expected when a girl enters adolescence: 
however, it is open to fairly broad interpretation, as to whether the body should be merely covered, 
or whether the garments should be loose enough to disguise the curves and contours of a woman. 
This point was at the crux of a lengthy and complex legal challenge by a British Muslim schoolgirl to 
her secondary school,4 whereby the school felt a particular outfit mandated by its uniform policy 
was sufficient to comply with the requirements of hijab, but the pupil had a different understanding 
of her religion and wished to wear a garment not permitted by the uniform policy. Nevertheless, it is 
clear from this source that Islam requires girls to dress more modestly as they approach adulthood. 
The interpretation of hijab also varies from country to country where Islam is the predominant 
religion, whether by legal dictate or cultural norm: at the most conservative end of the spectrum, 
Saudi Arabian law requires all women to be fully veiled, except for the hands and eyes, at all times in 
public. Saudi women generally wear flowing black robes (either abayas or chadors) together with a 
head covering and a niqab to cover the face. The abaya is also common elsewhere in the Gulf region, 
worn with or without a niqab. Muslims in India and Pakistan, in common with many Sikh and Hindu 
women in the region, tend to wear colourful salwar kameez, using a scarf to loosely cover their hair. 
In Turkey, despite the Islamic majority population, its secular constitution means that headscarves 
were actually banned in official buildings and universities for many years, although this policy has 
                                                          
3 Brems, Janssens, Lecoyer, Chaib and Vandersteen, Wearing the Face Veil in Belgium: Views and Experiences 
of 27 Women Living in Belgium Concerning the Islamic Full Face Veil and the Belgian Ban on Face Covering, 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, 1 June 2012, 
https://www.ugent.be/re/epir/en/researchgroups/public-law/research/human-rights/faceveil.pdf , see pages 
17-19 
4 R v Denbigh High School, to be discussed in detail in chapter 2 
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been relaxed recently. Whilst there is no clear consensus as to the extent hijab should take, it is 
apparent that adherents to the various interpretations believe sincerely that theirs is the correct 
version and take it seriously as an expression of faith. 
Veils covering the face are often referred to as ‘burkas’, both in the press and by politicians and 
political commentators.5 It is, however, incorrect to use ‘burka’ as a catch-all term for a face veil: in 
fact, it refers to one distinct garment. A burka is a one-piece full-body cloak that drapes over a 
woman’s head and covers the entire body, made from silk or heavy cotton with a small crocheted or 
open-worked panel over the eyes to enable the wearer to see, generally in shades of muted mid-
blue or brown. It is, arguably, an outlier in the spectrum of versions of hijab and was mandatory 
dress for all women when Afghanistan was under the control of the Taliban from the mid-1990s until 
around 2001. In the West, the garment itself now carries connotations of religious extremism, 
oppression, and draconian attitudes towards women, and it is perhaps unsurprising that Western 
individuals and groups aiming to criminalise the wearing of face veils tend to apply this emotive 
term. The key difference, which many opposed to face veiling either forget, disregard or do not 
realise, is that the  Taliban imposed the burka upon women regardless of their will. Conversely, and 
particularly in Western Europe and the United States, Muslim women often make a free and 
informed choice to veil their faces, symbolising both religious observance and agency. 
Illustrating this point, a study carried out in Belgium during 2010-116 consisted of in-depth 
interviews with Muslim women concerning their feelings and views on hijab generally and the niqab 
in particular. The Belgian study straddled the time period shortly before and shortly after the Belgian 
government introduced a legal ban on veiling the face, and was instigated when the researchers 
noticed that the discussions surrounding the proposed ban seemed to lack knowledge and 
understanding of the concept of veiling the face, and that the voices of veiled women were absent 
from the debate. After interviewing 27 women, some of whom wore niqabs and others who had 
done in the past or were considering doing so in the future, the researchers found overwhelmingly 
that that their subjects were in no way forced or coerced into veiling, but had instead reached or 
were approaching the decision with care and thoughtfulness as ‘a personal trajectory of deepening 
and perfecting [their] faith.’7 The study concluded that, on the whole, women viewed the niqab as a 
non-obligatory part of Islam, but one that represented a greater piety.8 It was variously described by 
                                                          
5 Labour MP Jack Straw, Conservative MP Philip Hollobone, and Nigel Farage, leader of the UK Independence 
Party, are all on record as using ‘burka’ to refer to face-covering veils in general. This will be discussed in 
greater detail in chapter 3. 
6 Brems et al, Wearing the Face Veil in Belgium  
7 Ibid at p5 
8 Ibid at p6 
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participants as an outward sign of an inner dignity and grace,9 a way of reserving their physical 
appearance for their husband, or a way of avoiding unwanted attention from men.10 These findings 
amply demonstrate both the depth and variety of reasons for Muslim women to cover their faces, 
none of which suggest oppression or a lack of agency. 
 
Veiling the face in Christianity 
The practice of Christianity, the dominant religion in the UK and Western Europe, does not involve 
anything that could be described as a true equivalent to hijab, which may go some way in explaining 
why the West has struggled with the concept. It could be argued that, to the individual, Christianity 
is a less pervasive religion than Islam, with no codified requirement to dress in a certain way and 
more scope for compartmentalisation. However, it is worth bearing in mind that the West also 
subscribes to a dress code of sorts, albeit a fluid and largely unspoken one.  
As a general rule, both men and women dress to cover their chest, abdomen, genitals and buttocks 
as an absolute minimum when out in public. The nature of the public setting also has an effect upon 
the level of coverage required: for instance, in formal settings such as an office or a courtroom both 
men and women are generally expected to also cover their shoulders, upper arms, and legs to at 
least the knee, and to wear structured business dress which partially conceals the shape of the body. 
Conversely, it is often acceptable for men to leave their chests exposed and for women to uncover 
their upper chest and abdomen when at the beach or in other casual environments. Until relatively 
recently, most Christian women in Great Britain would not have contemplated attending a church 
without wearing gloves and a hat or some other head covering. It was also thought improper for a 
church outfit to reveal too much bare skin, and so consideration was given to the modesty of 
necklines, hemlines and sleeve lengths: even in the present day, brides wearing strapless or low-cut 
wedding dresses to marry in church often choose to cover their arms, shoulders and upper chest 
with a wrap or shrug during the ceremony and then remove it once they have left the church, and 
sheer white wedding veils are often worn covering the face for the bride’s procession down the 
aisle. In addition, it should be noted that the customary dress for Christian nuns generally includes a 
long, loose gown in a dark or muted shade, worn with a head covering designed to conceal the hair 
and neck: not dissimilar to certain styles of Islamic dress. 
                                                          
9 Ibid at p6 
10 Ibid at p7 
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Parts of the Bible seem to place emphasis on suitable dress for observant Christians: for instance, in 
1 Corinthians 11:4–16, St Paul is said to have advocated that women should cover their heads whilst 
praying: 
‘Any man who prays or prophesies with his head covered brings shame upon his head. But 
any woman who prays or prophesies with her head unveiled brings shame upon her head, for 
it is one and the same thing as if she had had her head shaved. For if a woman does not have 
her head veiled, she may as well have her hair cut off. But if it is shameful for a woman to 
have her hair cut off or her head shaved, then she should wear a veil.’ 
Further, in 1 Timothy 2, a letter from Paul entitled ‘A Call to Prayer: Instructions to Women’ suggests 
the following: 
‘In like manner also, that women adorn themselves in modest apparel, with shamefacedness 
and sobriety, not with braided hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly array; but (which becometh 
women professing godliness) with good works.’ 
These directions resonate with the hijab direction for women to cover their hair around men to 
whom they are not related, indicating that the concept of a woman’s hair being a major sexual 
attractor (her ‘crowning glory’) has endured for millennia and has cross-cultural acceptance. Further, 
it is apparent that in both Christianity and Islam, in order to be truly pious, women must dress in a 
way that does not draw attention to themselves: the inference being, if an adherent chooses to 
dress in expensive, fashionable or eye-catching garments, she is likely to be perceived as more 
concerned with her appearance than with her faith, and so a ‘lesser’ Christian. 
Whilst it is evident that some passages of the Bible advocate modesty in dress and that some 
Christians hold particular standards of dress for church attendance and day-to-day life, the concept 
is in no way embedded into Christian culture in the same way that hijab inhabits Islamic culture. 
However, that is unlikely to make it any less important in the eyes of adherents. By the same token, 
the practice of hijab should be equally worthy of respect from non-Muslims within a multi-cultural 
society. 
 
Veiling the face in a non-religious context 
Veiling the face, arguably, resides towards one end of the spectrum of hijab. It would be 
disingenuous of the author not to concede that a covered face, at first encounter, can be 
disconcerting to some, particularly in Western countries or areas without significant Muslim 
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communities. Western women do not habitually cover their faces or heads in public: however, it 
should be noted that this has not always been the case. Depending on age and social class, it was 
customary for most British women to wear gloves and a hat, shawl or headscarf whenever they left 
the house, until approximately the mid-1960s, and heads were always covered in church, either by a 
hat or a chapel veil. Mourning veils were also common, enabling bereaved women to conceal their 
emotions at a time when formality and reserve were demanded: both Queen Elizabeth II and the 
Queen Mother, up to and during the funeral of King George VI, and Jacqueline Kennedy, at the 
funeral of her husband, US President John F Kennedy, concealed their faces with semi-sheer black 
veils at these hugely public occasions. There is evidence to show that, historically, British women 
wore face coverings on a regular basis: in her 1973 examination of women’s headcoverings from 
600AD, Georgine de Courtais described the variety of face veils and even masks that went in and out 
of fashion over the centuries.11 These were used primarily to maintain women’s highly-prized fair 
skin: as de Courtais notes, during the Stuart period (1603-1660), it was fashionable not to wear a 
hat,  
‘but to protect the complexion in summer short veils of fine material were draped over the head 
and face…12 Masks, usually made of black velvet, satin or silk were also worn out of doors, 
possibly as a disguise but also very likely as protection for the complexion against winter winds. 
Whole masks covering the face were known as vizards and were kept in place by a round bead 
attached to the inside and held between the teeth. Half masks were fastened by strings round 
the back of the head.’13 
De Courtais also identifies subsequent trends for veiling the face: for example, during the Georgian 
period (1810-1837), ‘as a fair complexion was considered attractive, large veils were often worn with 
[…] bonnets, particularly in summer’14; in mid-Victorian times (1860-1880) ‘bonnets worn by widows 
and the elderly had very large and voluminous dark veils, but except for riding or travelling, veils 
were not generally fashionable.’15 By the late Victorian years (1880-1901),  
 
‘veils of net, tulle or gauze frequently patterned with spots and in a colour to match the hat 
or costume became very popular [...] Short veils reaching the tip of the nose were worn over 
smaller hats and under large ones during the early ‘eighties. By 1890 larger veils were 
                                                          
11 de Courtais, Georgine, Women’s Headdress and Hairstyles in England from AD600 to the Present Day, 1973, 
The Anchor Press, London 
12 Ibid at p64 
13 Ibid at p66 
14 Ibid at p108 
15 Ibid at p128 
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becoming fashionable. These covered the face entirely and were pulled in under the chin by a 
string or were pinned at the back of the neck…Veils were also used to secure all types of hats 
during sporting activities, especially cycling and motoring. The vogue for veiled hats 
continued into the next period.’16 
 
Some of the reasons for veiling the face given by de Courtais help to illustrate why some corners of 
British society disapprove of the Islamic face veil. Although, relatively speaking, it was fairly recently 
that fashionable English women often wore full face veils, in fashion terms a span of around a 
century is an extremely long time, and so to wear a face veil is to resurrect a style presumed long-
dead. Furthermore, as popularised by Queen Victoria, a black veil over the face signified deep 
mourning, potentially adding connotations of morbidity and sadness to the contemporary niqab, 
which is often made of black fabric and worn with other black garments. Finally, the most usual 
reason for a face veil was to maintain the pale skin fashionable at the time, thereby making a veil a 
tool for women to increase their attractiveness to men. Veiling for this reason is no longer necessary 
since the introduction of sunscreens and other cosmetics, and an ongoing vogue for tanned skin, so 
to Western culture the veil becomes superfluous. In any case, Muslim women’s primary reason for 
wearing the niqab is to conceal the face from unrelated men. Therefore, the Islamic face veil could 
be said to turn the English concept of fashionable veiling on its head – by donning it, the wearer can 
choose to remove herself from the demands of fashion and beauty, rather than be complicit in its 
requirements. 
 
Most recently, veiling the face by Westerners has emerged as a provocative fashion statement, 
calculated to garner press attention and stimulate the wearer’s social media presence. At the 
Scream Awards in 2010, British-Sri Lankan rapper MIA wore a niqab and matching jilbab printed with 
colourful flowers and the slogan ‘I Love You’,17 followed by press speculation as to whether she 
intended the outfit to make a statement about France’s ban on veiling the face or merely promote 
her forthcoming album. Pop singer Lady Gaga has been pictured in scarves covering her face from 
below the eyes downward, and, in 2013, appeared on stage wearing a sheer shocking-pink garment 
resembling a burqa. Commenting on this outfit in the Independent, Myriam Francois Cerrah noted 
that much of the criticism levelled at Gaga for her outfit choice implied that she had made herself a 
stooge to the patriarchy, had sexualised Muslim culture, and was blindly insulting the oppressed 
                                                          
16 Ibid at p138 
17 Homa Khaleeli, MIA: what was she doing in that niqab?, The Guardian, 18 October 2010, 
http://www.theguardian.com/music/2010/oct/18/mia-wearing-a-niqab-at-awards-ceremony, last viewed 6 
April 2015 
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women forced to cover their faces. Whilst conceding the potential orientalist overtones of the outfit, 
Cerrah declared herself unconvinced by these criticisms, suggesting instead that Gaga had merely 
added another facet of meaning to the garment and associated it with confidence, power, and a 
bold sexual identity, contrasting with the passivity and repression often applied to veiled Muslim 
women by the media.18 US fashion designer Jeremy Scott included cropped burkas in metallic 
leopard-print and sheer black fabric in a 2013 collection which, he claimed, was inspired by the Arab 
Spring uprising of the previous year.19 Scott is well-known for pushing boundaries in his work: as 
Fogg remarks, he ‘is not so much making a political statement as having fun, breaking various taboos 
based on religious iconography and costume.’20 The face veil was even used to advertise jeans: in 
September 2013, when the issue of face veiling was subject to fierce debate amongst the British 
press, Italian denim brand Diesel launched an advertising campaign titled ‘I Am Not What I Appear 
To Be’, featuring a photograph of a white woman wearing a denim garment similar to an Afghan 
burka, but incorporating an opening for the eyes instead of a crocheted grille and a deep side split, 
revealing that the model was apparently naked beneath the garment and had numerous tattoos on 
her arms and torso. Diesel’s media consultant stated that the campaign aimed to address the 
assumptions held by Westerners about veiled women. 21  It is arguable whether these examples 
constitute a genuine desire to explore the clothing of other cultures, or blunt and insensitive cultural 
appropriation employed for shock value: however, this thesis tentatively suggests that, by bringing 
the concept of veiling the face into the context of mainstream Western entertainment and high 
fashion, it could potentially become more familiar, and so less alarming to Western eyes.  
 
Conclusions 
It is, then, apparent that the practice of hijab can be a deeply personal matter, its spectrum of 
meaning affecting every follower differently. It cannot be understated that there is no firm 
consensus amongst the global Muslim population on what constitutes sufficient or acceptable hijab. 
This indicates that it would be inappropriate for Western governments to attempt to legislate 
against any part of the practice: applying a piece of catch-all legislation to the practice would affect 
                                                          
18 Cerrah, Myriam Francois, Lady Gaga’s burqa is good for Muslim women, The Independent, 11 August 2013, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/lady-gagas-burqa-is-good-for-muslim-women-8756228.html  
19 See http://www.style.com/slideshows/fashion-shows/spring-2013-ready-to-wear/jeremy-scott/collection, 
see looks 1 and 22 for runway images 
20 Fogg, Marnie, Why You Can Go Out Dressed Like That: Modern Fashion Explained, Thames & Hudson, London 
2014 
21 Ameena Meer, Take-Out Media, quoted in ‘Diesel Burqa Ad: Islampohobic or Empowering?’, Huffington Post, 
21 September 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/21/diesel-burqa-ad_n_3962554.html  
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some individuals far more than others, making such a move unfair, contrary to the spirit of human 
rights legislation, and potentially discriminatory. 
As we have seen, the concept of hijab and the practice of veiling the face are not entirely alien to 
Western culture, despite often being treated as such. Dress codes and the covering of ‘private’ parts 
of the body are enforced and upheld at a societal level, generally by mutual consensus. However, as 
the next two chapters will discuss, the English courts have recently been called on to wrestle with 
the range of interpretation in hijab and with the enforcement of dress codes: for instance, in Begum, 
the Court of Appeal relied on differing opinions from a number of Islamic authorities in an attempt 
to establish whether a Muslim schoolgirl should be permitted to wear a non-uniform garment 
because she felt the school uniform was not modest enough for her understanding of hijab, whilst 
giving her opinion little credence. Similarly, Jack Straw MP demonstrated his failure to understand 
the subtlety and nuance of hijab, and not a little arrogance, when he revealed that he informed one 
of his constituents (a Muslim woman wearing a niqab) that the garment was not, in fact, obligatory 
according to Islamic scholars.22  
In both examples, we observe white men speaking from positions of power and authority, 
attempting to impose their understanding of a practice that occurs outside their own cultural and 
gender boundaries, upon the women who choose to engage in the practice. This creates an almost 
comically paradoxical situation: an assumption is formed that the face veil is imposed upon Muslim 
women against their will, thereby denying them agency and free choice. As a solution to this 
perceived problem, pressure is exerted upon the women to remove their face veils, once again 
denying them agency and free choice. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 ‘I felt uneasy talking to someone I couldn’t see’, October 6 2006. Retrieved via The Guardian (no longer 
available through original source), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/oct/06/politics.uk, 
accessed Sat 11 May 2013 – see chapter 3 for full discussion. 
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Chapter 2: Veiling in the UK: a critical examination of the law  
Introduction 
 
In English law, legislative restrictions or guidelines on what citizens must or must not wear in public 
are seldom found. The key exception can be found in the ‘Other Offences’ category of the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003. S.66 of this Act, replacing the earlier offence of indecent exposure, prohibits the 
intentional exposure of the genitals ‘with the intent that someone will see them and be caused 
alarm or distress’.23 This offence is worded extremely narrowly and the mens rea required to 
complete the offence indicates that it aims to deter or punish behaviour within the sphere of sexual 
assault. It is possible to argue that the offence deliberately excludes various other forms of public or 
semi-public nudity which may be construed as less offensive, such as topless sunbathing, skinny-
dipping, and streaking.  
 
In addition, there exists the common law offence of outraging public decency (‘It is an offence to 
commit an act of a lewd, obscene, and disgusting nature, which is capable of outraging public 
decency, in a public place.’).24 The definition of this offence carries the potential for a person 
appearing in public unclothed or partially clothed to be charged with disorderly conduct under public 
order legislation. It is, therefore, apparent that the UK legislature has so far not troubled itself to 
dictate the clothing choices of the population much beyond the scope of everyday decency.  
 
Leaving aside decency issues, UK courts have ruled on several contentious and divisive cases over 
the last decade or so regarding clothing choices: more specifically, the wearing of religious or 
cultural items in schools and workplaces. These cases generally focus on individual rights as defined 
under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its enshrinement in UK law, the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). Marshall25 notes that, prior to these rulings, ‘whether or not a person 
manifests his or her religious beliefs in public spaces and places has largely been a non-issue in the 
United Kingdom.’26 Subsequently, the manifestation of religious beliefs in public has become very 
much an issue, sparking debate and discord in many quarters of society. 
 
                                                          
23 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.66(1)(b) 
24 Crown Prosecution Service, Other Offences That Might Involve Nudity, 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/l_to_o/nudity_in_public , last accessed January 2016 
25 Marshall, J, Women’s right to autonomy and identity in European human rights law: manifesting one’s 
religion, [2008] Res Publica 14(3), 177-192 
26 Ibid, at 178 
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This chapter will provide an analysis of the judicial reasoning in each case. All the cases share a 
common basis, in which the claimants are school pupils or employees who have challenged the 
uniform policy applying to them because there was an attempt to prohibit the wearing of a 
particular item which they see as a mandatory expression of their religious beliefs. The facts of each 
case will be outlined individually, followed by a summary of the ruling and its reasoning, and finally a 
discussion of relevant academic commentary and theory. There will then follow an outline of the 
non-statutory guidelines on school uniform policy proposed by the Department for Education in 
2007 and the ways in which they relate to contemporaneous case law, a consideration of the 
response to their consultation, and an examination of the current guidelines published by the 
Department. 
 
Case analysis: Shabina Begum v Denbigh High School 
The claimant in the first significant UK case to consider the issue of Muslim dress in schools was 
Shabina Begum.27 Shabina is a Muslim teenager who attended Denbigh High School in Luton. The 
school’s pupil population is culturally and ethnically diverse: a 2007 Ofsted report published on the 
school’s website confirms that ‘the great majority of pupils are from minority ethnic backgrounds’,28 
with around 79% identifying as Muslim at the time of the case in 2003-2004. 29 The school 
acknowledged this diversity in its uniform policy following consultation with the local Islamic 
community.30 The required uniform for girls stipulated that, besides the regulation school blazer, tie, 
jumper, and blouse, they could choose to wear either a skirt, trousers or salwar kameez. 31 
Headscarves in school uniform colours were also permitted, provided they were worn without loose 
or trailing ends, for reasons of health and safety and to allow the school tie to be clearly seen.32 
Shabina had worn the uniform salwar kameez without issue during her first two years at Denbigh. At 
the start of her third year in 2002, when she was 14, she arrived at school wearing a jilbab33 in place 
                                                          
27 R(SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15 (hereafter Begum [2006]) 
28 Ofsted Inspection, Denbigh High School, 10 October 2007, retrieved via 
https://www.denbighhigh.luton.sch.uk/assets/downloads/Ofsted%20Inspection%20Report.pdf 6 April 2015 
29 R(SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2005] 1 WLR 3372 (hereafter Begum [2005]), at p1 
30 R(on the application of SB) v Denbigh High School Governors [2004] ACD 66 (hereafter Begum [2004]), at H4 
31 A loose sleeveless calf-length tunic (kameez), often with splits at the seams from hem to mid-thigh, worn 
over loose trousers, tapered and cuffed to the ankle (salwar). Most commonly worn in Southern Asia by Sikh 
and Hindu men and women as well as Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims. 
32 Denbigh High School uniform policy, http://www.denbighhigh.luton.sch.uk/pages/uniform.php, retrieved 
July 31 2013  
33 A loose, long-sleeved, ankle-length gown worn with a headscarf, usually in black or another solid dark 
colour, designed to conceal the shape of a woman’s body. 
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of her uniform. She was accompanied by her older brother,34 and the two advised the assistant head 
teacher that Shabina did not feel the salwar kameez was appropriate dress for a Muslim girl who had 
entered puberty. Her construal of the Koran required girls aged 13 and over to wear a jilbab in order 
to disguise the contours of the body: she felt that the salwar kameez revealed too much of her arms, 
and that the calf-length hemline was too short to comply with her interpretation of the Islamic 
requirement for modest dress.35 The jilbab is a form of traditional Islamic dress not permitted by 
Denbigh’s uniform policy. The assistant head instructed her to return home, change into her normal 
uniform and return to school. Despite encouragement by the school, Shabina refused to return 
unless she was allowed to wear her jilbab. Denbigh maintained its refusal to modify its uniform 
policy and as a consequence of this impasse, she missed two academic years’ schooling.36  
 
Judicial Review Application – 2004 
Shabina, with her brother acting as her litigation friend, sought judicial review on Denbigh’s decision 
on the grounds that it had constructively excluded her by its refusal to allow her to wear her jilbab, 
and that her right to manifest her religious beliefs under article 9 ECHR37 had been unjustifiably 
limited by the school.  
In the High Court, Denbigh High School argued that Shabina lived outside the catchment area of the 
school and her parents had therefore specifically chosen and taken active steps to send her there, 
that it had apprised Shabina and her parents of the uniform policy before she began school, and that 
she had previously worn a correct version of the uniform without complaint. It further argued that, 
following Shabina’s complaint, it had taken advice from local mosques and Islamic scholars who had 
agreed that the uniform policy was sufficient to comply with the requirements of hijab. 38 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 Begum [2004] at H3 
35 Begum [2005] at p14 
36 Begum [2004] at H4 
37 Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ensuring the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion. 
38 Begum [2004] at H4 
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First Instance Judgment (Bennett J.) (2004) 
Bennett J held that the interference with Shabina’s right to education under article 2 ECHR39 and the 
right to manifest her religion under article 9 ECHR flowed from her submittal that she was unlawfully 
excluded from school.40 The court further held that Denbigh had not positively excluded Shabina, 
and therefore her claim for interference with her Convention rights failed.41  
Bennett J made particular reference to the universality of the salwar kameez, remarking that it was 
‘worn by a number of different faith groups such as Hindus and Sikhs. This ensured that there was 
no visible distinction between Muslim, Hindu and Sikh female students.’42 He did not, however, 
explain why he felt it was especially beneficial to the pupils to remain, to an extent, culturally 
anonymous in this way. It is possible to argue that this approach actually contributes toward 
‘Othering’ non-white-British female pupils, by suffusing them into a homogenous mass, rather than 
allowing them to explore and own their religious identity in a safe and non-judgmental environment.  
Bennett J further held that ‘the school uniform policy avoided any division between those Muslim 
pupils who would choose to wear the salwar kameez and those who would choose to wear the 
jilbab’:43 however, achieving this by simply denying one group its choice and enforcing the choice of 
the other group upon them does not suggest an attitude of inclusiveness, as the school claimed, but 
rather an approach of over-generalisation and limited cultural understanding. 
 
Court of Appeal Judgment (2005) 
Shabina appealed this decision, and the following year her case was heard by Lords Justice Brooke, 
Mummery and Scott Baker in the Court of Appeal, with Brooke L J delivering the primary ruling.44  
In his ruling, Brooke LJ notes that, in 2003 whilst the dispute was ongoing, the complaints committee 
of the school’s governing body had taken advice from the London Central Mosque Trust, the Islamic 
Cultural Centre, the Muslim Council of Britain and two local mosques. It had duly concluded that the 
school’s uniform was sufficient to ensure compliance with the requirements of hijab, stating that,  
                                                          
39 Article 2 of the Convention Protocols of the European Convention on Human Rights – the right to an 
education. 
40 Begum [2004] at H6 
41 Ibid at H6-9 
42 Ibid at H14 
43 Ibid at H14 
44 R(on the application of SB) v Head teacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2005] 1 WLR 3372  
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‘Whilst accepting that the jilbab such as Shabina Begum wishes to wear constitutes proper 
Islamic dress for adult Muslim women in a public place, the evidence presented to the committee 
does not suggest that it is the only form of dress that meets these requirements.’45   
Earlier in his ruling, Brooke LJ noted that Shabina’s brother had argued that the salwar kameez was a 
form of Pakistani cultural dress with no particular religious basis.46 Shabina and her family came 
from Bangladesh and so it is significant that her family perceived her school uniform as belonging to 
another nationality rather than to their own religion. This point goes some way in legitimising 
Shabina’s concern about the insufficiency of a salwar kameez to comply with hijab requirements 
once she had entered puberty. 
Taken together, Brooke LJ identified two main groups of opinion: those who felt that the salwar 
kameez worn with a headscarf was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of hijab, which he termed 
‘liberal Muslims’47 and those who feel that a salwar kameez is insufficient and that a jilbab is 
required – ‘very strict Muslims’48. It is evident that no firm consensus exists on precisely what 
constitutes ‘appropriate’ Muslim dress, and one could question the wisdom of a court of non-
Muslim judges, primarily reliant on a spectrum of ‘expert opinions’, attempting to codify the 
concept. 
Brooke LJ also suggested that, because ECHR was enacted in the 1950s, between states with 
primarily Christian and Jewish populations, there was inevitably potential for tension between some 
of its provisions and the requirements of Islam.49 It could be argued that the authors of article 9 
never expected it to have to apply to a diverse range of religions or to a fast-growing minority 
population, which may go some way in explaining the increase in contentious cases concerning 
rights under this article. However, this suggests that the UK’s courts and institutions should be 
increasingly mindful of the need for tolerance and willingness to acknowledge traditions from other 
cultures, rather than taking a broad-brush, ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach as seen here. 
Judgment 
The court ultimately held that, because the school had not approached the matter correctly and had 
not given sufficient credence to Shabina’s religious convictions, it had in fact unlawfully excluded her 
and unlawfully interfered with her rights under articles 2 and 9 ECHR.50 However, all three judges 
                                                          
45 Ibid at p29 
46 Ibid at p14 
47 Ibid at p31 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid at p72 
50 Ibid at p78 
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acknowledged the difficulty for schools in interpreting their obligations under human rights 
legislation and recommended that the Department for Education issue authoritative guidance to 
assist in the area.51  
 
House of Lords’ Judgment (2006) 
Denbigh High School appealed against the Court of Appeal ruling and the case ultimately reached 
the House of Lords.52 It was heard by Baroness Hale of Richmond and Lords Bingham of Cornhill, 
Nicholls of Birkenhead, Hoffmann, and Scott of Foscote in February 2006, almost two years after the 
initial hearing. 
At the beginning of his ruling, Lord Bingham was at pains to point out: 
‘It is important to stress at the outset that this case concerns a particular pupil and a particular 
school in a particular place at a particular time. It must be resolved on facts which are now, 
for purposes of the appeal, agreed. The House is not, and could not be, invited to rule whether 
Islamic dress, or any feature of Islamic dress, should or should not be permitted in the schools 
of this country. That would be a most inappropriate question for the House in its judicial 
capacity, and it is not one which I shall seek to address.’53 
 
This remark is very telling, indicating that the court did not intend to offer obiter on the broader 
questions at play. Although this approach ultimately resulted in further legal challenges on the 
subject of religious dress in schools (see below), it could be viewed that the courts have taken their 
cue from Parliament. At the time of this ruling it had not issued any guidance, statutory or 
otherwise, with respect to school uniform policy and schools could therefore be said to have been 
working blind on this issue. 
 
Lord Bingham acknowledged Shabina’s conviction that the jilbab was the only suitable form of dress 
to comply with her religious beliefs, commenting that ‘…any sincere religious belief must command 
respect, particularly when derived from an ancient and respected religion.’54 He explained that this 
acceptance meant that her rights under article 9(1) were engaged and the questions to consider 
were whether there had been interference with those rights and if so, whether the interference was 
justifiable. He ultimately ruled that there had been no interference with Shabina’s rights under 
                                                          
51 Ibid at p82, p89, p91 
52 R(SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15 
53 Ibid at p2 
54 Ibid at p21 
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article 9(1). This decision was reached on the grounds that the school had ‘gone to unusual lengths 
to inform parents of its uniform policy’, and that there were three alternative schools in the district 
which permitted the jilbab and which Shabina could have attended instead without ‘any real 
difficulty’. 55 It seems somewhat muddled to first assert that a sincerely-held belief ‘must command 
respect’ before proceeding to belittle an attempt at manifesting that belief. This applies particularly 
in the case of religious clothing, in which the physical manifestation of the belief is intrinsic to the 
belief itself. In this case, Shabina had no alternative way of expressing or upholding her belief that 
the jilbab was the only garment sufficient to comply with her interpretation of the requirements of 
hijab, besides actually wearing a jilbab. There is an absurdity in acknowledging that Shabina’s desire 
to wear the garment was driven by a ‘sincerely-held religious belief’, rather than by a whim or a 
fashion trend, but ultimately supporting a decision to prevent her wearing it. 
 
Lord Nicholls was inclined to disagree with Lord Bingham’s finding that the school’s refusal to allow 
the jilbab did not represent a limitation on Shabina’s article 9 rights. He opined that his colleague 
‘may over-estimate the ease with which Shabina could move to another, more suitable school and 
under-estimate the disruption this would be likely to cause to her education.’56 However, he agreed 
that the interference was justified, although chose not to elucidate further, making his opinion 
somewhat vague and ill-grounded. 
 
Similarly, Baroness Hale stated that she was ‘uneasy’ about her colleagues’ view that there had been 
no interference with Shabina’s rights because she had chosen to attend Denbigh High School with 
the knowledge of its uniform policy. Hale made several points with regard to Shabina’s age and likely 
stage of development, and was of the opinion that the school had in fact interfered with her right to 
manifest her religion.57 Nevertheless, like Lord Nicholls, she felt that this interference was justified 
on the grounds that it had the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others.58 She 
was less certain on whether the interference was proportionate and considered a variety of sources 
concerning freedom of choice and gender equality in terms of veiling, ultimately concluding that it is 
acceptable for women to veil if they do so of their own free will, but unacceptable if it is imposed 
upon them or serves to deny them equal treatment.59 Whilst there is no doubt that Hale spoke 
sincerely, her conclusion here is somewhat unhelpful. Whilst Denbigh hoped to avoid creating 
                                                          
55 Ibid at p25 
56 Ibid at p41 
57 Ibid at p93 
58 Ibid at p94 
59 Ibid at p96 
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‘classes’ of Muslim girls, which it feared would happen if it allowed the jilbab alongside the salwar 
kameez, Baroness Hale managed to define two classes of veiled Muslim women: inferior, who veil 
because they are forced to do so, and better, who make the conscious decision to veil. This 
distinction is problematic – it maintains a stereotype that at least a sizeable proportion of veiled 
women are cowed, lacking in agency and entirely under the control of their fathers or husbands, and 
at the same time disregards any such women as less worthy of support and protection than their 
‘better’ counterparts.  
 
Baroness Hale ultimately held that Denbigh’s uniform policy was proportionate to the school’s 
pursuit of social cohesion and suitably acknowledged cultural and religious diversity, and therefore 
the interference with Shabina’s rights was fully justified. She drew attention to the school’s report 
that other girls were concerned about being pressured to wear jilbabs when they did not want to as 
support for her ruling, 60 although the Lords’ ruling does not at any stage challenge this report or 
demand tangible evidence of these concerns. It is possible to argue that this problem and Shabina’s 
case are in fact two separate matters that the school should have addressed individually, rather than 
conflating them into a single issue linked only by a garment. 
 
Lord Hoffmann, in common with Lord Bingham, was emphatic in his approval of Denbigh’s approach 
to its uniform policy, describing it as a ‘carefully crafted system’61 and noting that the school ‘went 
to immense trouble to accommodate the religious and cultural preferences of the pupils and their 
families.’62 As above, this author is less convinced by the inclusiveness of Denbigh’s uniform policy, 
and would argue that it in fact offered no more than a standard school uniform, similar in style and 
format to most British state secondary schools, with a catch-all ‘Other’ modification which it hoped 
would accommodate girls from a variety of non-white-British backgrounds.  Lord Hoffmann also 
demonstrates a certain amount of sympathy for the school in his outline of the events of 3 
September 2002, when Shabina first arrived at school wearing her jilbab: he alludes to the assistant 
head teacher as ‘having a busy morning’ and describes that Shabina’s brother and other male 
companion addressed him ‘at length and in forceful terms’,63 implying that Shabina and her family 
were in the wrong from the outset. Equally, this implies that the assistant head, quite 
understandably, made a quick decision when put on the spot and under pressure, but the school 
                                                          
60 Ibid at p98 
61 Ibid at p54 
62 Ibid at p44 
63 Ibid at p46 
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then stubbornly clung to that decision rather than giving it the discussion and consideration it 
merited. 
 
Whilst considering whether the school’s decision constituted an infringement of Shabina’s rights 
under article 9, Lord Hoffmann remarked: 
 
‘Article 9 does not require that one should be allowed to manifest one's religion at any time 
and place of one's own choosing. Common civility also has a place in the religious life.’64 
 
This implies that, at least in Lord Hoffmann’s opinion, conspicuous religious displays are lacking in 
civility or consideration for others, and indicates that the English judiciary prefers to endorse private 
or less obvious manifestations of belief. Whilst there may be religious manifestations that could be 
said to breach ‘common civility’, it is something of an exaggeration to suggest that Shabina’s desire 
to wear her jilbab to school constitutes behaviour that goes against ‘common civility’. 
 
In common with Lord Bingham, Lord Hoffmann felt that there had been no infringement of Shabina’s 
rights under article 9 because ‘there was nothing to stop her from going to a school where her 
religion did not require a jilbab or where she was allowed to wear one’65 and ‘until after the failure 
of her application for judicial review before Bennett J on 15 June 2004 she did not seriously try 
because she and her family were intent upon enforcing her “rights”’,66 published with the rather 
telling inverted commas which suggest either contempt for or dismissal of the concept of rights in 
this case. He expressed the opinion that Shabina’s change in beliefs ‘created a problem for her’67 for 
which she should have requested help from the school and local education authority, who, 
 
‘would no doubt have advised her that if she was firm in her belief, she should change 
schools. That might not have been entirely convenient for her, particularly when her sister 
was remaining at Denbigh High, but people sometimes have to suffer some inconvenience for 
their beliefs. Instead, she and her brother decided that it was the school's problem. They 
sought a confrontation and claimed that she had a right to attend the school of her own 
choosing in the clothes she chose to wear.’68 
                                                          
64 Ibid at p50 
65 Ibid at p50 
66 Ibid at p52 
67 Ibid at p50  
68 Ibid at p50 
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This remark suggests a significant criticism of Shabina’s approach to the matter, and could be said to 
paint Denbigh High School as a victim in this situation. Whilst her approach may not have been the 
most diplomatic or well-thought-out, Lord Hoffmann appears to make little allowance for the fact 
that she was not quite 14 years old at the time of the incident and did not necessarily have the 
requisite skills or experience to address the matter in a better way: with a little more compassion 
and a more tolerant dialogue, her school could have helped her find an alternative solution to their 
disagreement instead of resorting to legal action.  
 
Lord Hoffmann ultimately accepted Bennett J’s ruling and held that there had been no infringement 
of Shabina’s rights under article 9. He criticised the ruling of the Court of Appeal on this point, 
remarking that Brooke LJ had not fully explained why he felt her rights were limited and made no 
reference to established precedent,69 and that Mummery LJ’s finding that the school had a statutory 
duty to provide Shabina with education was irrelevant because, again, she could have chosen to 
transfer to another school.70  
 
Lord Scott of Foscote is also supportive of Denbigh’s head teacher, and critical of Shabina’s initial 
request to wear her jilbab, particularly of her brother’s approach, which he describes as ‘quite 
unnecessarily confrontational’71 and ‘verg[ing] on the threatening.’72 He considered the issue of 
whether Shabina was in fact excluded from school with reference to s.64 Schools Standards and 
Framework Act 1998 and ruled that she was not, because the school had not directed her to stay 
away and had in fact encouraged her to return, albeit wearing the correct uniform.73 He was also 
satisfied that the school’s uniform policy was more than reasonable and that its decision not to allow 
the jilbab was ‘unimpeachable’.74  
 
Finally, in his consideration of whether the school infringed Shabina’s rights under article 9(2), Lord 
Scott offers an analogy by way of illustrating his point: that of a pupil at a faith school who became 
an atheist and asked to be excused from the statutory daily act of worship. He states that, if the 
school refused the request, Strasbourg jurisprudence would only find interference with article 9 
                                                          
69 Ibid at p55 
70 Ibid at p57 
71 Ibid at p80 
72 Ibid at p79 
73 Ibid at p82 
74 Ibid at p84 
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rights if ‘the institution offered an essential service not obtainable elsewhere.’75 Because Shabina 
had other schools available to her, Lord Scott concurred with Lords Bingham and Hoffmann that her 
rights were not infringed. However, as previously noted by Lord Nicholls, changing schools is not 
necessarily an easy or straightforward process. Bearing in mind that Shabina was entering her third 
year at the school when the matter of her uniform became an issue, it is probable that she had 
formed friendships, established relationships with her teachers and otherwise become part of the 
community of Denbigh High School. To figuratively shrug and suggest she change schools seems to 
deny her the support and guidance she should, as a minor, be entitled to expect from her school and 
her country’s authorities. 
 
Commentary 
Difficulties with reasoning 
Hill and Sandberg are highly critical of Bennett J’s reasoning at first instance, remarking that his 
‘assertion that insistence on wearing religious dress does not constitute a manifestation of one's 
religion or belief is plainly wrong.’76 They are more supportive of the House of Lords’ ruling but 
remained critical of the reasoning used to reach the decision, arguing that their Lordships should not 
have applied the specific situation rule. They point out that ‘unlike a university student, a school 
pupil has not voluntarily accepted an employment or role which might legitimately limit his Art.9 
rights. In state schools there is no contractual relationship between school and pupil.’77 They also 
suggest that, as an alternative approach, the application of common law may have brought about 
much the same result, whereas the interpretation of article 9 ECHR ‘creates a confusing and 
unhelpful precedent which may have an unfortunate effect upon future judicial decisions on 
freedom of religion.’78 These remarks recognise some of the various flaws in this decision and their 
potential consequences, which did in fact inform later cases, to be discussed below. However, it 
would be disappointing, and even irrational, if the key piece of human rights legislation pertaining to 
UK law was overlooked in a case so obviously focused on the expression of a human right, in favour 
of the application of common law. Rather, it is possible to view Begum as a test case of sorts: the 
House of Lords had not previously been called upon to apply art.9 ECHR to a case concerning Muslim 
dress in schools, and it is unfortunate, though perhaps inevitable, that the eventual judgment was 
flawed in places. 
                                                          
75 Ibid at p88 
76 Hill, M and Sandberg, R, Is nothing sacred? Clashing symbols in a secular world, PL 2007, Aut, 488-506, at 
p498 
77 Ibid at p497 
78 Ibid at p498 
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The reasoning employed in the Court of Appeal’s ruling also met with criticism by legal academics. 
Poole is highly critical of Brooke LJ’s comments regarding the failure of the school to employ any 
kind of proportionality test when devising its uniform policy, remarking that,  
‘proportionality is a test to be applied by the court when reviewing decisions of public 
authorities after they have been made (ex post). It is not a test which ought to mean that 
public authorities should themselves adopt a proportionality approach to the structuring of 
their decision-making ex ante.’79 
This criticism illustrates the delicacy and difficulty of the facts before the court, and that it seemed 
favourable to make a ruling on purely procedural grounds rather than put itself in the position of 
assessing the appropriateness or otherwise of permitting religious dress in schools. In the House of 
Lords ruling, Lord Bingham’s remark that ‘The Court of Appeal's decision-making prescription would 
be admirable guidance to a lower court or legal tribunal, but cannot be required of a head teacher and 
governors, even with a solicitor to help them’80 illustrates this point further. Governmental guidelines 
on school uniform policies, which were first introduced around the time of the House of Lords’ 
judgment in Begum (to be discussed later in this chapter), remain somewhat woolly on the subject of 
restrictions or allowances for religious reasons. Much is left to the discretion or presumed local 
expertise of the school management team. Poole’s point identifies the inadvisability of delegating 
decisions on what are, essentially, human rights issues to unqualified non-lawyers: it is possible to 
argue that schools should be subject to more stringent guidelines on the issuing of uniform policies 
that acknowledge and embrace pupils’ rights under article 9.  
Davies,81 in common with Poole, finds the reasoning behind the Court of Appeal’s ruling to be lacking 
in clear and logical thought. He emphasizes that, although the court asserted that Shabina’s chosen 
form of dress was associated with extreme or fundamental branches of Islam, there was no evidence 
submitted that even suggested that Shabina herself, or any other girls who chose to wear the jilbab, 
behaved in threatening or intimidating ways toward other pupils. Davies identifies that one of the 
key arguments contained in the ruling focuses less on Shabina as an individual and more upon how 
others would perceive her based on her choice of dress. Davies argues that ‘the law requires more 
discipline than this’,82 suggesting that restrictions on certain religious clothing are often based upon 
                                                          
79 Poole, T, Of headscarves and heresies: the Denbigh High School case and public authority decision-making 
under the Human Rights Act, PL 2005, Winter, p689. For a similar stance, see Hill & Sandberg, Is nothing 
sacred?, PL 2007 
80 Begum [2006}, Lord Bingham at p31 
81 Davies, Gareth, Banning the Jilbab: reflections on restricting religious clothing in the light of the Court of 
Appeal in SB v Denbigh High School, ECL Review 2005, 1(3), 511.530 
82 Ibid at 520 
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an assumption that the wearer holds extreme or intolerant views.83 This particular line of reasoning 
is particularly illuminating amongst the variety of criticism levelled at this judgment: ultimately, the 
entire case was about others’ perceptions of the dress of one individual, embellished with tortured 
reasoning on various angles. It is difficult to see why, precisely, the legal system was required to 
intervene at such a high level on something that could, and perhaps should, have been resolved by 
Denbigh High School. 
It is possible to argue that secondary schools are uniquely placed to correct pupils’ perception of 
commonly-misunderstood things: for instance, Denbigh stated that it was concerned about girl 
pupils claiming to feel under pressure to wear jilbabs, presumably linking the garment with 
extremism and radicalisation. Shabina’s case would have given the school the perfect platform to 
disassociate the two things: for instance, the management team could have asked Shabina to give a 
talk during assembly about the jilbab and what it represented to her, or arranged for lessons 
appropriate to each year group during its citizenship or religious education sessions exploring the 
various styles of Muslim dress and their meaning. Instead, as above, it chose to stick with a decision 
made unexpectedly, at a busy and stressful moment, and treated Shabina no differently from a pupil 
who had arrived at school without her tie, or wearing trainers instead of school shoes, when it 
should have been clear after a conversation with Shabina that this was not a standard breach of 
uniform regulations. 
This selection of literature makes it evident that none of the verdicts in Begum met with universal 
academic approval, and a variety of improvements has been proffered. It could be argued that the 
combination of an area of law which is often open to wide interpretation, and a set of facts almost 
guaranteed to evoke a wide disparity of attitude and varying degrees of comprehension, meant that 
Begum resulted in a perfect socio-legal storm of sorts.  Going further, it should also be borne in mind 
that Denbigh High School was not called on to account for its actions at anywhere close to the level 
of examination applied to Shabina’s behaviour, and the author tentatively suggests that greater 
focus should have been applied here, bearing in mind the difference in social responsibility between 
a school and an individual pupil. It seems possible that, had a court at any stage of the process 
considered the damage done to Shabina’s education, the negative press undoubtedly generated, 
and the dismissive way in which Denbigh apparently handled the Begum family, the judgment may 
have gone in Shabina’s favour and potentially been more legally sound.   
 
 
                                                          
83 Ibid at 521 
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Wearing the jilbab: a personal decision or influenced by outside pressure? 
 
Writing in-between the rulings of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, Blair raised concerns 
about the wider issue of sexual discrimination within religious groups, which, she argues, results in 
the application of pressure on girls and their families to conform to particular standards of dress: 
‘ Women much more than men are subject to highly restrictive dress codes by their 
communities and a big question mark hangs over whether female pupils (or indeed their 
parents) have real choices about what they should wear. […] Given the individual rights 
perspective of this decision, it will be vital to ensure that other young women's voices are not 
marginalised in future as pressure is placed on them to conform to a more rigid reading of 
doctrine than they wish to accept. Worryingly, media reports of pressure on young women to 
wear the jilbab, which they had previously been able to resist because of school uniform 
rules, emerged within a few months of the Denbigh decision.’84 
 
This point fails to acknowledge Shabina’s unwavering assertion, both in her evidence to the court 
and in various interviews with and statements to the media,85 that the decision to begin wearing a 
jilbab was hers alone, brought about by the evolution of her own religious beliefs. In common with 
Baroness Hale, Blair doubts the agency of Muslim women and, in her concern that their 
communities inflict strict dress codes upon them, fails to acknowledge that Denbigh High School was 
effectively guilty of the same offence. Commentary of this ilk encourages a narrative in which veiled 
Muslim women are all victims requiring forcible liberation from their purdah by Western institutions. 
Whilst the author acknowledges that there almost certainly exists a proportion of Muslim women 
who suffer various types of oppression by their husbands or other male relations, it should not be 
ignored that some Western non-Muslim women suffer in similar ways, nor that many Muslim 
women make a free and conscious choice to dress in a way that complies with their religious beliefs. 
It is regressive and damaging to assume otherwise. 
 
                                                          
84 Blair, A, R(SB) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School: Human rights and religious dress in 
schools, 17 C.F.L.Q 3990414 [2005]  
85 See for example, The Guardian 3 March 2005, ‘I hope in years to come policy-makers will take note of a 
growing number of young Muslims who, like me, have turned back to our faith after years of being taught that 
we needed to be liberated from it.’ http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/mar/03/schools.faithschools (last 
viewed 02.09.13); The Guardian 22 March 2006: ‘Even though I lost, I have made a stand. Many women out 
there will not speak up about what they actually want…I still don’t see why I was told to go home from school 
when I was just practising my religion.’ http://www.theguardian.com/education/2006/mar/22/schools.uk (last 
viewed 02.09.13); BBC News 22 March 2006, ‘I feel it is an obligation on Muslim women to wear this [the 
jilbab], although there are other options.’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4832072.stm (last viewed 02.09.13);  
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Additionally, it cannot be avoided that during each stage of the case, much was made of Denbigh’s 
sensitivity and care in devising a school uniform that, it felt, was appropriate to a variety of religious 
and cultural beliefs. As discussed above, however, it is possible to argue that, by its insistence on the 
salwar kameez as the only acceptable alternative to the familiar UK school uniform, Denbigh in fact 
demonstrated a lack of cultural sensitivity and diminished its female Muslim pupils to a non-specific 
‘Other’. The salwar kameez is a traditional region-specific garment, worn primarily in South and 
Central Asia by Sikhs and Hindus as well as Muslims, and by both men and women. It is seldom, if 
ever, worn in other predominantly Islamic regions such as Northern Africa, the Middle East, Turkey, 
or Indonesia. Denbigh’s uniform policy acknowledged neither the breadth of the Islamic global 
community nor the diversity of its practice and observance. For a school with such a large Muslim 
pupil population, this insistence on the salwar kameez for all Muslim girls, because some Muslims in 
a particular region wear it, is surprising. Whilst it is likely that Denbigh took into account the 
preference of its largest Muslim group, in retrospect it is short-sighted for it not to have 
acknowledged other preferences to the extent that one of its pupils lost two years of her education. 
 
Scolnikov appears to have mixed feelings about Denbigh High School’s position.86 On one hand, she 
conceded that some of the reasons cited by the school for its uniform policy, particularly the 
concern that Muslim pupils wearing the jilbab would create fear amongst non-Muslim pupils, are 
inadequate, remarking that ‘schools should not pander to prejudice’.87 On the other hand, she feels 
that other Muslim pupils may have felt under pressure to adopt a more extreme dress code had 
Shabina been allowed to continue wearing her jilbab, and believes that it was important to protect 
the religious freedom of these students from ‘subtle restrictions created by communal pressure.’88 
These two contradictory opinions underline the difficulty of the case, and of the broader issue: if the 
exercising of one individual’s rights under s.9 has the potential to infringe upon the same rights of 
another individual, or group of individuals, whose rights take precedence? Here, it is possible to 
argue that the potential for a manifestation of Shabina’s rights to infringe upon those of the 
remaining Muslim girls at the school was negligible, and therefore the school could have devised a 
way for both groups to enjoy their rights concurrently. 
 
Adopting a similar viewpoint to Blair, Scolnikov also considers that although Shabina herself may 
have made the decision to adopt the jilbab, it seems at least equally possible that she had been 
                                                          
86 Scolnikov, Anat, Case Comment: A dedicated follower of (religious) fashion?, Cambridge Law Journal 2005 
64(3) at 527-529 
87 Ibid at 528 
88 Ibid at 529 
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under pressure to conform to the more extreme style of dress. She points to Shabina’s home life 
(her father was dead, her mother spoke no English and died before the case was concluded, and her 
brother had confronted the head teacher over Shabina’s initial refusal to comply with the uniform 
code) to underline her concerns here.89 In contrast to this opinion, Shabina, accompanied by her 
barrister, was interviewed on GMTV in March 200690, the morning that the decision of her case was 
due. She explained that the jilbab is ‘what [she] felt was the correct Islamic clothing’,91 and was 
emphatic that wearing it was entirely her own decision, borne out of a deeper understanding of her 
religion, and not the result of coercion by any other person.92 During the interview she appears 
articulate, bright, and passionate about her subject. It is striking that some commentators are so 
reluctant to believe that Shabina was not coerced into wearing a jilbab and indicates an ongoing 
perception of Muslim women being oppressed and without agency. This disparity of opinion relates 
to Motha’s stance (below), in which he asserts that, in many Western democracies, the decision to 
veil is perceived to occupy an uncomfortably tense region between heteronomy and autonomy.93  
 
Edwards notes that the evidence submitted by the head and deputy head of the school tended to 
codify the jilbab with a ‘fixed and specific meaning’94 by associating it firmly with extremist attitudes. 
She casts doubt on whether Denbigh High School was, in fact, best placed to assess whether the 
jilbab was an unequivocal signifier of Islamic extremism, and notes that this opinion appeared to be 
derived from the opinions of a small group of pupils and two Islamic scholars rather than the school 
itself.95 Edwards also argues that the increasing scope of limitations to the manifestation of rights 
under article 9 seems contrary to the original intention and spirit of the provision, which was ‘to 
defend and uphold’ these rights rather than limit them.96 Vakulenko observes a similar problem, 
noting that the House of Lords’ ruling contained ‘constructions of veiling as dangerous religious 
radicalism’.97  She is also critical of the Lords’ refusal to rule on whether others’ perceptions of the 
jilbab as a threat to moderate Islam were right or wrong, despite upholding Denbigh’s decision to 
ban the garment within its grounds. This is a key point: judges at each stage of this case seemed 
intent on restricting Shabina’s right to religious self-expression in favour of upholding the ‘right’ of 
                                                          
89 Ibid at 529 
90 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9hN-vAb4dQg, retrieved 4 March 2013 
91 Ibid, at 0.50 
92 Ibid, at 4.22 
93 Motha S, Veiled Women and the Affect of Religion in Democracy, (2007) J.L.S 34(1), pp139-62 
94 Edwards, S, Imagining Islam – of meaning and metaphor symbolising the jilbab, C.F.L.Q [2007] 19(2), pp247-
268 at p250 
95 Ibid at p257 
96 Ibid at p259 
97 Vakulenko, Anastasia, Islamic Veiling in Legal Discourse, Routledge, Abingdon, 2012, at p121 
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an ill-defined and unquoted group of pupils to be protected from encountering a garment with the 
dubious potential to offend or otherwise trouble them. Concurring with Edwards, this author would 
argue that it should be an unusual, extreme, and highly provocative matter to legitimately require 
restriction under art.9(2) ECHR, and that Shabina’s request to wear her jilbab to school was none of 
these. 
Edwards also feels that the West often perceives Muslim women as universally oppressed and 
welcomes part of Baroness Hale’s judgment, in which she identified that Muslim girls often wear 
various forms of the veil for different reasons, such as asserting political or religious identity, 
rejecting Western values, or declaring control over their bodies. She goes on to identify what she 
terms ‘a disconcerting trend of religious intolerance’ emerging from Strasbourg jurisprudence, and ‘a 
rising tide of intolerance flowing across Europe’, directed at Muslims and impacting most heavily on 
Muslim women.98 This, she feels, has resulted in a disinclination to tolerate the dress standards of 
Muslim women, designated by the media as ‘multiculturalism’, which serves mainly to victimise and 
marginalise these women. 99 However, Edwards’ support for Baroness Hale’s judgment is 
problematic: as noted earlier in this chapter, Baroness Hale seemed to divide veiled Muslim women 
into those who veil of their own volition, and are therefore acceptable, and those who are forced to 
veil and are unacceptable.  It is unhelpful to suggest that such a dichotomy exists, particularly when 
it implies that one group is both less fortunate and less deserving of societal and legal support than 
the other. 
 
Moreover, it is possible to argue that Shabina lost out regardless of which category she fell into. No 
matter whether her brother was forcing her to wear a jilbab or her school were refusing to educate 
her while she wore one, she missed two years of secondary education and suffered the upheaval of 
lengthy and onerous legal proceedings. It seems reasonable to suggest that, if her school genuinely 
believed she was under pressure to wear a jilbab, the most human-rights-focussed, inclusive, and 
sensible response would be to accept her and educate her in whatever she was wearing rather than 
allowing her education to stall whilst engaging in a battle of wills over an outfit, which would 
theoretically leave her even more open to radicalisation, if indeed that was a factor at play. 
 
Motha makes many of the same points as Edwards with regard to the complex and multiple reasons 
Muslim women choose to wear various forms of the veil, the struggle in the West with the 
boundaries of multiculturalism, and the ‘spurious equivalence’ attributed to Islam and terrorism.100 
                                                          
98 For similar arguments, see Vakulenko, H.R.L.R (2007); Bhandar, J.L.S (2009) 
99 Ibid at p260 
100 Motha, Veiled Women at p140 
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He is, however, more critical of Baroness Hale’s ruling, asserting that, despite her acknowledgment 
of the ‘complexity of agentive decisions on veiling’ made by Muslim women and girls, her reasoning 
is based upon a somewhat limited concept of the significance of autonomous agency.101 Motha 
rightly feels that the choice of a woman to veil can be informed and influenced by any combination 
of political, cultural, religious and societal factors. This is another important point, underlining the 
difficulty of legal involvement in veiling itself: it is an intensely personal and multi-faceted practice, 
making it challenging to legislate or judge objectively. This is especially true for those with a limited 
working knowledge of its intricacies, pertinent examples being the various judges who ruled in 
Begum.  
 
Mikhail is dissatisfied with several aspects of the Lords’ ruling and identified a theme of ‘us and 
them’ in the application of, and perceived right of access to, human rights law.102 He feels that 
several of the judges were unnecessarily critical of Shabina and her family’s assertion of what they 
perceived as her legal rights. As he remarks, the Lords ‘implicitly reprimanded Begum for injecting 
her rights into the dispute, characterising this approach as threatening, intransigent and 
confrontational.’103  Mikhail also notes that the Lords failed to adequately acknowledge that many 
Muslim women choose to veil their bodies with loose clothing in order to avoid being objectified by 
others, or the probability that Shabina had begun to wear a jilbab because she had entered puberty 
and begun to develop breasts and hips which she wished to conceal from the public gaze.   
 
Finally, Mikhail feels that the Lords’ reliance on expressions of opinion by various members of the 
Muslim community fails to take into account the overriding principle emerging from the 
Reformation of the sixteenth century, that no individual should feel obligated to accept the religious 
authority of another. He describes the overarching message of the Lords’ ruling as evasive and 
supportive of double standards, summarising it as  
‘We celebrate human rights, heroic individualism and the stubborn vindication of self-
determination against established legal, political or religious authorities. You, meanwhile, 
should avoid making unnecessary assertions of your so-called ‘rights’, and you must conform 
to the beliefs of whatever religious authorities of yours we choose to recognise.’104 
 
                                                          
101 Ibid at p144 
102 Mikhail, J, Dilemmas of cultural legality: a comment on Roger Cotterell’s ‘The struggle for law’ and a 
criticism of the House of Lords’ opinions in Begum, Int J.L.C 2008, 4(4), 385-393 
103 Ibid at p389 
104 Ibid at p392 
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As we can see, Blair and, to some extent, Scolnikov, have argued that the decision in this case 
represented a positive outcome for Muslim girls and women, on the basis that it may help prevent 
them from those who compel them to cover their bodies or faces against their will. Whilst this 
position has perennial popularity within areas of Britain’s mass media, the author is inclined to 
contend that this argument is paternalistic and fails to acknowledge those women, including Shabina 
herself, who make a free and informed decision to veil. Further, it potentially provides academic 
support to the concept of a ban on aspects of the Islamic veil, to which this author is firmly opposed.   
 
Conversely, Edwards, Motha and Mikhail have argued to varying extents that the judgment in this 
case fails to recognise the deeper meaning behind veiling and is too ready to equate traditional 
Islamic practices with extremist Islamist activity. Whilst Mikhail’s extended argument is, potentially, 
overly inflammatory, all three writers concur that Shabina’s rights in this issue were unfairly and 
unnecessarily restricted in favour of ‘protecting’ her fellow pupils from offence. This is a plausible 
line of argument, reinforced by the authors’ acknowledgment of the variety of reasons Muslim 
choose to veil all or parts of the their bodies,  demonstrating a greater understanding of the 
practice: this author would argue that this understanding is vital in successfully upholding the human 
rights of all UK citizens, rather than merely the majority group. 
 
R (app X) v Y School (2007) 
 
A year after the House of Lords ruled on Shabina Begum’s case, the High Court heard a judicial 
review on a Buckinghamshire secondary school’s refusal to permit a Muslim schoolgirl, referred to 
only as ‘X’, to wear a niqab to school.105 The claimant, in common with Shabina Begum, was resolute 
and emphatic that her interpretation of her religion demanded a certain standard of dress. In this 
case, X believed that once she had reached puberty, she should cover her face with a niqab whilst 
she was at school and being taught by, or likely to be seen by, men. Her three sisters had previously 
attended the same school and all had worn niqabs whilst in lessons with a male teacher.106  
X attended a selective girls’ grammar school which, in common with Denbigh High School, claimed 
that it had designed its uniform policy with the aim of fostering a welcoming and comfortable 
environment, stimulating a sense of identity, equality and cohesion, and reducing social pressures on 
pupils to dress in any particular way.107 It went on to explain that it had taken advice from the local 
                                                          
105 R(on the application of X (by her father and litigation friend) v The Headteachers of Y School, The Governors 
of Y School [2007] EWHC 298 (Admin) 
106 Ibid at p7 
107 Ibid at p65 (quote from evidence submitted by the defendants) 
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county council and several Muslim sources before being satisfied that it had no requirement to 
permit the wearing of a face veil. In addition, the school referred to concerns about the ease and 
effectiveness of teaching whilst a pupil’s face was covered, the potential for security breaches by 
intruders using face veils to disguise themselves, and, in echo of Denbigh’s reasoning, the possibility 
of tacit pressure on other Muslim pupils to adopt the niqab who may otherwise not have chosen to 
wear it. In order to resolve the dispute the school had offered X a small amount of private tutoring in 
core subjects. As an alternative, the local educational authority offered her a place at an equivalent 
school which allowed niqabs to be worn during school hours. She declined both offers with the 
support of her parents. 
 
Judgment (Silber J.) 
In an extension of Lord Bingham’s words in the Begum decision, Silber J emphasised early in his 
ruling that. 
‘[t]his judgment is fact-sensitive and it does not concern or resolve the issue of whether the 
wearing of the niqab should be permitted in the schools of this country. That is not a question 
that a court could or should be asked to resolve. Nothing that appears in this judgment seeks 
to resolve or to throw any light on this problem or the circumstances in which a veil should be 
permitted to be worn in schools or any other arena in this country. Indeed it follows that 
nothing in this judgment is intended to be any comment on the traditions or the requirements 
of the religion of Islam.’108 
This remark makes it evident that the English courts are reluctant to become involved in the wider 
debate surrounding Muslim dress and instead endorse decision-making on such issues at a local 
level. 
In court, X argued that she had a legitimate expectation that the school would permit her to wear 
her niqab when she became a pupil. Furthermore, she contended that she would not have applied to 
Y school had she known it would not permit her to do so, and that there was no good reason for the 
school to change its position on niqabs. Finally, she contended that the school’s refusal to permit her 
to wear her niqab constituted an infringement of her rights under Article 9 ECHR.  
 
                                                          
108 Ibid at p1 
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Rights under Article 9 ECHR 
The school countered that it had not interfered with X’s Article 9 rights, but that even if it had, it 
could rely on article 9(2). It also maintained that its actions satisfied the requirements of 
proportionality.109 This argument relied heavily on Lord Bingham’s reference to Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in Begum, in which he ruled that,  
The Strasbourg institutions have not been at all ready to find an interference with the right to 
manifest religious belief in practice or observance where a person has voluntarily accepted 
an employment or role which does not accommodate that practice or observance and there 
are other means open to the person to practise or observe his or her religion without undue 
hardship or inconvenience …110 
Although  this dicta appeared to resolve the case on the grounds that X had been offered two 
alternative educational options, either of which would have meant she could wear her niqab without 
difficulty, a dispute arose over Lord Bingham’s use of the word ‘voluntarily’. Silber J acknowledged a 
material difference in the facts of the instant case and that of Begum, in that X had enrolled at Y 
school in the expectation that she would be permitted to wear her niqab, whereas Shabina Begum 
enrolled at Denbigh High School in the full knowledge that it did not permit the jilbab.111 
The court held that, although the school’s refusal to allow X to wear a niqab to school had engaged 
her rights under article 9, it did not constitute an actual infringement because she had received an 
offer of a place at an alternative local school of equal educational standing which would allow her to 
wear her niqab. Notwithstanding, Silber J went on to explain that, even if the claimant’s rights under 
article 9 had been engaged, the school’s interference with the rights would have been justified 
under article 9(2), primarily for the method the school used for devising its uniform policy which the 
court found to satisfy the requirements of the three-limb proportionality test.112 He also provided 
some reasoning, with reference to EU case law and the ruling in Begum, to explain the difficulty in 
finding, and reluctance to find, interference with Article 9 rights when the individual had voluntarily 
accepted a role which did not accommodate her preferred manifestation of her beliefs. For instance, 
X was free to attend another school where she would have been free to wear her niqab, without 
                                                          
109 Ibid at p25 
110 Begum [2006] at p23 
111 X v Y [2007] at p29 
112 Ibid at p77, p101 
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undue hardship, and had not submitted as evidence any reason why the alternative school was 
unacceptable to her.113 
Legitimate expectation 
Silber J went on to hold that X’s expectation that she would be allowed by her school to wear a 
niqab was not reasonable and should at best have been uncertain. His reasoning included the fact 
that X’s sister had been the last pupil at the school to wear a niqab and had left 2 years previously, 
and that a new head teacher with much more stringent views on uniform policy had joined the 
school in the meantime.114 He ruled that, even if the school was found to have made a 
representation that niqabs were acceptable, its departure from it was proportionate in the pursuit of 
a legitimate aim (for the reasons outlined above).115 
Finally, the court held that X had no right to expect treatment similar to that of her sisters. Alongside 
pointing out the change in headship and complaints from teachers about the difficulty of teaching 
pupils in niqabs, Silber J pointed out the timescale involved, in which the last of X’s sisters had 
entered Y school in September 1998 whilst X herself had joined in September 2005. He remarks that 
‘The claimant's case seems to assume that since that time, conditions in the world had stood still 
while the evidence of the head teacher shows that matters have moved on with a greater number of 
Muslim girls at the school and increased concern for security.’116  
Commentary 
Although Silber J makes no overt reference to the Al Qaeda attacks on the United States in 
September 2001 and London in July 2005, it is reasonable to conclude that these are the key 
‘matters’ that have instigated the school’s amplified security concerns. It is possible to argue that 
this approach panders to an elevated suspicion and fear of Muslim individuals in the wake of the 
terrorist incidents: surely an exaggerated fear when applied to teenage girls attending secondary 
school. The court’s approach seems very much on the side of the school, with a dismissive attitude 
toward the defendant’s complaint. As in Begum, Silber J underestimates the ease with which X could 
change schools and gives undue weight to the issue of security threats: it seems over-cautious to 
place a blanket ban on a form of religious expression on the basis that it may be used as cover for a 
terrorist attack, with no real grounds to suggest that such an attack was any more than a remote 
possibility. 
                                                          
113 Ibid at p40 
114 Ibid at p106-107 
115 Ibid at p130 
116 Ibid at p135 
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Hill and Sandberg argue that the ruling in Begum provided a poor precedent for the decision in X, 
and that the specific situation rule was overstated and misapplied without question in this decision. 
They go on to remark ‘it is unfortunate that courts have sought artificially to limit the universal 
application of such rights rather than systemically developing an exposition of the qualifications to 
those rights.’117 This argument recognises the flawed way in which courts have attempted to apply 
art.9 ECHR, and acknowledges the trend toward finding reasons to restrict human rights rather than 
uphold them: it is possible to argue that Silber J was bound to follow the precedent set by the higher 
court in Begum, but the author feels that the facts of this case were sufficiently different to those of 
Begum to warrant at least a partial deviation and, potentially, the setting of a more helpful 
precedent. 
 
R(app Watkins-Singh) v Aberdare Girls’ School [2008] 
In contrast to X sits Silber J’s ruling in Watkins-Singh a year later.118 The facts of this case are broadly 
analogous to X and Begum: a Sikh schoolgirl, Sarika Watkins-Singh, had been refused permission to 
wear her steel Kara bangle to school119 on the grounds that it contravened the school’s uniform 
policy, which prohibited jewellery. Sarika had refused to remove the Kara, which she stated was 
important to her religious beliefs, and was taught in isolation for as long as she maintained her 
refusal.  
Judgment (Silber J.) 
In 2008 Silber J held that the school’s refusal to allow Sarika to wear her Kara amounted to indirect 
discrimination under section 71 of the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA), because Sikhs are recognised 
as a race for the purposes of the Act.120 The court distinguished the ruling from those in both Begum 
and X, comparing the narrow steel Kara to the ‘extremely clearly visible and very ostentatious nature 
of the religious dress sought to be worn by the claimants in those cases.’121 Silber J was dismissive of 
                                                          
117 Hill & Sandberg, Is nothing sacred?, at p505. For a similar argument, see Gibson, N, Faith in the courts: 
religious dress and human rights, C.L.J. 2007, 66(3), 657-697, in which he identifies that the approval of 
‘dubious Convention case-law [has created] a precedent which is already being applied’ in reference to X v Y. 
(p669) 
118 R(on the application of Watkins-Singh) v Aberdare Girls’ High School Governors [2008] EWHC 1865 
119 The Kara is one of the Five Ks, symbols of devotion to Sikhism that are accepted as common to all Sikhs: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/sikhism/customs/fiveks.shtml, accessed 24 August 2013 
120 Watkins-Singh v Aberdare at p35, p91: authority for defining Sikhs as a distinct racial group defined by 
ethnic origins can be found in Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 A.C. 548, which held that a school could not refuse 
admittance to a male Sikh pupil on the grounds that his father would not allow him to cut his hair and cease 
wearing a turban. 
121 Ibid at p77 
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the school’s various concerns (social pressures, potential for bullying, the fostering of community 
spirit, and a ‘floodgates’ argument in which it feared other pupils would wish to wear various items 
of jewellery to school if Sarika was permitted to wear her Kara). He opined that the Kara was 
sufficiently small and ‘unostentatious’ to attract much attention and held deep religious significant 
for the claimant.122 He also reminded the school of its obligations under the RRA and its own Racial 
Equality Policy to tackle racial bullying.123  
Finally, the court maintained that requiring a claimant to demonstrate wearing a particular item or 
garment is a mandatory requirement of her religion is too high a standard.124 It is difficult not to 
compare this tolerant and accommodating view with Silber J’s earlier ruling in X, in which he was 
highly supportive of Y School’s reasons for prohibiting the niqab, despite it doing so for largely the 
same reasons that Aberdare Girls’ School attempted to prohibit Sarika’s Kara. Although the Kara is 
far less obvious than either a niqab or a jilbab, as in Begum, the principle of the dispute is identical. 
Whilst the ruling in Watkins-Singh ultimately owed much to the requirements of the RRA and 
established precedent, it is difficult to reconcile Silber J’s lengthy and detailed dismissal of the 
school’s arguments for its refusal to modify its uniform policy with his equally detailed acceptance of 
very similar arguments put forward by Y School in X.  
 
Commentary 
Bhandar argues that France’s secular character125 and the UK’s doctrine of multiculturalism, whilst 
appearing very different, operate similarly by ‘hold[ing] in place unitary, sovereign political 
subjectivity.’126 She feels that the court in X, rather than considering visible manifestations of Islam 
like the niqab as enhancements to plurality and diversity, found them to be ‘too different’.127 This, 
she argues, results in the creation of an ‘acceptable level’ of religious or cultural expression based on 
how visible the expression is.128 Bhandar identifies that the clutch of cases related to Muslim veils 
and a general climate of fear in relation to Islamic extremism contributed to the emergence of an 
attitude that ‘difference was tolerable only in so far as it was palatable to the majoritarian British 
                                                          
122 Ibid at p78 
123 Ibid at pp82-84 
124 Ibid at p89 
125 To be considered in chapter 2 
126 Bhandar, B, The Ties That Bind: Multiculturalism and Secularism  Reconsidered, J.L.S, 2009, 36(3), pp301-326 
at p304  
127 Ibid at p313 
128 Ibid at p314 
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sensibility’:129 an approach by the government and the judiciary of ‘so far and no further’ in relation 
to expressions of religious difference, which also relates to the ruling in Begum, in which the school 
deemed a salwar kameez sufficient to comply with Islamic dress requirements but felt a jilbab was 
excessive and had the potential to incite extremist attitudes.  
This is a shrewd point, identifying the unfamiliar nature of Islamic veils to the British eye as a key 
reason for the level of negativity toward their wearers, both from the judiciary and the media. Hill 
and Sandberg’s argument in relation to Begum and X, in which it was put that the judiciary has 
sought to find reasons to restrict this particular right rather than reasons to uphold it, can be 
extended here. It is possible to argue further that a judge may already hold feelings of distaste or 
disapproval towards veiling prior to hearing the facts of the case, and whether consciously or 
otherwise, seek to manipulate legislation to produce an outcome by which the wearing of the veiling 
garment must be restricted. Whilst in no way doubting the integrity of the judges involved in the 
cases examined in this chapter, the author must at least consider this possibility as an explanation 
for the somewhat tortuous and laboured judgments that they generate. 
 
R(app Playfoot) v Millais School Governing Body [2007] 
Later in 2007, the High Court presided over a further application for judicial review concerning 
religious items worn in school.130 In this case, Lydia Playfoot, a 16-year-old schoolgirl from West 
Sussex, disputed her school’s decision to refuse permission for her to wear a silver ‘purity ring’ on 
her finger whilst on school grounds. The ring symbolised her membership of the quasi-Christian 
organisation Silver Ring Thing, which promotes sexual abstinence until marriage.131 Millais School is 
non-denominational and its uniform policy prohibits the wearing of any jewellery without a specific 
exception, on the grounds of either health and safety, a likely unlawful breach of a pupil’s human 
rights, or ‘where there were exceptional and compelling grounds’.132  
Lydia argued that her school had unlawfully interfered with her right to manifest her religious beliefs 
under Article 9 ECHR, and, because the school permitted Muslim girls to wear headscarves and Sikh 
girls to wear Kara bangles, it had unlawfully discriminated against her, contrary to her rights under 
                                                          
129 Ibid at p315 
130 R(on the application of Lydia Playfoot (A Minor)by her Father and Litigation Friend Philip Playfoot v 
Governing Body of Millais School [2007] EWHC 1698 (Admin) 
131 Silver Ring Thing’s website describes the organisation as ‘a unique para-church youth ministry that 
promotes the message of purity and abstinence until marriage’, http://www.silverringthing.com/whatissrt.asp, 
retrieved 18 March 2013 
132 Playfoot, at H11 
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Article 14 ECHR.133 The court heard that she had worn her ring to school without issue for around a 
year prior to being asked to remove it in summer 2005 as it contravened the uniform policy.134 
Immediately following this incident Lydia’s father wrote to the school’s head teacher to assert his 
support of the purity ring and the values it represented. He also maintained that wearing the ring 
was an expression of Lydia’s personal faith and, as such, was analogous to Muslim pupils wearing 
headscarves.135 
The school, following a meeting with its governors, countered that the purity ring was 
‘representative of a moral stance, not a necessary symbol of Christian faith’,136 and so did not merit 
the same exemption from the uniform policy as headscarves and Kara bangles. It suggested that the 
purity ring was more comparable to charity wristbands, which the governors had previously decided 
pupils were permitted to attach to their bags but not wear on their wrists. Several months later 
Lydia recommenced wearing her purity ring and, with the support of her father, referred the dispute 
to court. 
Judgment 
The court accepted Lydia’s statement that, as part of her Christian faith, she held a sincere belief in 
sexual abstinence until marriage. Consequently, the key questions before the court were whether 
wearing the purity ring was a legitimate manifestation of Lydia’s belief,137 whether preventing her 
from wearing it was an interference of her Article 9 rights, and if so whether the interference was 
justified under article 9(2).138  
It was held that the wearing of the purity ring was not ‘intimately linked’ to a belief in sexual 
abstinence before marriage. Further, because Lydia had not expressed that her belief obliged her to 
wear the ring, it was found that wearing the ring was not a manifestation of that belief for the 
purposes of Article 9. This decision was reached with reference to Lord Hoffman’s dicta in Begum 
(‘Article 9 does not require that one should be allowed to manifest one's religion at any time and 
place of one's own choosing’) and consideration of Strasbourg authority. 
Further, it was held that the school had not interfered with Lydia’s rights under Article 9 for two key 
reasons, which closely echo those decisions reached in both Begum and X. Firstly, because the 
                                                          
133 Article 14 ECHR provides that ‘the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall 
be secured without discrimination on any ground’. 
134 Playfoot, at H6 
135 Ibid, at H7 
136 Ibid, at H8 
137 In contrast to both Begum and X, in which it was uncontested that the jilbab and niqab were legitimate 
manifestations of the Muslim faith and intimately linked to its practice. 
138 Ibid, H18-19 
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school uniform policy was made clear to her and her parents prior to her admission. Secondly, 
because Lydia had other avenues open to her with which to express her beliefs without undue 
hardship: for instance, to attach the ring to her bag with a keyring. 
Commentary 
In a statement issued shortly after the ruling and published on Lydia’s personal blog, she expressed 
her concern that the decision represented the beginning of a gradual prohibition on the expression 
of Christian faith. Lydia also explained her motivation for wearing the ring, outlining her concern at 
the increase in incidences of sexually transmitted infection, pregnancy, and abortion in teenagers, 
and detailed her decision to commit to God and her future husband not to have sex before she was 
married. She maintained her view that Millais School’s refusal to allow her to wear her ring 
constituted an interference of her rights under article 9 ‘in a democratic Christian-based country’ 
and stated that she would consult her legal team about an appeal, which ultimately did not take 
place.139  
The Silver Ring Thing was a relatively new organisation at the time of the case, and its symbolic ring 
is not a widely-known or accepted symbol of Christianity: however, it could be said to have a parallel 
with the wedding rings worn by some Christian nuns to symbolise their union with God, and is 
therefore not an entirely novel item.  
In his consideration of the ruling in Playfoot in the context of various cases concerning religious 
freedom that were heard around the same time, Sandberg notes that, ‘the incorporation of a 
positive right to religious freedom by the Human Rights Act 1998 may not have affected the actual 
decisions reached by the judiciary but it has affected their reasoning.’140 Sandberg doubts the 
application of the law in Playfoot, pointing out that it effectively inverted obiter dicta from the 
House of Lords141 by ruling that, because Lydia was not under any obligation by reason of her faith to 
wear her purity ring, wearing the ring could not be a manifestation of that faith. In fact, Lord 
Nicholls’ ruling in Begum opined that ‘the belief takes the form of a perceived obligation to act in a 
specific way, then, in principle, doing that act pursuant to that belief is itself a manifestation of that 
belief in practice’.142 He then emphasised that the lack of a perceived obligation did not necessarily 
mean that the act was not a manifestation of belief.  
                                                          
139 Lydia Playfoot Silver Ring Thing Internship Diary, entry dated Monday 16 July 2007 (‘Response’), 
http://www.lydiaplayfoot.blogspot.co.uk/, retrieved 20 August 2013 
140 Sandberg, Russell, Recent controversial claims to religious liberty, L.Q.R. 2008, 124(Apr), 213-217 at p214 
141 R(on the application of Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15, 
Lord Nicholls at pp32-33 
142 Ibid, at p32 
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Sandberg goes on to point out that the courts in both Begum and Playfoot misapplied Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in their rulings, by applying the ‘specific situation’ rule to school pupils. He argues that 
the ECtHR has only applied the rule in contractual settings, such as workplaces or universities, and 
that misapplication of the rule by domestic courts has created uncertainty as to its scope.143 He 
concludes that domestic courts are muddying the waters of this area of law ‘by continuing to 
struggle with the semantics of Art.9(1) when a more satisfying and Strasbourg-compliant decision 
could be made by reference to Art.9(2) alone.’144 As discussed previously in this chapter, the 
convoluted way in which courts have attempted to apply this piece of law to cases concerning 
religious dress indicates a desire to suppress pupils’ right to religious expression: Sandberg’s analysis 
throws this argument into sharp focus by outlining a simpler method of application with potential 
for a more liberal outcome. However, it is possible to argue that a liberal outcome is precisely the 
opposite of each court’s preferred outcome, possibly explaining the circuitous route taken through 
art.9 ECHR. 
In her analysis of human rights cases affecting children, Shelley145 points out a potential weakness in 
Lydia’s case: that her father was head of the Silver Ring Thing’s UK campaign. Although the text of 
the ruling makes no reference to his position beyond that of Lydia’s litigation friend, Shelley suggests 
that ‘his role, interest, and suspicions of parental pressure did not assist his daughter's case.’146 
Shelley makes a similar point about the eventual ruling in Begum, noting that Shabina’s brother, who 
acted as both her guardian and eventual litigation friend, ‘had staged a campaign in the local Muslim 
community, including a demonstration outside the school, about the right for female pupils to wear 
full covering.’147 The judges in each stage of Begum noted the brother’s involvement, but attributed 
more levity to Shabina’s capacity to inflict pressure on her fellow pupils by wearing her jilbab than 
her capacity to be pressured by others to wear the garment. Whilst it may be unwise of Shelley to 
engage in conjecture about factors not considered in the judges’ rulings, it is difficult to dismiss her 
point entirely: potentially, the courts did not want to assist in what they may have seen as a father 
or brother of the defendant using his daughter or sister as a pawn to further his own cause. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that both Shabina Begum and Lydia Playfoot made 
emphatic statements regarding the personal significance of their respective items. To dismiss such 
                                                          
143 Sandberg, at p215 
144 Ibid, at p217 
145 Shelley, Catherine, Beating children is wrong, isn’t it? Resolving conflicts in the encounter between religious 
worldviews and child protection, Ecc. L.J. 2013, 15(2), p136 
146 Ibid at p136 
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testimony, by assuming it to be the result of coercion by an older male relative, would be patronising 
to the girls and dismissive of their personal agency. 
Bacquet raises concerns about the courts’ readiness to defer decisions on school uniform to the 
head teacher or governing board, on the grounds that a person or entity close to the school is better 
placed to make such decisions.148 Whilst she concedes that this is true in some situations, she feels it 
may not be appropriate with regard to decisions relating to human rights issues. Furthermore, she 
observes that cases like Playfoot, Begum and X have caused school governing bodies to make 
decisions on what does and does not constitute a valid symbol of faith: an issue which she describes 
as ‘extremely sensitive[…] on which there is no general consensus.’149 The ‘expert evidence’ relied 
upon in Begum, for example, demonstrates that even a small sample of Muslim authorities drawn 
from the Greater London area cannot agree on how far girls should cover themselves to comply with 
the standard of hijab. It seems, therefore, inadvisable to allow such decisions to be made by school 
staff when devising school uniform policies. 
 
Governmental advice on uniform guidelines 2007 
Following the House of Lords ruling in Begum [2006], Steve Sinnott, General Secretary of the Nation 
Union of Teachers issued a press release welcoming the clarity brought by the ruling but criticising 
the government for previously failing to provide guidance on school uniform policies. He felt it was 
‘vital that something as sensitive as the issue of religious belief and school uniform should not be the 
subject of further legal proceedings.’150  
Consultation 
In March 2007, the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF)151 issued for consultation a 
set of non-statutory guidelines concerning school uniform.152 As of October 2015, there is no 
legislation dealing specifically with school uniforms or dress codes.  
Section 4 of the guidelines addressed the recommended process for a school governing body when 
setting its uniform policy. It advises: consideration of groups of pupils who may be affected 
                                                          
148 Bacquet, S, School uniforms, religious symbols and the Human Rights Act 1998: the ‘Purity Ring’ case, 
(March 2008) , Education Law Journal, 2008, U of Westminster School of Law Research Paper no 08-05, at p4 
149 Ibid at p7 
150 Press release: Monday March 27 2006, http://www.teachers.org.uk/node/1937, accessed 31.07.13 
151 Replaced in 2010 by the Department for Education (DfE) 
152 DCSF Guidance to Schools on School Uniform and Related Policies, available via 
https://www.education.gov.uk/consultations/index.cfm?action=conResults&consultationId=1468&external=n
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adversely by any particular part of a uniform policy; weighing the needs and concerns of different 
groups against each other to explore whether they can be practically met, with reference to 
considerations of security, effective learning, protection from external pressure to dress in a certain 
way, and promotion of a cohesive and inclusive school identity; and full documentation of the 
consultation process. 
It evident that much of this guidance takes its cue from the rulings in Begum, X and Playfoot: for 
instance, Begum considered the potential for Muslim pupils feeling pressure to adopt a style of dress 
associated with more extreme Islamic groups. Similarly, X raised concerns about the difficulty in 
identifying or engaging with veiled pupils; and all three rulings drew attention to the importance of a 
consistent uniform in building equality and cohesion within a school.  
The document goes on to explain the responsibility of schools to be mindful of the Human Rights 
Act, in which it paraphrases Lord Hoffman in Begum [2006] (‘…schools should note that the freedom 
to manifest a religion or belief does not mean that an individual has the right to manifest their 
religion or belief at any time, in any place, or in any particular manner.’)153 It states,  
‘a school uniform policy that has the effect of restricting the freedom of pupils to manifest 
their religion may still be lawful, so long as this interference with pupils’ rights is justified on 
grounds specified in the Human Rights Act’,154  
And, 
 ‘each case will always depend on the circumstances of the particular school. So the 
judgements do not mean that banning such religious dress will always be justified, nor that 
such religious dress cannot be worn in any school in England. It is for a school to determine 
what sort of uniform policy is appropriate for it.’155  
This advice, taken in its totality, appears somewhat vague and succeeds in delegating responsibility 
for an element of both statutory and religious interpretation to school managers and governors: as 
discussed above, this may well not be effective or appropriate. 
 
 
                                                          
153 Ibid, at section 20 
154 Ibid, at section 21 
155 Ibid, at section 21 
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Consultation response 
DfES released its response to the consultation paper in summer 2007,156 claiming a generally positive 
welcome to the new guidance.157 However, a closer reading of the response demonstrates that a 
significant proportion of the respondents have serious reservations about the potential effectiveness 
of the new guidance. Initially, it should be noted that these guidelines were intended to apply to 
nearly every school and school pupil in the UK, and so a consultation response of 232 is unlikely to 
be sufficiently representative. In addition, the reported ‘positive response’ of just over 50% suggests 
more of a lukewarm, than an overall positive, response. Furthermore, the response document 
reveals that substantial sections of the respondents raised concerns that the guidance was too open 
to interpretation and nuance, not sufficiently clear or too vague, and fostered the potential for 
unwitting discrimination against pupils. There also appeared to be a concern that the guidance left 
schools with too much responsibility for researching and interpreting their obligations under human 
rights legislation. 
DfES is dismissive of these concerns, pointing to the obligations for schools to act reasonably in 
accommodating religious garments and comply with their obligations under HRA contained within 
the guidance. However, it goes on to explain that ‘restricting the freedom of pupils to manifest their 
religion may be lawful, so long as this interference with pupils’ rights is justified on grounds specified 
in the Human Rights Act.’ It is possible to argue that the provisions of the HRA are themselves open 
to interpretation, and that it may not be desirable to delegate the interpretation of key legislation to 
non-legal bodies or individuals. 
Commentary 
Bacquet is critical of the guidelines, noting that they are non-binding on schools, excessively general 
in scope, and allow individual schools to interpret legislation in their own way. This, she feels, has led 
to schools becoming ‘arbiters of faith’ and ‘will inevitably result in more litigation.’158 She argues that 
this responsibility should be shifted away from schools and suggests a more satisfactory result could 
be achieved by the establishment of a national body to ensure state school uniform policies comply 
with the schools’ requirements under ECHR and HRA 1998. Bacquet concludes by identifying the 
                                                          
156 DfES Guidance to Schools on Uniform Related Policies – Consultation Results, available via 
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current inclination to devolve responsibility onto school governing bodies and appears sceptical that 
this will change in the near future.159 
The Department for Education (DfE)’s current non-statutory guidance on school uniforms,160 which 
was issued in September 2013 and is due for review in summer 2015, places its main emphasis on 
the sourcing, availability and cost of school uniforms. With respect to the issue of accommodating 
pupils who wish to incorporate items of religious or cultural significance into their uniform, the DfE 
recommends that the governing body should 
‘consider carefully reasonable requests to vary the policy, in particular to meet the needs of 
any individual pupil to accommodate their religion or belief, ethnicity, disability or other 
special considerations’ and ‘consider carefully the risk of a challenge to the policy and 
consider appropriate insurance cover.’ 
This advice presumably takes its cue from the protracted legal action that ensued when Denbigh 
High School refused to allow Shabina Begum to wear her jilbab, and from the other cases that 
followed: a realisation of Bacquet’s concern that the government devolved too much responsibility 
for interpretation of human rights legislation onto schools and governing boards. 
In the short section ‘Human Rights, Equality and Discrimination Considerations’,161 the DfE offers 
examples of ways in which pupils may feel obliged to outwardly manifest a particular belief, such as 
‘wearing or carrying specific religious artefacts, not cutting their hair, dressing modestly or covering 
their head’. The final two examples are most pertinent to this thesis, and whilst covering the face is 
not mentioned, it could easily be interpreted to fall under either ‘dressing modestly’ or ‘covering the 
head’. The section goes on to paraphrase Lord Hoffmann in Begum [2006] (‘Article 9 does not require 
that one should be allowed to manifest one's religion at any time and place of one's own 
choosing’),162and references the Equality Act 2010. The next paragraph essentially explains schools’ 
responsibilities in balancing the rights of individual pupils against those of the school community, 
but gives no real advice on how this is to be achieved apart from stating, ‘it should be possible for 
most religious requirements to be met within a school uniform policy and a governing body should 
                                                          
159 Ibid at p 8 
160 Department for Education, School Uniform: Guidance for governing bodies, school leaders, school staff and 
local authorities, September 2013, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/269113/school_uniform_gui
dance_2013.pdf, last viewed 07.04.15 
161 Ibid at p6 
162 Begum [2006] at p50 
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act reasonably through consultation and dialogue in accommodating these.’163 In light of the 
difficulty in resolving Begum, X, and Playfoot, this remark does not seem entirely satisfactory: if only 
‘most’ religious requirements can be met, which ones cannot? How should the governing body 
decide what constitutes a requirement, bearing in mind, for example, the lack of consensus amongst 
Muslims as to whether the face should be covered or not? And if what an individual pupil perceives 
to be her right is at odds with what the governing body perceive as the best interests of the school 
community, which party has its right upheld? 
 
Rather than attempt to provide detailed guidance for such matters, the DfE instead advises that 
‘disputes about school uniforms should be resolved locally and should be pursued in accordance 
with the school’s complaints policy’, stipulating that there should be a simple way for parents to 
raise a complaint and that the governing body should work with the parents to reach a ‘mutually 
acceptable outcome’, whilst being willing to ‘consider reasonable requests for flexibility[…]to 
accommodate particular social and cultural circumstances.’164 Although still somewhat non-
committal in content, this advice does encourage schools to resolve their own problems and should 
result in more beneficial outcomes than those achieved from the clutch of cases discussed above. In 
Begum, especially, the issue was exacerbated by the lack of dialogue between the school and 
Shabina and her family: had both parties taken the opportunity to sit down together, explain their 
relative positions and try to reach an agreement, possibly with the support of an impartial mediator, 
the matter could well have been resolved much more quickly, without recourse to legal action and 
the consequent damage to Shabina’s education. 
Although it can be argued that the DfE’s guidance is not entirely satisfactory, it should be noted that, 
as of April 2015, there have been no significant cases concerning direct challenges to school uniform 
policies since Watkins-Singh in 2008. Whether this can be attributed to the success of the DfE’s 
guidelines, to the defeat in court of Shabina Begum, X, and Lydia Playfoot, or to a combination of the 
two factors is debatable.  
 
Veiling in the workplace: Eweida and Others v the UK (2013) 
 
A ruling handed down by the European Court of Human Rights in January 2013 further illustrates 
Strasbourg’s reluctance to permit individual religious or ideological convictions to prevail over 
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prescribed uniform policies. Two of the claims in Eweida and Others v the UK165 concerned women 
whose workplaces had refused permission for them to wear religious symbols during work: in both 
cases, a cross on a chain worn visibly round the neck. Shirley Chaplin, who was a nurse on a geriatric 
ward in an NHS hospital and Nadia Eweida, who worked on a British Airways check-in desk, both 
argued that their employers’ refusal infringed their rights under article 9, both alone and in 
conjunction with article 14. Both women had appealed to employment tribunals which rejected their 
claims, and Eweida had unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeal, which reiterated Lord 
Bingham’s objections as outlined in Begum. In addition, both employers had offered the women 
alternative positions without contact with patients (in Shirley’s Chaplin’s case) or customers (in 
Nadia Eweida’s case), which they had declined.  
 
Eweida argued that, ‘[n]o other fundamental right was subjected to the doctrine that there would be 
no interference where it was possible for the individual to avoid the restriction, for example by 
resigning and finding another job, nor should an individual be considered to have “waived” his or her 
rights by remaining in employment.’166 She felt that the availability or otherwise of appropriate 
means to avoid a restriction on this right should be considered under article 9(2), rather than used as 
grounds of a finding of no interference. 
 
The ECtHR held, although BA’s uniform policy in and of itself did not constitute an interference with 
Miss Eweida’s rights under article 9, ‘that a fair balance was not struck’167 between her fundamental 
right to manifest her religious convictions and BA’s desire to project a particular corporate image. It 
felt that BA’s interests were ‘accorded […] too much weight’168 by the UK courts, and pointed out 
that its corporate image had not been damaged by permitting other employees to wear religious 
garments including turbans and headscarves. Further, the court held that BA had amended its 
uniform policy fairly readily following Miss Eweida’s claim and the attendant negative publicity, so 
doubted the ‘crucial importance’169 of the ban on religious garments or symbols in the first place.  
 
Chaplin posited that the UK court had set too high a bar for finding a religious practice worthy of 
protection under article 9.170 She felt that the court attempted to distinguish between 
‘requirements’ and ‘non-requirements’ of a religion, which would ultimately offer greater protection 
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to religions with specific rules for their adherents (for example, the practice of hijab for Muslims, or 
the wearing of the Five Ks for Sikhs) and less protection to those without (such as Christianity). In 
addition, she felt that her employer, and subsequently the court, attached undue magnitude to the 
purported risks to patient and staff health and safety as a result of her cross. A large part of the 
NHS’s case against Mrs Chaplin’s wearing of her cross concerned its significant size and weight, and 
the potential risk of a confused or disturbed patient grabbing the pendant, thereby risking injury to 
themselves or to Mrs Chaplin: equally, there was concern that the cross could come into contact 
with an open wound, increasing the risks of infection and cross-contamination. In fact, the ECtHR 
conceded that ‘no evidence was adduced before the Employment Tribunal to demonstrate that 
wearing the cross caused health and safety problems’,171 which Chaplin argued represented a breach 
of her rights under article 14.  
 
Notwithstanding, ECtHR felt that the health and safety concerns of the NHS trust outweighed Mrs 
Chaplin’s preferred method of religious expression. It additionally cited that the Mrs Chaplin’s 
employer, as a public hospital, ‘must be allowed a wide margin of appreciation’172 in terms of 
assessing what does or does not pose a health and safety risk. Further, the court pointed out that 
the trust’s refusal to permit Mrs Chaplin to wear her cross was not unprecedented: within the same 
hospital, another Christian nurse had been refused permission to wear a cross on a chain, two Sikh 
nurses had been refused permission to wear a kara bangle, and there was an accepted ban on 
‘flowing’ hijabs173 (whereas tight-fitting sports-style hijabs were permitted). The court was satisfied 
that the trust had offered Mrs Chaplin suitable alternative methods to wear her cross (as a brooch, 
or tucked inside a high-necked top worn under her V-necked uniform, both of which she found 
unacceptable), and held that the trust’s approach was not disproportionate in the circumstances.174  
 
Although this ruling represented a defeat for Mrs Chaplin, it could be argued that she appeared 
exceptionally unwilling to compromise with her employer, despite being offered a number of 
reasonable solutions. This aspect of the case sets it aside from Nadia Eweida’s complaint and from 
Begum and X, in which compromise did not seem to be an option for either complainant or 
defendant. It should be noted that, whilst Nadia Eweida’s job was primarily desk-based and her cross 
was described by the court as ‘small and discreet’, Shirley Chaplin’s cross was significantly larger, 
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worn on a longer chain, and her job involved caring for elderly hospital patients, a role in which the 
wearing of any jewellery is discouraged, much less large pieces which move and swing freely. 
 
Hill was generally supportive of the decision, noting that the Court’s ruling that an action only has to 
be intimately linked with a religion, rather than expressly mandated, in order to qualify for article 9 
protection ‘means that dress code policies which only permit items to be worn that are a strict 
religious requirement will be unduly narrow.’175 Going further, this ruling may inform future cases to 
prevent the over-reliance on so-called expert evidence seen in Begum: it would have been difficult 
to argue that the jilbab, or indeed the niqab, are not ‘intimately linked’ with Islam, regardless of the 
spectrum of opinion concerning whether they are demanded by the Koran. 
 
Ladele v Islington,176 another case considered by ECtHR at the same time as Eweida and Chaplin, was 
discussed in some depth by Malik in 2011. Although the subject matter of this case sits outside the 
scope of this thesis, the general principle – the tension between the ideals of a liberal society and 
the beliefs of the religious – is applicable. Malik notes that ‘although liberal societies guarantee 
freedom of religion and belief, they seem to do so from a position of superiority where the 
framework and terms of the debate are unilaterally dictated by secular liberalism.’177 This point can 
be applied to all of the cases discussed in this chapter: each time, the claimant’s behaviour resides 
somewhere beyond the boundaries of ‘normality’, effectively Othering her in a judicial sense when 
she is already Other in terms of gender, culture, religion, and in some cases Other within the scope 
of her own religious or cultural community (what Malik terms ‘minorities within minorities’,178 for 
example, Shabina Begum’s jilbab was apparently considered extremist by other Muslim pupils at 
Denbigh High).  
 
This observation encapsulates the immensity of the force levelled against the claimants in these 
cases, and forces one to consider whether they ever had a hope of meaningful success in their 
claims. Shrewdly, Malik argues that the conflict in Ladele was most likely created by a failure of 
management to effectively resolve the dispute,179 and recommends better workplace training and 
management, and the use of mediation or other alternative dispute resolution techniques rather 
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than ‘the all or nothing structure of litigation which sours relations between the two parties.’180 This 
is particularly relevant to the school uniform cases, in which the claimants generally lost significant 
portions of secondary education, presumably including many of the social and extra-curricular 
aspects of a state school education. 
 
On the question when an interference with article 9 will be found, the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission submitted that the courts in the United Kingdom have, in effect, guaranteed different 
levels of protection for individuals asserting a purely religious identity as opposed to those whose 
religious and racial identities are intertwined.181 This point can be traced back to Watkins-Singh 
[2008], which ruled that manifestations of Sikhism in the form of worn articles were sufficient to 
warrant exemption from the school uniform policy because Sikhs are defined as a racial group, as 
well as a faith, in UK law. Conversely, neither Christians nor Muslims are recognised as discrete racial 
groups and the case law examined in the ‘Schools’ section of this chapter demonstrates that they 
have not so far been successful in legal challenges to uniform policy.  It is to be hoped that Eweida 
has set a more equitable precedent, securing protection for all citizens who wish to wear an outward 
symbol of their religion or faith except for where there are compelling and reasonable grounds to 
insist on a compromise. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The case law discussed above reveals the profound way in which the British judiciary has struggled 
to understand the concept of veiling. It has persistently attempted to establish precisely what 
constitutes ‘sufficient’ coverage to comply with hijab, and what is excessive and therefore could 
legitimately be restricted, all whilst generally failing to give adequate credence to the views of the 
women and girls directly involved and affected. Instead, it is possible to argue that it has contorted 
human rights legislation in order to arrive at legally tenuous decisions which disproportionately 
restrict the rights of women and ethnic minorities. 
 
It is impossible to under-emphasise that, in each of the cases outlined above, the claimant was in a 
significantly less powerful position than the defendant, both in terms of relationship (either school – 
pupil or employer – employee) and by dint of her gender and race in a predominately white 
patriarchal society. When collated in the context of the various cases above, these facts contribute 
                                                          
180 Ibid at p38 
181 Eweida at p77 
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to an overarching narrative of veiling as a negative, even distasteful practice, which Muslim women 
and girls either have forced upon them or blindly follow without thought for the implications on 
themselves or others, and from which they must be ‘rescued’. One of the chief outcomes of this 
narrative is to suppress the voices of Muslim women, both literally and symbolically, by attempting 
to restrict their sartorial manifestation of religious belief, and replace them with damaging 
stereotypes of oppression and extremism. In a broader sense, this may perpetuate discord at the 
intersection between white Western women, who are primarily at liberty to dress however they like, 
and Muslim women, who have to struggle to achieve or maintain the same privilege. 
 
The ruling in Eweida and Others stands out amongst the other cases for its more logical decision, and 
it is perhaps unfortunate that none of the cases concerning Muslim garments reached ECtHR for 
fuller consideration. It should be reiterated that there do not appear to have been any legal 
challenges regarding the wearing of Muslim garments within UK schools since the introduction of 
the DfE’s uniform guidelines, although it is difficult to know whether this can be attributed directly 
to the success of the guidelines, to a growth in more liberal attitudes toward Islamic dress, or even 
to schools’ apprehension over potential legal proceedings. Ironically, further disputes and challenges 
may be an opportunity to improve the legal position here: as illustrated by the various academic 
literature discussed above, there are fundamental faults in much of the reasoning employed by 
courts at all levels, misapplications of legal principles, and flaws in understanding of the practice of 
veiling. Much of this literature exemplifies the weakness of the precedent set in Begum and makes a 
number of suggestions for improvements: a fresh challenge would be welcomed, certainly by the 
academic community, as a chance to correct this unfortunate area of law. 
 
The chief effect of this collection of cases occurring over a relatively short time span, in the years 
directly following the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 and the United States’ ‘War on Terror’, 
was to convey the issue of Islamic veiling to the forefront of public attention. As we will see in the 
following chapter, this increase in awareness led to sporadic bouts of intense focus on the part of 
the British press, coupled with attempts by various political figures to insert themselves into the 
debate, a Private Members’ Bill proposing the banning of any veil which covered the face, and a 
campaign by a right-wing political party to ‘ban the burka’. 
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Chapter 3: ‘Un-British’? Discussing the UK’s debate on veiling 
Introduction 
A key theme that emerged in the previous chapter was the reluctance of courts at all levels to make 
recommendations, beyond the facts of the instant case, as to the legal position of wearing religious 
items. This reticence left the subject wide open to debate. Additionally, the proliferation of cases 
involving very similar issues over a relatively short span of time, coupled with the blanket media 
coverage of Al Qaeda activity, seemed to associate face veiling directly with Islamist terrorism and 
gave it, arguably, more prominence than necessary.   This chapter will consider the involvement of 
political figures and parties in the issue of Islamic veiling in the UK, with specific reference to the 
positions of Labour MP Jack Straw and of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). It will 
explore the origins of these positions, the extent and tone of associated media coverage, and 
relevant academic commentary where available. Additionally, there will be an examination of the 
ultimately unsuccessful Private Member’s Bill, Face Covering (Regulation) Bill 2010 and its 
provisions, followed by a summary of political and media responses to the bill. Finally, this chapter 
will consider an unusual incident occurring in September 2013, in which a criminal court judge held 
that a defendant must remove her niqab whilst giving evidence in court, and will assess the ensuing 
media coverage of the matter. 
 
Political and Academic Commentary: a Survey of Views 
 
In October 2006, shortly after the House of Lords ruling in Begum and the events leading up to X v Y 
School, the then Home Secretary Jack Straw joined the debate over veiling. In his weekly column for 
the Lancashire Evening Telegraph, the local newspaper for his Blackburn constituency, he described 
his practice of asking veiled Muslim women to remove their face-coverings when they attended his 
surgery.182 Mr Straw reveals his distaste for veiling with the remark, ‘…this is a country built on 
freedoms. I defend absolutely the right of any woman to wear a headscarf. As for the full veil, 
wearing it breaks no laws.’183  
 
Straw’s comment almost impeccably contradicts itself. It first reinforces the freedom of expression 
enshrined within UK law and offers fervent support to women who choose to wear headscarves, 
                                                          
182  ‘I felt uneasy talking to someone I couldn’t see’, October 6 2006. Retrieved via The Guardian (no longer 
available through original source), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/oct/06/politics.uk, 
accessed Sat 11 May 2013 
183 Ibid 
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then virtually dismisses those who elect to wear face veils, their only saving grace that they are not 
actually breaking the law. Straw goes on to note that he ‘can't recall a single occasion when the lady 
concerned refused to lift her veil; and most I ask seem relieved I have done so’,184 indicating a 
preconception that all veiled women cover their faces reluctantly and under sufferance. He further 
reinforces this impression by a description of a specific incident of asking a constituent to remove 
her veil, in which he expresses surprise that ‘the husband had played no part in her decision. She 
explained she had read some books and thought about the issue. She felt more comfortable wearing 
the veil when out. People bothered her less.’185 Ultimately, he challenged this particular woman on 
the grounds that ‘many Muslim scholars said the full veil was not obligatory at all’, but advised her 
that he would consider her points. This attitude illustrates Bhandar’s view that ‘differences that 
challenge the boundaries of the sovereign political subject are perceived as a threat to be contained 
and managed.’186 It is disappointing that Straw felt it necessary to argue with his constituent even 
after she explained to him her reasoning and motivation for wearing her niqab, which, after all, she 
was under no obligation to do. In this way, Straw appears to place himself as some kind of authority 
on the requirements of hijab, refusing to fully concede even to a well-read Muslim woman on the 
point, and instead attempting to rescue her from the confines of her veil. 
Straw’s column subsequently attracted a huge amount of debate and media interest, both adverse 
and supportive. In a press conference, the then Prime Minister Tony Blair was critical of the practice 
of veiling but planted his opinion in the field of concern for community cohesion, remarking, ‘It is a 
mark of separation and that is why it makes other people from outside the community feel 
uncomfortable. No-one wants to say that people don't have the right to do it. That is to take it too 
far. But I think we need to confront this issue about how we integrate people properly into our 
society.’187 Speaking on Radio 4’s Today programme, Salman Rushdie remarked that ‘speaking as 
somebody with a very large Muslim family, there’s not a single woman I know who would have 
accepted wearing the veil…I think the veil is a way of taking power away from women.’188 
On the other side of the debate, the Guardian’s David Edgar noted ‘Now many people who defend 
free expression to the death want to stop other people wearing what they want, in order to protect 
                                                          
184 Ibid 
185 Ibid 
186 Bhandar, The Ties That Bind, at p304 
187 Reported by BBC News, 17 October 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6058672.stm, accessed 
15 May 2013 
188 Gledhill, Ruth, Muslim veils suck, Rushdie says, The Times, 11 October 2006 p13 
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themselves from cultural offence.’189 He goes on to reflect on the paradox of liberal-minded people 
defending what they see as illiberal practices in the name of freedom of expression, remarking  
‘we are having to defend things we disapprove of, such as the glorification of terrorism or, 
indeed, calls for censorship. The conundrum that one of the things liberals have to tolerate is 
intolerance hasn't needed to be at the forefront of debates on free expression before. It is 
now, and it should be.’190  
This argument encapsulates the difficulty veiling seems to cause in UK politics: there is a perception 
that veiling is forced upon women by powerful men such as political or religious leaders, their 
husbands and families, so some UK politicians believe they can and should ‘release’ women from 
their perceived obligation to veil by attempting to force them to unveil. This approach to the issue 
has some parallels with the way in which women who are raped or suffer domestic violence are 
often treated by the judiciary: for instance, a victim will often be asked why she did not leave her 
abusive husband, or what she was wearing when she was raped. This approach lays a significant 
amount of responsibility at the victim’s feet and, whether intentionally or not, paints the male 
perpetrator as an unfortunate and helpless slave to his own urges. If parties calling for a ban on 
veiling the face genuinely believe that all veiled women veil only because their husbands or fathers 
force them to do so, it would seem more sensible to call for a law preventing any man from coercing 
any woman into wearing something against her will than to attempt to criminalise the woman for 
wearing the garment. 
Shortly after the publication of Straw’s remarks, Professor Eric Barendt gave an interview on 
freedom of expression.191 One of the key points of the interview was the media commotion over 
various controversial cartoons published earlier that year depicting Mohammed and Ariel Sharon in 
a less than reverent manner. Barendt compared Mr Straw’s remarks to the cartoons, and 
commented that both helped instigate, in their own way, a debate which ought to be taken 
seriously. He went on to remark,  
‘We have difficulties in understanding the Muslim religion and their religious sensitivities, just 
as they find it hard to accept our easy going philosophy of freedom of discussion and I think 
                                                          
189 Edgar, David, Sorry, but we can’t just pick and choose what to tolerate, The Guardian, 11 October 2006, 
accessed via http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/oct/11/immigration.comment, retrieved 21 
May 2013 
190 Ibid 
191 Martino, Tony, In conversation with Professor Eric Barendt: hatred, ridicule, contempt and plain bigotry, Ent. 
L.R. 2007, 18(2), 48-55 
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the only way in which we can approach each other is to be prepared to discuss these 
issues.’192  
Barendt raises a valid point here, especially taking into account the significant Muslim population in 
Europe and North America. It is possible to argue that Jack Straw’s approach was somewhat clumsy. 
However, the sheer volume of coverage given by the media to what was, after all, merely a 
politician’s weekly column in a small local newspaper, suggests a sense of relief amongst 
commentators that it had become acceptable to discuss the specific issue of veiling and, in context, 
the wider issue of Islam in the UK. 
A week after Straw’s column was published, the research company Ipsos MORI conducted a poll on 
behalf of ITV.193 The poll asked 1,023 UK adults about their views on veiling. Its summary of 
conclusions notes that ‘the majority of the public think Muslim women are segregating themselves 
by wearing a veil (61%) and they [veils] are a clear statement of separation and difference (59%)’.194 
However, it fails to draw specific attention to other conclusions: for instance, 77% of respondents 
agreed that Muslim women have the right to wear a veil, 74% stated that they understood why 
some Muslim women wear a veil, and 60% agreed that children should be allowed to wear Islamic 
dress in schools. This bias in headlining suggests a slight alignment with the reactions to Straw’s 
article published by the more right-wing press.195 In many ways, the media must accept some 
responsibility for stimulating and fuelling the controversy over veiling. 
 
The Face Covering (Regulation Bill) 2010-12 
 
In 2010, Conservative backbencher Phillip Hollobone sponsored the Face Covering (Regulation) Bill 
2010-12 (‘the Bill’). The Bill was drawn seventeenth out of twenty in the Private Members’ Bill ballot 
and primarily followed France’s Ban in its remit and extent (see chapter 3). The initial text of the Bill 
recommends that ‘a person wearing a garment or other object intended by the wearer as its primary 
                                                          
192 Ibid at p52 
193 Muslim Women Wearing Veils, http://www.ipsos-
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/315/Muslim-Women-Wearing-Veils.aspx, accessed 11 May 
2013 
194 Ibid 
195 In particular, the Daily Express, whose front page for 21 October 2006 showed a photograph of a woman 
wearing a niqab and abaya, with the headline ‘BAN IT! The veil is outlawed even by some Arab countries so why 
must we put up with it here?’, 
http://www.ukpressonline.co.uk/ukpressonline/open/simpleSearch.jsp;jsessionid=8589F2166045AC01CE3D1C
C4046EBEE2?is=1, accessed 11 May 2013 
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purpose to obscure the face in a public place shall be guilty of an offence.’196 The Bill goes on to 
make exceptions to the proposed offence, the first four of which mirror those enacted in France’s 
Ban. Further, one of the remaining two exceptions within the Bill (‘in a place of worship’197) is 
covered differently by the Ban, which does not classify places of worship as public places.198 The final 
exception contained within the Bill does not reflect its French counterpart: it specifies that ‘a person 
does not commit an offence under subsection (1) [above] if the garment or other object is worn for 
the purposes of art, leisure, or entertainment.’199  
 
It is impossible to know how broadly or narrowly this exception is intended to be interpreted, 
because the Bill was not read in Parliament as scheduled on 3 February 2012 and ultimately failed to 
complete its passage into the statute books.200 However, in common with the Ban, it appears from 
this extensive list of exceptions that Hollobone primarily intended the Bill to criminalise the wearing 
of Islamic veils rather than face-covering garments in general. 
 
Hollobone was something of a lone voice in Parliament with regard to this issue. During a debate on 
immigration and immigrant issues in Westminster Hall on 2 February 2010, he interjected with some 
remarks concerning the growing immigrant population of the UK. He then turned his attention to 
what he described as ‘the burka’ (presumably meaning the niqab), remarking that ‘I must say that I 
have huge sympathy with those who want action taken against people who want to cover 
themselves up in public’ and ‘it is the religious equivalent of going around with a paper bag over 
your head with two holes for the eyes. In my view, it is offensive to want to cut yourself off from 
face-to-face contact with, or recognition by, other members of the human race.’201 In addition, he 
remarked that ‘part of the British way of life is that you smile at people you pass in the street, wave, 
say hello – you can’t do that if you can’t see somebody’s face. I think there’s a traditional mistrust in 
                                                          
196 Face Coverings (Regulation) Bill 2010 s.1(1) 
197 Ibid at s.1(3)(f) 
198 ‘Q: Is it prohibited to conceal one’s face in places of worship? A: Wearing clothes which conceal the face is 
not prohibited in places of worship when they are prescribed for religious reasons and accepted as such by the 
person responsible for the premises. In other situations, the specific regulations for public order in places of 
worship apply, under which the police can only intervene at the request of the religious leaders present.’ 
French Embassy, Burka Ban – FAQs, http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Burka-ban-FAQs, retrieved February 2 
2012. 
199 Ibid at s.1(3)(e) 
200 UK Parliament website, http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-12/facecoveringsregulation.html, retrieved 
May 31 2012  
201 Daily Hansard, Westminster Hall 2 Feb 2010 column 12WH, accessed via 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm100202/halltext/100202h0002.htm#1002
0246000536, retrieved February 3 2012 
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this country of people covering their face.’202 It is possible that Hollobone refers here to the IRA’s 
practice of wearing balaclavas, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. However, it is something of a 
stretch to describe this as a ‘traditional mistrust’, bearing in mind the practice was most visible as 
recently as the 1980s. In fact, there is evidence that veiling the face has sporadically emerged as a 
fashion statement in the UK over the last few centuries, as explained in Chapter 1 of this thesis.  
 
Hollobone’s remarks, taken as a whole, denote a somewhat rose-tinted view of modern UK society 
that does not take into account the country’s reputation for moderacy and open-mindedness. 
Further, as a government minister, he is unusually well-placed to help influence a change to any 
‘mistrust’ of people who cover their faces, rather than reinforcing the attitude. None of the other 
ministers who were engaged in the debate on 2 February 2010 appeared to acknowledge 
Hollobone’s remarks about the ‘burka’, nor referred to them later in the debate. However, when the 
BBC reported the debate it quoted Ed Balls (then Secretary of State for Schools, Children and 
Families), who remarked that it ‘is not British’ to tell people what to wear in the street,203 and noted 
that Hollobone’s views mirror those of the far-right United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).  
Hollobone’s phrasing (he wants ‘action taken against’ women who choose to veil their faces) 
suggests he views the practice of veiling as on a par with criminal offences rather than a personal 
choice or an overt expression of religious and cultural identity. Later in 2010, the then Environment 
Secretary Caroline Green commented,  
‘I take a strong view on this, actually, that I don't, living in this country, as a woman, want to 
be told what I can and can't wear. That's something which both myself and (community 
cohesion minister Baroness) Sayeeda Warsi have argued very strongly, that one of the things 
we pride ourselves on in this country is being free - and being free to choose what you wear is 
a part of that. So actually banning the burka is absolutely contrary, I think, to what this 
country is all about.’204 
The Minister’s remarks indicate a clear disdain for Hollobone’s proposals, and have the political 
effect of condemning, not veiling, but the Bill itself as intolerant and contrary to ‘the British way of 
life’. 
                                                          
202 BBC news  30 June 2010, accessed via http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10465209, viewed April 11 2013 
203 BBC News 2 February 2010, accessed via http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8494285.stm, retrieved 
February 3 2012.  
204 Damian Green says burka ban would be ‘un-British’, BBC News 18 July 2010, accessed via 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10674973, retrieved 21 May 2013 
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United Kingdom Independence Party campaign 
At the time the Bill was progressing through Parliament, UKIP was the only UK political party 
campaigning for a ban on veiling in public places205, on the grounds that it is a security risk, not 
proscribed by the Koran, and is symbolic of Islamic extremism.206 UKIP’s 2010 manifesto also 
endorsed removal of support for multiculturalism and the UK’s withdrawal from the European 
Union,207 indicating its desire for the UK to become insular and traditionally ‘British’. In September 
2013, the party’s deputy leader Paul Nuttall advised that the policy had been abandoned, but tacitly 
confirmed that his party was still at least partially opposed to veiling the face, stating, ‘”We do not 
have a policy on it. But our view is pretty much that if people need to see your face, then quite 
frankly it should be shown."’208 
 
Before abandoning its policy of ‘banning the ‘burka’’, the party’s official website featured a video clip 
showing a feature from the BBC Politics Show209 in which the party’s leader, Nigel Farage, debates 
his policy alongside Salma Yaqoob, then leader of the Respect Party. The feature opens with footage 
of a Muslim woman, Rehana Sidat, wearing a niqab and explaining her feelings about her choice of 
dress. When asked what wearing the veil means to her, she describes it as spiritual, comforting, 
liberating, and offering purpose and identity. She equates the garment with the goth or punk ‘looks’, 
indicating that she recognises her choice is an extreme one, but deserving of no more censure than 
any other extreme clothing style. She explains that wearing the niqab was her choice, that her 
husband was initially surprised by her decision, and that she feels it would be oppressive to attempt 
to control what people may wear in their day-to-day lives.210  
 
The remainder of the clip features a debate between the show’s presenter, Farage and Yaqoob on 
UKIP’s policy of banning face veils. Farage describes veiling as symbolic of female oppression and of 
                                                          
205 UKIP began a campaign to ban the wearing of the burka in public places and buildings in 2010. It appears to 
include the niqab within its mistaken definition of ‘burka’: http://www.ukip.org/content/latest-news/1407-
ukip-call-to-ban-burka, retrieved 3 February  2012  
206 Radio Five Live phone-in debate with Lord Pearson (leader of UKIP), 4 May 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b00s90sq/5_live_Breakfast_Phonein_04_05_2010/ ,retrieved 8 April 
2012 
207 UKIP official manifesto, http://www.ukip.org/page/ukip-national-manifesto, retrieved 3 February 2012 
208 Moseley, Tom, UKIP’s Muslim veil ban policy has been reversed, The Huffington Post, 19 September 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/09/19/ukip-veil-ban-policy-reversed_n_3954164.html , retrieved 28 
March 2015 
209 UKIP website video zone, http://www.ukip.org/content/video-zone/1409-where-angels-fear-to-tread, 
accessed 11 April 2013, no longer available 
210 Ibid at 00.26-01.58 
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‘an increasingly divided Britain’211 and expresses concern over security issues such as the difficulty in 
identifying a veiled individual on CCTV footage.212 Yaqoob argues that to ban veiling is equally as 
oppressive as to enforce or permit it.213 The show’s presenter puts to Farage that his party stands for 
liberalism and minimal state interference in the lives of citizens, which does not appear to sit well 
with the proposed ban: Farage finds it difficult to respond directly, instead referring again to the 
veil’s symbolism of oppression and to media debate regarding the introduction of Shar’ia law into 
the UK system.214 Yaqoob makes the point that Muslims represent just 2% of the UK population, and 
that of those, only 0.25% wears any form of face veil:215 Farage contends that the correct figure for 
those Muslims who wear face veils is in fact ‘several hundred thousand’,216 including young children. 
Neither party provides a specific citation or source for their figures.  
 
Ultimately, the essential point of disagreement is revealed:217 Yaqoob argues that to attempt to 
restrict the clothing choices of a part of society, unless they impose those choices upon unwilling 
others, goes against what she terms ‘the British way of life…live and let live’. Farage retorts that the 
imposition occurs merely by dint of British citizens appearing in public wearing the clothing choices 
in question. It is difficult to reconcile the notion that a British citizen should be prevented by law 
from wearing any particular garment in public lest another citizen see her and be offended by the 
garment, with the spirit of article 9 ECHR and the HRA. It is possible to argue that, in the wake of the 
9/11 and 7/7 Al Qaeda attacks on the United States of America and London, tacit or overt racism 
towards Muslims has become increasingly acceptable in some parts of British society. The niqab and 
burka are both highly visible symbols of Islam and without obvious equivalent in any other culture 
represented within Britain: these reasons may go some way to explaining why they have become a 
political scapegoat in the way traditionally ‘male’ symbols of Islam, such as beards, keffiyeh 
(headdresses) and turbans, have not. 
 
                                                          
211 Ibid at 02.20 
212 Ibid at 02.55: the persons engaged in the debate make comparisons with wearing a motorcycle helmet 
inside a bank, which is almost universally prohibited in the UK. None of them refers to the fact that an 
individual would be unlikely to have a legitimate reason to wear a motorcycle helmet whilst not actively riding 
a motorcycle, whereas a Muslim woman’s face veil forms part of her everyday outerwear and in these terms, I 
believe, is more comparable to a coat or hat. 
213 Ibid at 04.12 
214 Ibid at 05.28 
215 Ibid at 06.41. The Office for National Statistics reported the UK’s Muslim population at the 2011 Census at 
2.7m, or 4.8% of the overall population. By Yaqoob’s claim, this would translate to a veiled population of 
around 6,750. (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-statistics-for-local-authorities-in-
england-and-wales/rpt-religion.html, accessed 11 April 2013) 
216 Ibid at 08.16 
217 Ibid at 09.34 
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September 2013: Niqabs in Court 
 
In September 2013, a dispute between a judge and a defendant due to stand trial for witness 
intimidation reached the UK’s press. An outpouring of debate, opinions and arguments followed, 
temporarily reigniting the issue of veiling the face. 
 
The defendant in question was a Muslim woman (‘D’) who habitually wore a very complete form of 
hijab, including a niqab and gloves. She wished to wear her usual dress whilst attending court for her 
trial, which resulted in the widespread press attention. In a pre-trial hearing at Blackfriars Crown 
Court, Judge Murphy held that, whilst he held no objections to her wearing her niqab during the 
majority of the trial, he would insist upon her removing it when giving evidence on the grounds that 
the jury should be able to see her facial expressions as well as hear her voice in order to reach an 
accurate verdict.218 He was willing to allow her to give evidence from behind a screen or via video 
link to enable her to be shielded from all men in the courtroom besides those on the jury, and also 
directed that her face should not be depicted in court sketches. 
 
Judge Murphy delivered a substantial ruling, discussing the role of hijab in Islam, rejecting the 
popular concept that veiling the face is a form of abuse or removes the wearer from public life,219 
and expressing his acceptance that D’s reluctance to uncover her face in front of unrelated men was 
a sincerely-held belief.220 However, he ultimately felt that the needs of the jury to see the 
defendant’s face prevailed over her right to cover her face. For the purposes of this thesis, it appears 
that the judge gave rather too much weight to the necessity of seeing a defendant’s face, noting ‘it is 
unfair to ask a juror to pass judgment on a person whom she cannot see.’221 This logic implies that, 
whilst wearing a niqab, D would have been all but invisible, and fails to take into account the scope 
for the jury to interpret body language, intonation of the voice and expressiveness of the eyes. It 
seems something of a stretch to suggest that a defendant wearing a niqab would interfere with a 
universally fair trial to such an extent that she must be required to remove it. Further, the judge 
acknowledges that removal of the niqab, for a woman who is accustomed to wearing it, may inhibit 
her whilst giving evidence,222 thereby potentially affecting the outcome of the trial.  He also 
‘express[es] the hope that Parliament or a higher court will review this question sooner rather than 
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220 Ibid at 14 
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later and provide a definitive statement of the law to trial judges.’223 As seen in the previous chapter, 
however, this may be a vain hope, due to the higher courts’ well-documented reluctance to rule on 
covering the face outside of the facts immediately before them. 
 
The story reached the press the day after Judge Murphy issued his decision, inspiring coverage that 
ranged from the reasoned to the ill-informed to the vitriolic. The Sun’s front page featured a close-
up of the face of a woman wearing a niqab beneath the word ‘UNVEILED’, followed by its proposals 
for a partial ban in the UK.224 The story continued on pages 4 and 5, preceded by the somewhat 
jarring juxtaposition of its traditional photograph of a topless glamour model on page 3. Page 4’s 
headline reads ‘It’s Time To Face Justice’, implying that her niqab would somehow enable the 
defendant to evade or avoid ‘justice’. 
 
The Daily Mail devoted its front cover to a picture of the defendant in her niqab with the headline 
‘YOU MUST TAKE OFF YOUR VEIL’,225 and pages 4 and 5 went on to isolate some of the more strident 
remarks from Judge Murphy’s ruling and present them, out of context and order, in a separate box, 
implying that he was entirely opposed to niqabs in general and eliminating all traces of reasoned 
debate and sensitivity that were present in the full text. In addition, the feature incorporated a 
column by Jack Straw entitled ‘A Sensible Ruling, But We Should Go Further’, in which he expands on 
points raised his 2007 column (discussed above), including the non-obligatory nature of the niqab 
based on Koranic interpretation, and suggests that Judge Murphy should, in fact, have decreed that 
the defendant should remove her veil for the duration of the trial. The tone of this coverage is fairly 
typical of the Daily Mail, which has a largely middle-aged, middle-class, Conservative-voting 
demographic, but it could be argued that its presentation of this issue was irresponsibly skewed 
toward its own agenda rather than to the nuances of the case at hand. 
 
Follow-up coverage in the Daily Telegraph on 14 September referred to a petition and planned 
protest against Birmingham Metropolitan College’s ban on face coverings, which was subsequently 
reversed.226 The article quotes a spokesperson for Prime Minister David Cameron, who stated he 
‘support[ed] the right of schools to set their own uniform policies’ but, contrary to the article’s 
headline, would not be drawn on whether or not he approved on specifically banning face veils 
                                                          
223 Ibid at 12 
224 Unveiled: As Judge Orders Woman To Uncover Face, The Sun Demands Vital Reforms, The Sun, 17 
September 2013, pp1, 4-5 (editorial) 
225 Camber, Rebecca, The Daily Mail, p1, 17 September 2013 
226 Dominiczak & Paton, I would back veil ban at my child’s school, says Cameron, The Daily Telegraph, 14 
September 2014, p15 
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altogether. Elsewhere on the same page, and also covered by the Daily Mail’s website, another 
article describes an academic study by Dionne Taylor of Birmingham City University into the effects 
on young girls of highly-sexualised music videos.227 The findings of the study list Miley Cyrus’s 
performance style as an exemplar and report that such performances, in which men tend to be fully 
clothed whilst women often wear only underwear or equally scant garments, have a negative impact 
on the confidence and self-esteem of young girls and contribute to an increased focus on their 
bodies. Whilst a Muslim woman wearing a niqab and abaya in her day-to-day life is clearly not 
comparable to Miley Cyrus dressed in flesh-coloured latex underwear to perform on stage, and it is 
not the author’s intent to compare the two, it is striking to note the extent of news coverage given 
to what women choose to wear. In one set of articles, Muslim women are urged to unveil their faces 
in order to become ‘free’ and ‘liberated’, and the very concept of covering one’s face is seen as such 
a problem for British society that there are calls for it to be made illegal. In another set of articles, 
celebrities are pilloried for exposing too much of their bodies or presenting themselves in too sexual 
a manner for the press’s palate, and blamed for negatively impacting the self-esteem of girls and 
young women. However, this thesis would argue that blame for this problem cannot be attributed to 
veiling, nor ‘hyper-sexualisation’, nor any other style of dress or self-presentation. Instead, the print 
and online media’s obsessive interest in women’s bodies and outfits instils a sense in girls and young 
women that they are perpetual objects of scrutiny, that their appearance is their main or only aspect 
of value, and that society at large is expected and entitled to make judgments on what they wear 
and how they look. A paradigm shift in focus toward women’s achievements beyond merely being in 
possession of a woman’s body, and using clothes to cover it, could be much more helpful in 
supporting women who may feel the need for liberation and boosting the self-esteem of others. 
 
The Times228 echoed several of Judge Murphy’s more damning quotes, including ‘the niqab has 
become the elephant in the courtroom’, and also quoted Jack Straw as remarking ‘I think there is an 
issue about whether she should have to have it [the veil] off the whole way through the 
proceedings.’ The reiteration of the ‘elephant in the courtroom’ seeks to imply that English courts 
are inundated with veiled defendants and that the issue of niqabs being worn during trials is a major 
headache facing judges across the country, requiring an urgent and drastic solution. As set out in the 
                                                          
227 ‘Video vixens like Cyrus damage girls’ self-esteem’, The Daily Telegraph, 14 September 2014, p15; Cox, 
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ruling, however, it is exceptionally rare for the issue to arise in this context, and the number of 
people potentially affected is minimal (taking into account that only a small minority of Muslim 
women veil their faces and it is unlikely that more than a very small proportion of those will ever be 
required to attend court in any capacity), making this a marginal issue at best. Therefore, it is 
difficult to understand the rationale behind such extensive press coverage on the subject, and hard 
not to conclude that it is carried out more to promote anti-Islamic sentiment than to report news in 
a proportionate and considered way. 
 
Malik, writing in the Guardian, offered a contrast to the histrionics of the tabloids with a considered 
piece arguing that veiled Muslim women in 21st-century Europe exist in a paradox created by well-
meaning political ideology, both victims of a medieval patriarchal culture and emblems of radical 
Islamism.229 She feels the way to address the issue of the niqab in this context is for Islamic 
communities to engage in debate about the niqab’s place in British society, ensuring that the voices 
of the women directly affected by this debate are clearly heard. Malik notes that both the French 
and Belgian governments introduced niqab bans without proper consultation with niqab wearers 
and argues that these bans ‘left these women feeling alienated, defiant and isolated from 
mainstream democracy’,230 an outcome that ultimately benefits nobody. Malik does, however, 
exercise a degree of moderation and is of the opinion that niqabis should accept ‘reasonable limits 
on their freedom’,231 such as removing veils in courts and schools. This restrained approach appears 
reasonable, although could be said to pander to the sensibilities of those who find the niqab 
distasteful and avoiding the more controversial aspects of the debate, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter and in chapter 2. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The recent domestic case history (Begum, X, Playfoot, Watkins-Singh) demonstrates that UK courts 
are loath to make overarching recommendations with regard to the appropriateness of veiling in 
schools and workplaces, preferring instead to confine themselves to ruling on a case-by-case basis. 
However, this reluctance to make a definitive statement on veiling has nonetheless seen courts at all 
levels reject claims of interference with human rights from both Muslim and Christian women who 
                                                          
229 Malik, Maleiha, Full-face veils aren’t barbaric – but our response can be, The Guardian, 17 September 2013, 
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were restricted by existing uniform policies from manifesting their religious beliefs. The sole 
victorious case, Watkins-Singh, appears to have succeeded primarily on the technical grounds that 
the applicant was a Sikh and so her religious manifestation was protected under the Race Relations 
Act rather than dependent on the court’s often convoluted and tortuous interpretation of article 9 
ECHR. 
 
Similarly, the UK government has not, so far, found it necessary to introduce legislation to regulate 
the wearing of religious items in any way, instead relying on non-statutory guidance for schools. 
Whilst in one respect this is beneficial, (as discussed above, statutory restrictions on dress are 
unlikely to reflect the UK’s tolerant character), recent case law suggests that this reluctance to make 
a definitive statement on veiling has resulted in significant legal and social uncertainty. This applies 
particularly with regard to veiling the face, which is arguably the most contentious form of religious 
dress practiced in the UK today. It is impossible to disregard the problems caused by cases such as 
Begum and X: for instance, the significant disruption to the girls’ education, first by the sanctions 
imposed through schools’ enforcement of the uniform policy and then by the legal process itself; the 
inevitable distress and anxiety caused to the girls; and the impact, both on the girls and their 
schools, of significant and sometimes critical media attention.  
 
It should be noted that, whilst neither the Ban (France’s prohibition on veiling the face in public, to 
be discussed in chapter 4) nor the Bill refer directly to Islamic veils of any kind, the remarks made by 
the proponents of both pieces of legislation prior to their introduction indicate an intention to target 
veiling specifically rather than ‘face-covering garments’ in general. Furthermore, both documents 
contain exceptions which exclude from prosecution the vast majority of instances in which non-
Muslim Western citizens would feasibly appear in public wearing a face-covering garment. It is 
therefore difficult to imagine that either piece of legislation has any significant target aside from 
veiled Muslim women.  
 
Gareth Davies, commenting on the ruling in Begum, reinforces this by remarking ‘despite the 
framing of rules in neutral terms, the debate is all about Islam. The legislative, judicial and public 
focus is overwhelmingly on the clothes worn by Muslim women and girls.’232 Preposterously, 
however, many of those weighing in on the debate appear to do so with extremely limited 
understanding of why Muslim women and girls choose to dress in certain ways and demonstrate 
little or no interest in expanding their knowledge by opening a two-way discussion. They prefer 
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instead to pontificate on the necessity to free women from their veils, without considering the 
possibility, as evidenced in the Belgian study discussed in Chapter 1, that many women veil of their 
own volition, as a symbol of their piety and devotion to their beliefs, and as such are in no need of 
liberation from their veils. To situate these garments as symbolic of extremism or terrorism does a 
severe disservice to individuals who are already marginalised by Western society, by dint of being 
female, non-white, and Muslim, and so would benefit from governmental support rather than tacit 
condemnation.  
 
Following the exhaustive consideration in Chapters 2 and 3 of the amorphous and developing legal 
position on veiling in the UK, Chapter 4 will examine the equivalent legal position in France, which is 
much more defined. France has already made it illegal to veil one’s face in public, and the chapter 
will discuss the reasons for the introduction of this law, the debate surrounding it, and the 
consequences for French Muslim women. In doing so, it will aim to illustrate the disadvantages of 
banning face veiling and so illustrate why the United Kingdom should not consider the concept any 
further. 
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Chapter 4: The ‘Niqab Affair’ in France: veiling and multiculturalism in a 
constitutionally secular society 
 
Introduction 
 
France has one of the largest Muslim populations in Europe, at around 7.5%, or 4.7 million 
individuals. This fact makes it particularly significant that it criminalised the wearing of face veils in 
2011, a manoeuvre almost guaranteed to provoke discord amongst its many Muslim citizens. This 
chapter will closely examine this piece of legislation, and the preceding governmental speeches and 
debates, in order to offer a balanced critique of this legal development. It will also consider the 
nature of France’s constitutional secularity in relation to the requirements of Islam, the historical 
development of local and national bans on garments commonly associated with Islam, and the 
various legal challenges brought against these bans. Finally, this chapter will examine a judgment 
handed down by the European Court of Human Rights in the summer of 2014 in response to a 
challenge to the banning of face veils by a French Muslim woman, together with a consideration of 
academic commentary and press coverage. Ultimately, this section will aim to demonstrate that the 
negative effects of criminalising face veiling far outweigh any positive outcomes, and that it would 
therefore be inadvisable for the United Kingdom to instigate any similar piece of legislation. 
 
Legal framework 
In 2011, France passed a law prohibiting the wearing of any garment designed to cover or conceal 
the face in a public place by both French citizens and visitors to the country (the Ban). 233  In theory, 
this would include balaclavas, face masks, and motorcycle helmets as well as niqabs and burkas, as 
worn by a very small proportion of French Muslim women. However, the Ban contains several 
exceptions, which in practice protect a number of categories of garment from prohibition. These 
include: garments worn for medical or professional reasons; articles that are part of necessary attire 
for sporting activities; garments required by law for safety reasons, such as a motorcycle helmet 
worn whilst the wearer is riding a motorcycle; and garments or articles which are not intended to 
fully conceal the face, such as a hat or a pair of sunglasses. 234   
 
                                                          
233 Loi no. 2010-1192 du 11 Octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public 13 July 
2010,  article 1, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/ta/ta0524.asp,retrieved 21 January 2012 
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Contravention of the Ban is currently punishable by either a fine of €150 or a course of citizenship 
education, or both.235 Additionally, the Ban incorporates a fine of €30,000 together with a year’s 
prison sentence for anyone found guilty of ‘compel[ling] another person, by reason of the sex of said 
person, to conceal their face’,236 and the penalty here doubles if the person compelled to conceal 
their face is a minor. This provision is couched in somewhat clumsy language. It uses a gender-
neutral pronoun to refer to the person compelled to wear the concealing garment but specifies that 
the compulsion to wear the garment must be ‘by reason of the sex of said person’. It is, arguably, 
difficult to imagine a situation in which a woman would attempt to force a man to conceal his face in 
public purely on the grounds that he is male.  
 
In addition, concealment of the face by non-Muslims in Europe, for reasons other than those 
covered in the Ban’s exceptions, is rare, if not unheard of. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that 
this provision is principally aimed toward the French Islamic community, founded upon the 
assumption that a proportion of Muslim women are forced by their husbands, fathers or other male 
relatives to unwillingly wear full face veils in public. The discrepancy between penalties for 
contravention of the Ban suggests that the French judiciary regards Muslim men as authoritarian 
and controlling of their wives and daughters, whilst Muslim women are viewed as subservient, 
oppressed and lacking in agency. This stereotype only reinforces the ill-conceived notion that veiled 
Muslim women need to be rescued from a kind of medieval purdah by the progressive and 
enlightened secular West, and does nothing to promote social cohesion and integration, instead 
emphasising and polarising the differences that exist between the two cultures. 
 
Further weight can be lent to this assertion by examining a remark made by then-president Nicolas 
Sarkozy concerning veiling in the Islamic community prior to the introduction of the Ban. During a 
prominent policy speech to the French parliament in 2009, he stated "The burka is not a sign of 
religion, it is a sign of subservience. It will not be welcome on the territory of the French republic."237 
This demonstrates that Sarkozy believed face veiling is most commonly imposed upon unwilling 
women by men. In contrast, anecdotal sources indicate that many Muslim women in fact choose to 
cover their faces in public, sometimes in defiance of their male relatives. This point was discussed in 
chapter 1 and will be expanded upon in chapter 5 but at present it is sufficient to note Sarkozy’s 
presumption in defining the connotations of the veil for the purposes of the Ban, when the wider 
Islamic community itself is divided over the meaning, purpose, and necessity of veiling. It should also 
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be noted that Sarkozy refers to the burka. As discussed previously, this garment is, in fact, seldom 
seen outside Afghanistan: Sarkozy appears to have conflated it with the niqab, which is more 
commonly worn by Western Muslim women (although still not a widely-worn garment).  
 
For the purposes of this piece, it is important to note that the text of the Ban makes no exception for 
religious or cultural considerations. At its inception, the French government published a set of 
explanatory notes in a question-and-answer format.238 This includes the question ‘Does this 
prohibition restrict freedom of religion?’ The answer states that the Ban complies with article 10 of 
France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 1789 (‘no one may be disturbed on 
account of his opinions, even religious ones, as long as the manifestation of such opinions does not 
interfere with the established Law and Order’). It goes on to explain ‘[t]his prohibition does not aim 
to restrict the exercise of freedom of religion in places of worship open to the public.’ However, it is 
possible to argue that the manifestation of religious identity through the wearing of a veil in 
everyday life does not, in itself, interfere with law and order. In addition, by relaxing the restriction 
only when the wearer is in a public place of worship, the legislators appear to have profoundly 
misunderstood of the concept of veiling in Islam: the wearer’s chosen form of veil or hijab is worn at 
all times when out in public, not just whilst the wearer is attending a mosque. Further, as discussed 
in chapter 1, faces must not be covered during acts of worship, making this concession 
fundamentally meaningless in the Islamic community. 
 
Historical context 
France is a constitutionally secular state under the principle of laïcité. This enshrines the formal 
separation of church and state within the French constitution. As such, it is mandated that religion 
does not play any part in French government and that religious organisations do not become 
involved in political issues. French citizens are entitled to engage with any religion they choose, but 
are expected to keep their religious allegiances discreet and unobtrusive, maintained within their 
private life and away from the public sphere.  
 
Historically, Catholicism was the dominant religion in France and it is, on the whole, a more private 
and introverted religion than Islam: pertinently, Catholicism has no formal restrictions or 
requirements for the day-to-day dress of its adherents. In contrast, Islam requires its adherents, 
both male and female, to dress modestly at all times (although varying interpretations of the Koran 
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mean that there is no clear consensus on the degree of modesty required). Regardless of 
requirement, face veils are both one of the most visible symbols of Islam and probably the least 
familiar to Western eyes.239 Idriss notes that, out of the many Western European countries with 
growing Muslim populations, ‘France has had more difficulties adjusting policies towards cultural 
diversity.’ This, he feels, is attributable to laïcité and the French preference for immigrants to 
assimilate to its ostensibly neutral public society, which, it believes, is impossible if they preserve 
religious or cultural practices not commonly observed in France.240 It is possible to argue that Islamic 
veils, which are particularly noticeable symbols of religious identity, became emblematic of France’s 
disquiet with its growing Muslim population and a perceived erosion of its national secular identity. 
The Ban, therefore, becomes a prop to the Procrustean bed of laïcité, attempting to enforce a 
cultural principle which is increasingly lacking in relevance as France’s cultural landscape evolves to 
include increasing numbers of citizens from other cultures. Pew Research notes that France, 
together with Germany, has the largest Muslim population in the European Union, with 4.7 million 
Muslims recorded as living in France in 2010: around 7.5% of its population.241 Despite these 
numbers, Idriss argues that many Muslims immigrants living in France are ghettoised, with little 
opportunity or encouragement to integrate, and so form stronger attachments to cultural and 
religious practices such as veiling as a form of comfort.242 
 
The Ban was preceded in France by a law preventing the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols 
within French public schools.243 This was precipitated by what came to be known as l’Affaire du 
Foularde (‘the headscarf affair’). It began in 1989 after three Muslim girls were excluded from their 
school for wearing headscarves in class, on the grounds that it was contrary to the principles of 
laïcité.244 This event, and the political tumult that ensued, led to a ruling by the Conseil d’Etat that 
individual schools were responsible for deciding on the acceptability or otherwise of the headscarf 
within their institution. Fysh and Wolfreys comment that the Affair was, effectively, a highly-charged 
emotional storm in a very small teacup, and affected a tiny proportion of citizens in a relatively 
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minor way. They also suggest that Muslim girls who were, according to opponents of the headscarf, 
oppressed by being forced to wear the scarf, would only be more oppressed if the French 
government excluded them from school.245 Writing in 2010, Fernandez noted a variety of negative 
factors affecting the affair, including: the over-simplification of the meaning of the hijab; the 
widespread presumption that girls were coerced into wearing it against their will; and most notably, 
the exclusion of their voices from the debate. She notes that, by wearing their scarves to school in 
contravention of the ban, the girls effectively transformed its meaning, as understood by the French 
media, from a symbol of oppression to one of defiance and liberation: however, because their voices 
were effectively muted, this facet of the argument was lost.246 
 
ECtHR has subsequently heard several cases247 based on Muslim girls’ refusal to remove their 
headscarves whilst in French schools, and in each case has found no interference of the girls’ rights 
under article 9 ECHR. The European Human Rights Law Review, commenting on the decision in 
Aktas, feels that it ‘indicate[s] the Court’s unwillingness to engage further in debate about the 
prohibition of religious items in French schools.’248 The Review considers the equivalent lack of 
success in similar challenges by other constitutionally secular countries such as Turkey and 
Switzerland. It goes on to speculate that, given the Court’s acceptance of interference with article 9 
rights in these cases coupled with its reluctance to overturn decisions made by state governments, 
that even an application from a country with no constitutional secularity may achieve the same 
ruling.249  
 
As part of its Global Attitudes Project, the Pew Research Centre conducted research about attitudes 
towards a ban on veiling. 250  In April and May 2010, three months before the lower house of the 
French parliament voted on the proposed law, the Centre surveyed members of the public from 
France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. It asked respondents 
whether they approved of France’s plan to ‘ban Muslim women wearing full veils that cover all of 
the face except the eyes in public places including schools, hospitals, and government offices’. All 
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four European countries surveyed showed a majority would support such a ban.251 It seems 
reasonable to assume that a similar ban in the respondents’ home states would also find at least a 
degree of support, indicating a tendency in Europe toward intolerance toward, and limited 
understanding of, Islamic culture. With the rise in multiculturalism across Western Europe, it is ill-
advised for a national government to promote such a divisive piece of law-making. Certainly in light 
of statistics such as those compiled by Pew, which suggest a serious intolerance toward Muslims in 
France, the passing of laws clearly aimed at restricting the everyday rights of Muslim women seems 
almost guaranteed to make the country’s Muslim population feel marginalised and unwelcome, 
whilst validating the views of the intolerant. Idriss concurs, noting that ‘the current treatment of 
Muslims in France belies the myth of equal citizenship…the ban might have been more easily taken 
had there been additional measures accompanied to assure Muslims that they were not being 
singled out or targeted.’252 
 
Commentary 
 
Errera253 is critical of the Conseil’s decision to uphold the Ban as valid constitutional law, in particular 
its attempt to establish the intentions of Parliament by mentioning all aspects of the debate as 
related to the French constitution rather than affirming a new constitutional principle. He also 
identifies that the decision does not mention any constitutionally protected freedom aside from 
freedom of religion (the law has a reservation allowing face-covering garments in public religious 
spaces) – Errera comments that this acknowledges the religious aspect of face veiling and raises 
more questions than it solves with regard to religious freedom and France’s responsibilities under 
article 9.  
 
Davis254 explains the historical background to France’s non-secular society, asserting that the 
concept of laïcité was formed during a time of hostility towards religion as a whole in France255, and 
in recent years has been dominated by a fear of what he terms ‘the Islamification’ of Europe256. 
Davis portrays the origins of laïcité as ‘less than equitable’257 and is sceptical of its legitimacy in 
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modern French law, pointing out that the French Constitution guarantees ‘respect for all beliefs’ and 
equal rights for women to those of men. The Ban on veiling is rooted in laïcité and therefore, under 
Davis’ argument, lacks validity.  
 
In addition, Davis describes the history of ‘headscarf cases’ since the 1980s in French court.258 The 
overall stance of the courts has veered from conservative to liberal over the years but most recently 
has found in favour of students wishing to wear a headscarf or hijab, indicating that the French 
judiciary do not necessarily support restriction in dress and, in common with English courts, prefer to 
apply a case-by-case approach to such matters. Davis also identifies that the Conseil d’Etat tend to 
defer to Parliament when a balancing test is administered (e.g., between the rights of the individual 
to manifest religious beliefs versus the provisions of the constitution).259 
 
Davis goes on to suggest that Sarkozy’s determination to impose the Ban stems from his defeat in 
regional elections in March 2010, and a desire to appear more conservative on the issue of 
immigration260 rather than a response to any pressing social need. He is critical of the way in which 
France passed the law: in an unprecedented action, it was submitted to the Council for approval 
with the defence that it was necessary to uphold the constitutional principles of laïcité and gender 
equality. Subsequently, the Council did not insist on robust reasons as to how the ban would uphold 
these principles, or indeed how veiling or other methods of covering the face threaten these 
principles.  Davis argues that the ban is not comparable with cases concerning the wearing of Islamic 
headscarves in schools as the settings are different (general public space as opposed to the school 
environment) and that it is harder to adversely influence adult women than schoolchildren.261 
Overall, there is an indication that Sarkozy was determined to make the ban law, one way or 
another. 
 
Barbibay262, in his discussion of the Conseil d’Etat’s refusal to award citizenship to a Moroccan 
woman, Mabchour, on the grounds that she had failed to assimilate into French culture and was 
submissive to her husband, habitually wearing the niqab at his initial instigation, is critical of France’s 
stance on traditional Islamic dress. He traces its position from l’affaire du foulard (‘The Headscarf 
Affair’) in 1989 to Law No. 2004-228, which ostensibly prohibits the wearing of all ‘signs or clothing 
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that conspicuously manifest students’ religious affiliations’. The wording of the law is general to all 
religions, not specific to Islamic symbols or dress, but Barbibay contends that ‘it is commonly 
understood that its main purposes and effects are to eradicate Islamic headscarves from educational 
institutions’.263 He goes on to argue that France’s justification for Law No. 2004-228 on the grounds 
of cultural preservation conceals a linear link between the ‘headscarf ban’ itself and an underlying 
current of ‘xenophobia, geographic isolation, dire socio-economic standing and restrictive citizenship 
laws’264 that permeates French life. 
Barbibay goes on to discuss the likely outcome for potential challenges to the refusal of citizenship 
on the grounds of interference with Article 9 rights.265 He is of the opinion that France’s decision 
would not stand up to the three-pronged test required to justify state interference with an 
individual’s rights under article 9(2), stating that although it would be possible for France to 
demonstrate that the decision served a legitimate aim, it would be impossible to demonstrate the 
decision’s prescription by law or necessity in a democratic society.266 Barbibay speculatively 
concludes that the European Court of Human Rights ‘would criticise France’s attempt to regulate the 
behaviour of its religious minorities within the private sphere of their family.’ He bases this 
conclusion in part on the ruling in Dudgeon v United Kingdom, which established a narrower margin 
of appreciation for infringements affecting aspects of an individual’s private life versus the wide 
margin used in cases involving public entities. By this deduction, Barbibay demonstrates his lack of 
support for France’s lawmakers in this instance and indicates that he feels the ban poses too much 
of an imposition on the private lives of French Muslims: even remarking that ‘France myopically 
justifies the enactment of the headscarf ban on the narrow ground of cultural preservation.’267 It is 
apparent that he believes France tolerates, rather than welcomes, its Muslim immigrants. 
Further, Barbibay distinguishes from the instant case the decision in Dogru v France, in which the 
ECtHR upheld France’s refusal to allow a school pupil to wear her headscarf during a sports lesson on 
the grounds that there were legitimate risks to public safety and order. Dogru concerned behaviour 
within a school, in which pupils can reasonably be expected to behave and dress according to a 
specified code of behaviour. Barbibay argues that the same reasoning would not stand up to the 
scrutiny of the ECtHR in Mabchour’s case: similarly, the ‘burka ban’, which affects adult citizens in 
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both the public and private spheres of their lives, could be considered under the same reasoning in 
the event of a challenge under Article 9. 
 
Discussing the introduction of the ban, Welch268 describes Sarkozy’s state of the nation address 
(before an ‘agreeable audience’269) incorporating the remark that the burka represents 
‘subservience and debasement’ rather than religious beliefs. Welch is of the opinion that Sarkozy is 
unqualified to assess the symbolism of Islamic dress, and that his decision to ban certain garments is 
equally oppressive, commenting, ‘in a liberal society the state has no place dictating how people 
dress in the street, particularly when this restricts their right to manifestation of religious belief.’270 
This is a true liberal opinion, but bearing in mind the qualifications that restrict article 9 ECHR, it may 
represent a somewhat idealistic world view. Welch also contends that banning the veil is 
counterproductive: he asserts that the ban is more likely to create disenfranchisement and 
disillusion with the French government amongst Muslim women, and could potentially provoke 
extremist acts rather than suppress what Sarkozy perceives as Islamic extremism or fundamentalism, 
particularly since Western-Islamic relations are still fragile post-9/11.271 
 
Research into veiling carried out in Belgium in 2010-11, consisting of frank in-depth interviews with 
Muslim women,272 found that not one of the 27 participants had been forced to veil by her husband 
or anyone else, nor knew of any other women who had been forced to veil. Some participants began 
to wear it after they were married, with the knowledge that their husbands would be happy and 
supportive; others veiled against their husbands’ express wishes; still others had husbands who were 
neutral on the subject.273 Negative reactions from other family members were reported by a number 
of participants,274 indicating that the decision to veil actually takes considerable individualism and 
strength of conviction. Additionally, the participants who wore niqabs reported myriad positive 
effects, including feelings of peace and freedom, an increased closeness to God, and the avoidance 
of unwanted male attention.275 These findings imply that one of the key impetuses for banning 
niqabs – the perception that they are forced on women against their will, thereby oppressing and 
stifling them – is, in fact, a red herring. If it can be assumed that French Muslim women who veil 
their faces can report similar experiences to those who participated in the Belgian study, the Ban 
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equates to a significant blow to their personal identity, religious journey, and day-to-day life, 
without any likely positive effects as a counter.  
 
European Court of Human Rights’ Judgment 
Shortly after the introduction of the Ban in 2011, a French Muslim citizen issued a legal challenge to 
her government. She argued that the legislation was neither necessary in a democratic society nor 
the pursuit of a legitimate aim and therefore represented an infringement of her rights under 
articles 3, 8, 9, 10, and 11, taken both separately and together with article 14 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. The case reached the European Court of Human Rights, which issued 
its ruling in July 2014. 276 It held that the applicant’s claims under articles 8, 9, and 10, taken both 
separately and together with article 14, were admissible: however, she had not sufficiently 
demonstrated breaches of her rights under articles 3 or 11 and these complaints were declared 
inadmissible. 
By a majority of 15 to two, the Court held that the Ban was proportionate in its pursuit of a 
legitimate aim, ‘namely the preservation of the conditions of “living together” as an element of the 
“protection of the rights and freedoms of others”,277 and was therefore necessary in a democratic 
society. However, it should be noted that the three other grounds submitted by the French 
government as justifications for the Ban were not accepted by the Court: the Ban was deemed 
disproportionate in its pursuit of public safety, and the Court did not feel that either the equality or 
human dignity arguments represented the pursuit of legitimate aims.  
The Court carried out a detailed examination of the legislative history of the Ban, which verified that 
its sole target was Muslim women, despite the broad and neutral terms in which it was ultimately 
drafted. A study carried out by the Interior Ministry in 2009 concluded that around 1,900 Muslim 
women across France habitually veiled their faces with niqabs, and none wore burkas278 – a 
significantly marginal number compared to France’s total Muslim population of around 4.7 
million.279 An enquiry by a parliamentary report, submitted in January 2010, described wearers of 
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the full-face veil in terms including ‘radical’, ‘in search of identity’, and ‘extremist fundamentalist’.280 
These are highly emotive phrases with connotations of terrorism and jihadists, almost guaranteed to 
trigger a negative reaction amongst the increasingly vocal anti-Islamic segment of European society. 
The report’s authors were also of the opinion that veiling the face symbolised subservience, negated 
the principle of gender equality and was ‘a flagrant infringement of the French principle of living 
together (“le vivre ensemble”)’.281 It should be noted that, as far as the evidence tells us, no Muslim 
women were interviewed at any point in the legislative process with regard to the reasons why they 
wore face veils, or what, if anything, they felt the veil symbolised. It is unsettling that a decision 
affecting such a specific group of women in such a direct and personal way could be taken without 
their input, rendering them effectively powerless against the will of the French government. 
An opinion opposing the concept of a ban was submitted in January 2010 by the National Advisory 
Committee of Human Rights (Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme, or CNCDH). 
The CNCDH felt that to introduce such a law risked stigmatising Muslims and would deprive women 
of access to public space, which could only be to their detriment:282 it was, however, in favour of 
prioritising political support for women suffering violence and of an increased focus on civic 
education, the promotion of dialogue between cultural and religious groups, and studies into the 
evolution of the wearing of face veils.283 
Days after the submission of this opinion, the Conseil d’Etat was tasked by the Prime Minister of 
France to carry out a study into the legal grounds for banning the face veil. It found that existing 
legislation was sufficient to address instances of citizens covering their faces for potential criminal 
purposes. Additionally, it felt that a ban on the face veil on the basis of the values it was perceived to 
represent, would be legally weak and difficult to enforce.284 It suggested legislation directed 
specifically at those forcing women to cover their faces or attempting to use face veils solely and 
deliberately to conceal their identity may be more sensible.285 Any of these solutions would have 
represented a more thoughtful and less antagonistic approach to a relatively minor,286 though 
visible, issue. Notwithstanding, the National Assembly pressed ahead in drafting the legislation, 
which, as discussed above, was enacted in October 2011 and came into force the following spring. 
Based on the evidence examined above, it is clear that Sarkozy and the French government were 
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intent on prohibiting the wearing of face veils in an Islamic context, regardless of advice to the 
contrary.  
As a presumably unintended but by no means unforeseeable consequence of the Ban, there were 
incidents of both verbal and physical aggression toward French Muslim women who chose to 
disregard the new restriction,287 which draws into question the wisdom of addressing the issue via 
the criminal law rather than by a process of social education and dialogue. Because face veiling is 
practiced uniquely by women and is distinctive even amongst the ‘otherness’ of Muslim dress in a 
Western setting, it is possible to argue that a chief effect of the Ban was to situate veiled French 
Muslim women as a highly visible target for anti-Islamic feeling. In this way, the Ban both legitimised 
prejudice against Muslims and positioned veiled Muslim women as emblems of Islamic extremism, 
using the bodies of women as stages to play out the wider debate on immigration and 
multiculturalism.  
Whilst the introduction of the Ban was undoubtedly aimed at the French Muslim community, by 
definition it only affects Muslim women, as Muslim men generally do not cover their faces in day-to-
day life. The French government attached a great deal of weight to the perceived security risks in 
allowing some citizens to cover their faces, as well as to the potentially deleterious effects upon 
society, and it was ultimately this second factor that convinced the Court of Human Rights. This 
thesis argues that the purported risks were infinitesimally small and could be easily tempered with 
straightforward security procedures, such as asking veiled women to raise their niqab in front of a 
female member of staff in settings where security is necessarily heightened, such as airports, banks 
and courts. Instead, the French government allowed the imaginations of a proportion of its citizens 
and media to run wild, envisaging veiled suicide bombers around every corner. 
It should be noted that the January 2015 attacks on the staff of the French satirical magazine Charlie 
Hebdo were carried out by young French-born Algerian Muslims, none of which appeared to cover 
their faces during the assaults. Whilst many factors were at play in the background to this incident, 
including the perpetrators’ history of radicalisation and the magazine’s predilection for satirising 
Islam, the contribution of the Ban should not be downplayed. It helped to perpetuate a pervasive, 
intolerant anti-Muslim climate within France, almost baiting those Muslims with more extreme 
beliefs into retaliation. This argument in no way justifies acts of murder or terrorism, whatever the 
motive or provocation, but instead acknowledges the ease in which sides can be taken, lines drawn 
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and feelings of indignation and vengefulness amplified in an atmosphere of intolerance: an 
atmosphere that could have been calmed with the promotion of multicultural acceptance. 
In their partly dissenting opinions, Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom hold the opinion that the Ban 
does, in fact, violate the claimant’s rights under article 8 and 9 ECHR by dint of not pursuing a 
legitimate aim, and disproportionality in the pursuit of its stated aims. They are critical of the weight 
attached by the rest of the court to the abstract concept of ‘living together’, which they describe as 
‘far-fetched and vague’.288 The European Human Rights Law Review concurred, expressing surprise 
over the ‘marked’ leeway allowed to France by the Court, to the extent that it ‘effectively permitted 
France to introduce its own legitimate aim, that of ‘living together’’, thereby ‘contaminat[ing] the 
rest of the legal analysis.’289 The judges also contest that covering the face does not necessarily 
inhibit social interaction, as argued by the majority of the court: they agree that the face is an 
important part of such interaction, but feel that the majority drew a false conclusion by implying 
that interaction is irretrievably hindered without sight of the face.290  
This is an important point: whilst a veiled face could potentially form an initial barrier to social 
interaction, particularly amongst individuals who are unfamiliar with the garment, it is by no means 
an impassable obstacle. However, banning the face veil on the grounds that it impedes socialisation 
seems to dismiss veil-wearers as active participants in their choice whether or not to socialise, 
instead painting them as passive caricatures to be socialised with regardless of their will: as 
Nussberger and Jäderblom note, ‘the right to respect for private life also comprises the right not to 
communicate and not to enter into contact with others in public places – the right to be an 
outsider.’291 As Liogier remarked, ‘Others will opine that one cannot be a true citizen if one hides 
one's face, because one is thus refusing human interaction. Yet some people wear dark glasses out 
of shyness or pure obnoxiousness, and nobody would think of denying them their right to 
humanity.’292 In short, choosing to disguise one’s face is not unique to Muslims, and not so aberrant 
a behaviour as to necessitate legal prohibition. 
This point illustrates the fundamental ineffectualness of banning face veils: cross-cultural social 
interaction and cohesion cannot be forced, but instead must be allowed to evolve and develop. 
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Individuals have the right to interact or not interact with each other, and do not owe interaction to 
anybody. Further, as the minority opinion states, the ECHR does not grant individuals the right to be 
free from shock or provocation by unfamiliar methods of religious expression.293 In banning the veil, 
France has succeeded in stimulating in some segments of its society a perception that face veiling is 
unacceptable, that it has the right to demand an end to the practice, and that it is entitled to interact 
with veiled women regardless of their feelings on the matter.  
Nussberger and Jäderblom also argue that, in banning the face veil, the French legislature has 
restricted pluralism and the promotion of tolerance. They note that previous case law has set down 
that ‘the role of the authorities…is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but 
the ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other’,294 and that the French government has 
actually done the precise opposite in this case, to the detriment of one group but with little or no 
significant consequence to the rest of society. Further, they identify the quandary facing women 
who choose to veil: either remain faithful to their convictions and choices, but stay at home, or 
venture outside and risk criminal sanctions.295 They are also unconvinced by the argument that 
preventing women from veiling their faces will liberate them from ‘oppression’, but will instead 
‘further exclude them from society and aggravate their situation’,296 and note that the government 
failed to explain why the less restrictive measures recommended during the legislative process, 
including awareness-raising and community education, were not considered in place of 
criminalisation. As discussed above, the existing anti-Muslim feeling in France was only fuelled by 
the introduction of the Ban: a considered and inclusive programme of cross-cultural education could 
have done much to dampen such feeling, at the same time as allowing French Muslim women a 
voice, which they were denied throughout the introduction of the Ban. 
Conclusions 
The Ban stands as an emblem of disapproval and intolerance of France’s Muslims, marking out battle 
lines where none were needed, and stimulating feelings of alienation and disenfranchisement 
amongst a young minority population. In recent months, hundreds of young Muslims born in the UK 
and Europe have travelled to Syria to join the militant group Islamic State (IS, ISIL or ISIS), engaging in 
guerrilla warfare and acts of terrorism in an attempt to establish an Islamic caliphate in the Middle 
East. Whilst it is mere speculation to argue that the Ban directly prompted this migration, we cannot 
escape that it contributes to a climate of Western distaste for, and distrust of, Islamic practice, in 
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which some young people feel unwelcome and misunderstood in their country of birth. This 
succeeds in rejecting them further, denying them a tangible position in Western society.  Illustrating 
this point, a recent conference of the United Nations Security Council heard from Professor Peter 
Neumann of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at King’s 
College London. The centre has been gathering the stories of young Europeans who have joined 
Islamic State and has established that, despite their ostensible diversity, their common thread was 
‘they didn’t feel they had a stake in their societies. They often felt that…they weren’t European, they 
didn’t belong, that they’d never succeed however hard they tried.’297 Crown Prince Al Hussein Bin 
Abdullah II of Jordan, chairing the meeting, urged the council to ‘partner with young people…instead 
of leaving them as a target of violence and destruction’298 through empowerment and education. In 
terms of the Ban, it would also be prudent to provide accessible education to non-Muslim French 
citizens on the basic precepts of Islam and the meaning and purpose of the niqab, in an attempt to 
reduce the number of citizens who see veiling the face as unacceptable or associated solely with 
jihad.  
Ultimately, in banning the wearing of face veils, France has exacerbated precisely the situation it set 
out to correct: it has denied agency to, and imposed its own beliefs upon, the women that, it stated, 
were oppressed, lacking in agency and forced to live in a way that reflected extreme beliefs not their 
own. Muslim women have been all but dismissed as either cowed servile beings, meekly complying 
with medieval views on their appearance, or as aggressive radicalised Islamists, liable to commit 
atrocities at any moment. This result cannot be seen as any kind of a success for basic human rights, 
much less women’s equality. To disempower women, especially young women, in such a 
fundamental way as to attempt to dictate how they must dress, is to deny them the right to fully 
participate in society with confidence and pride. Such an approach has no place in the twenty-first 
century, much less in a country where human rights are guaranteed and protected by law. That 
Western nations feel both entitled and obliged to enact laws whose primary effect is to undermine 
these rights is surely cause for disquiet. However, the next, and final, chapter will discuss this 
tendency in the broader context of the intense scrutiny and commodification attached to women’s 
bodies by Western media and popular culture. With this correlation in mind, it is perhaps less 
surprising, though no less distasteful, that Western governments societies persist in attempting to 
meddle with women’s right to cover their bodies. 
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Chapter 5: Feminism, veiling and twenty-first century women in the media  
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter will consider the broader reasons why parts of Western society seem compelled to 
prevent Muslim women from covering their faces. It will apply some of the theories of postcolonial 
and third-wave feminism to the findings outlined in preceding chapters, incorporating the concepts 
of Othering and the male gaze, and their position in the debate over veiling. In addition, it will 
examine the attitudes toward, and treatment of, the bodies of Western women by Western society 
and media, and compare this with the argument often put forward in favour of banning face veils, 
that such a ban will liberate women from their oppression.299 
 
Veiling and personal identity 
One of the most often-used remarks by those who oppose face veils is ‘you just don’t know who’s 
behind it.’ Leaving purported security considerations behind and examining the deeper meaning 
behind this statement, it seems that, in the West, our identity is intrinsically bound up with our 
outward appearance and, to a lesser extent, how we adapt it to remain societally ‘acceptable’: as 
will be discussed below, this is most applicable to women. Perhaps the disquiet about veiling the 
face is more about a perceived removal of identity, an unacceptable level of egalitarianism: how else 
is society to gaze upon women and deem them acceptable or not, if it can see no more than their 
eyes? Yet this may be one of the factors that attracts women to veiling their face. In the Belgian 
study,300 which interviewed Belgian Muslim citizens, mostly aged between 25 and 40, who wore 
niqab (discussed in more detail earlier), the following comments were recorded: 
‘We apply makeup, we do our hair, so it [adopting the niqab] actually changed absolutely 
nothing, we just made a choice to preserve our body and our beauty only for our husband.’301 
‘There are people who need when they go out in the street to not feel the gaze of men, 
because to them they feel dirty.’302 
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 ‘Once you put the face veil over your eyes, you have the impression of being alone with God 
in the street.’303 
An examination of blogs and comments in online forums by Muslim women reveals similar remarks: 
‘Being an active student of knowledge for the past few years, my ‘image’ became less 
important and the person inside became more prominent, something I really needed to focus 
on. I simply understood the beauty of modesty. In actions, in words and in physical covering. 
My beauty should be for my husband only, I refuse to be looked upon like I’m some prey, and 
even hijab wasn’t enough to keep perverted eyes away. Sacrifices were definitely worth this 
feeling, and I have never felt more at peace in my life.’304 
‘I wear the niqab because I believe it as [sic] an act of worship to God, and a means of 
identifying myself as a Muslim woman. I do not believe that men (or women) are purely 
sexual beings without any control over themselves. I do believe that our society has been 
poisoned by hypersexualization and the commodification of what should be a beautiful thing, 
and that Muslim or not, men and women alike are suffering on so many different levels 
because we've been trained to view the other gender as sexual objects, not human beings.305 
I wear it to become a better human being. To humble myself and to be more tolerant. I wear 
it in order to respect myself, to raise my status as a proud women who has a brain, a 
personality and feelings. And I wear it because I’m English. Because I have a right to be 
happy and to not be oppressed. Wearing it has raised my confidence.306 
These extracts, admittedly, represent a very small sample of a community of Muslim women living in 
the West who appear overwhelmingly positive about their reasons for, and experience of, veiling 
their faces. It is evident that these women do not feel emotionally or culturally stifled by their niqab, 
but rather empowered and confident: a far cry from the timid, repressed woman longing to throw 
off her veil and embrace Western cultural norms so often portrayed by those who support the 
banning of face coverings. For these women, their religious beliefs appear to form a large part of 
their sense of personal identity, and therefore the concept of concealing their face in public is 
probably less of a reach than it might be for a Western woman accustomed to demonstrating her 
self-identity through her appearance. As Idriss notes, ‘an Islamic headscarf is a continual reminder 
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that one should be a dignified and humble human being and Muslim women see it as part of their 
religious practice and as a symbol of their Islamic identity.’307 This symbol of identity should be 
worthy of no less respect and accommodation than any other such symbol worn by any other 
woman. 
 
 
The Male Gaze and ‘Raunch Culture’ 
 
Regardless of culture, it is inescapable that women’s bodies are systematically objectified, both by 
men and by the wider societal environment surrounding them. It is possible to perceive that veiling 
the entire face and body positions the wearer as a sexual object, a desirable chattel, to be hidden 
from view lest she inspire uncontrollable lust in passers-by. It is equally possible, however, to argue 
that, for a Muslim woman, living in Europe in the twenty-first century, to elect to veil her face and 
body is a conscious, even bold, decision to attempt to remove her physical self from the intense 
scrutiny prevalent in Western society. The ‘male gaze’, as defined by Mulvey 40 years ago,308 
continues to manifest itself ever more broadly, via innumerable websites, blogs, magazines, music 
videos and films, together with the increasing pervasiveness of online pornography. As Mulvey 
noted, ‘in their traditional exhibitionist role women are simultaneously looked at and displayed […] 
so they can be said to connote to-be-looked-at-ness.’309 Women who wear niqabs are still ‘looked 
at’, especially in the West where they are less commonly seen and carry a certain exoticness, but 
what they ‘display’ is largely neutral in Western terms of womanly beauty: little or no makeup is 
visible and nor are any perceived ‘flaws’ in the face; hairstyle and colour are covered and so 
irrelevant to the casual observer; the garments themselves are often simple, unadorned and 
remarkably egalitarian; and the body is concealed beneath loose opaque cloth, preventing the idle 
judgment on the acceptableness or otherwise of aspects of the figure, so familiar to Western 
women.  
 
In contrast to the debate over whether Muslim women should or should not be permitted to cover 
their faces sits the argument against the increasingly sexualised culture of the West. In Living Dolls, 
Natasha Walter raises concerns over the apparent U-turn in UK feminism since the mid-1990s.  She 
points to the falling proportion of female MPs,310 the growing trend for using scientific research to 
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ascribe biological rather than cultural explanations for differences between men and women,311 the 
acceptance of topless modelling as a legitimate, even aspirational career choice312 and the increasing 
‘girlification’ and sexualisation of children313 to illustrate her arguments.  Walter believes this 
combination of influences has served to emphasise the concept that women are the weaker, less 
intelligent sex whose primary function should be both appearing and being sexually available to 
men. She expresses particular disquiet at what she identifies as an overt theme of ‘empowerment’ 
and ‘individuality’ promoted by media outlets aimed at young girls, whilst the actual range of 
acceptable body types and personal styles endorsed by these outlets is extremely narrow and often 
punishing to achieve or physically or financially unobtainable by most girls.314  
Current examples of the sexualised culture Walter describes include reality television personality 
Kim Kardashian, who has twice posed completely naked for US-based fashion magazines and is 
celebrated for her curvaceous body;315 pop singer Miley Cyrus, who has cultivated a public image 
that is both cartoonish and oddly sexual, frequently posts partially naked images of herself on social 
media and promoted her album with a stage show involving highly sexualised imagery despite her 
fans tending to be young teenagers; and Katie Price, who began her career as a topless model and 
became extremely successful through relentless self-promotion, often involving her 
partners/spouses and children. Whilst the author does not suggest that any of these women is 
intrinsically correct or incorrect to present herself in a sexual, frequently unclothed manner, it is 
difficult not to question the way in which they are sometimes held up as examples of strong, 
empowered women, suggesting to their young admirers that success and empowerment comes 
most easily from displays of provocative sexiness. Additionally, whilst Kardashian, Cyrus, Price, and 
others of their ilk undoubtedly have a voice within society, the author believes that their physical 
image is often, figuratively speaking, a much louder voice. By inviting judgement and celebration of 
their physicality, it is possible to argue that these women are diminished to mere caricatures of 
‘Woman’, valued most highly for their bodies and ready to be cast aside when those bodies are no 
longer deemed acceptable to society, either through changes in the fashionable physique or 
personal changes acquired through, for example, pregnancy or aging.  
 
                                                          
311 Ibid, chapter 8, Myths 
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314 Ibid, p66-68 
315 Paper, winter 2014, ‘Kim Kardashian: Break the Internet’ and LOVE Magazine, spring-summer 2015, ‘Kim 
Wears Prada’. Images from both shoots were widely available online, both through news/gossip websites and 
via social media platforms, including those belonging to Kardashian herself. 
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Expanding this argument, Western women in general are almost universally judged on their bodies: 
what Germaine Greer termed The Eternal Feminine, ‘the sexual object sought by all men... [whose] 
value is solely attested by the demand she excites in others.’316 Greer identified that society often 
separates women’s bodies from themselves, treating them as public property to be variously 
examined, admired, criticised and abused. Although Greer’s earlier writings, emerging as they did 
from the second wave of feminism, tend towards the strident, her point here remains valid to the 
present day. This almost forensic level of interest in female physicality has the effect of stifling 
women’s voices to some extent: those who argue that Muslim women who cover their faces are 
prevented from having a voice within society often fail to consider how frequently the voice of any 
woman is drowned out by examinations of what she is wearing, whether she has lost or gained 
weight, and so forth. 
 
Walter’s depiction of a highly-sexualised Western culture is not one that sits well with the 
stereotypical media portrayal of a niqab-wearing Muslim woman, in which it is assumed that she is 
either a browbeaten adjunct in thrall to a deeply religious, controlling man, or a fundamental 
Islamist brainwashed by terrorists into extreme modesty. Alongside the highly-charged atmosphere 
of ‘being a woman’, with all its markers and expectations, comes an assumption that women actively 
enjoy showing off their bodies to the world at large, expending time, effort and money on 
maintaining their physical acceptability: that they are, in fact, inherently sexual beings. Within this 
assumption, the niqab and its typical accompanying long, loose garments, seem baffling: why would 
a woman choose to conceal her main form of power? Because neither law-makers nor the 
mainstream media appear to consult niqab-wearers in any depth before speaking on their behalf, 
there is a gap in comprehension and a subsequent assumption of something lacking on the part of 
the niqabis. These groups fail to understand that a woman who chooses to conceal her face and 
body from the general public can be just as much a woman of agency, a fulfilled being, a strong voice 
and as sexual or non-sexual as any other woman dressed in any other style, and is just as worthy of 
consideration and acceptance.  
 
Vakulenko317 identifies the essential hypocrisy in the West’s objection to the Islamic veil, both 
historically and currently, noting its persistent handwringing over the perceived oppression and 
confinement of veiled women whilst failing to acknowledge the ways in which it oppresses its own 
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‘modern’ or ‘liberated’ women. She points towards: the growth in cosmetic surgery procedures, and 
the increasing societal acceptance of the same; the lack of state-funded childcare in a culture where 
women are generally expected to be the primary carers for children, despite many families requiring 
two incomes to achieve a reasonable standard of living; and the less overt, but no less real, 
constraints placed upon them to dress in compliance with ‘western ideas of what is feminine, 
fashionable and appropriate.’318 Vakulenko feels that this hypocrisy may be a product of the way the 
West prizes what she terms ‘the formal existence of choice’, whilst failing to recognise the limits or 
barriers to its women actually being able to exercise their right to choose. In this way, the concept of 
‘choice’ is illusory: whilst it exists in a theoretical sense, if women are prevented by social, cultural, 
or economical obstacles from choosing to dress, appear or live in the way they wish, are they any 
less oppressed than the totemic veiled Muslim woman? 
 
Discussing the specific issue of veiling, Mallik pointed out that,  
 
‘Veiling need not simply be interpreted as a label of identity. It can constitute a genuine 
public expression of the personal significance attached to religion’319  
and that  
‘[Veiling] is often utilised as a universal response to a sexist and male-dominated society 
where women are judged by how they look.’320  
 
These two remarks demonstrate just two of the myriad reasons why some Muslim women veil their 
faces. To assume that all Muslims do so for the same reason is as facile as assuming all Western 
women who wear high-heeled shoes or skinny jeans do so for the same reasons: for instance these 
garments may help a woman feel sexually attractive; she may perceive that they flatter her figure 
better than other styles; the particular style or cut may have a specific cultural indicator or 
identifiable branding, marking her out as a member of a social tribe or as a culturally recognisable 
‘type’ of person; they may merely be a style that she feels comfortable wearing; or they could have 
been the first things she came across when getting dressed that morning. It should not be ignored 
that, per Vakulenko above, when such items conform to the prevailing fashion, women may feel 
they have no choice but to wear them, lest society think of them as lesser women, unable to keep up 
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with changing fashions or unwilling to make the required effort to do so. Furthermore, both reasons 
identified by Mallik provide clear challenges to the ban on veiling in France: if veiling, to some 
women, can be a genuine expression of religious conviction, there are grounds for contesting the 
ban under art.9 ECHR. Similarly, if veiling represents a stance against patriarchal standards of female 
beauty for others, it is difficult to justify the ban on the grounds that it will release women from their 
oppression.  
 
This motivation for veiling also illustrates the disparity between ideals of female liberation in the 
Western and Islamic worlds – in recent years, some Western women have adopted actions including 
the wearing of provocative clothing, stripping, modelling topless or nude, and using or making 
pornography, as symbolic of female liberation, empowerment and choice. The French ban on veiling 
suggests a belief that the Islamic approach of modesty is less deserving of recognition and protection 
than the West’s embracing of ‘raunch culture’321. On this topic Mallik is critical of Okin, referring to 
her assertion that ‘other’ cultures should assimilate as ‘condescending’322 and concluding that it is 
possible to end certain cultural practices without disrespect or damage to the cultural group itself, 
provided the impetus for change comes from or is supported by members of the cultural group. 
Again, the ban on veiling in France seems more of an imposition upon Islamic women from outside 
their cultural sphere, which goes some way to explain the extent of negative reaction against it: 
young Muslim women seem to have reclaimed the niqab as a reassertion of their identity in the 
wake of 9/11 and the ensuing conflicts. If wearing it gives them a feeling of empowerment, of 
belonging, it is difficult to fathom how any positive result could be brought about by unilaterally 
banning it. Fernandez advocates a re-reading of gender-specific cultural practices such as veiling so 
that they ‘can be considered other than through the prism of racism and Islamaphobia.’323 This, she 
feels, will be the first step in allowing Western cultures to understand veiling as a way of reclaiming 
the female body from male ideals of femininity and as a symbol of personal identity and resistance 
to global homogenization, rather than one of coercion and patriarchal obedience. 
 
How to be a woman: consume and conform 
Increasingly, Western society celebrates the pillars of individuality and consumerism. Individuals are 
able to non-verbally express themselves more and more minutely, simply by buying more and more 
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specialised, personalised items. The growth of online retailing has meant that clothing, accessories 
and jewellery are available to purchase in almost infinite options of style and colour, and unusual or 
specialised items are more accessible to the purchaser than ever before, since they are not 
restricted geographically to shopping at whichever stores are closest to home. Media outlets, 
particularly women’s magazines and fashion blogs, encourage the rejection of rules and guidelines 
on appropriate dress and the development instead of ‘personal style’. However, if examined closely, 
this earnest reification of personal choice and individuality is illusory: the male gaze remains all-
consuming. Women are still primarily celebrated for their bodies and overall outward appearance, 
meaning that however individual her style, it must in some way be attractive, or at the very least 
acceptable, to the eyes of men: never not enough, and certainly never too much. An overwhelming 
plethora of advice exists online and in print, with more published daily, describing the various ways 
women could (or should) adapt their bodies and clothing in order to continue to be acceptable to 
society, most often necessitating the purchase of new items or products. Their outfits and bodies are 
intensely scrutinised by the media: entire sections of magazines are devoted to analysing how much 
weight celebrities have gained or lost recently, whether their latest red-carpet dress is a style failure 
or success, or whether or not they have had, or should have, or should not have had, cosmetic 
surgery.   
 
In the West, successfully ‘being a woman’ in the twenty-first century seems to mean always being 
well-dressed, made-up, suitably coiffed and stylishly accessorised to at least an ‘acceptable’ 
standard during interaction with any other member of society, or else risk encountering ridicule and 
rejection. As Wolf noted, in her comparison of the transition from girlhood to womanhood in various 
societies, ‘our [Western] girls move toward womanhood through the demarcations of what they can 
buy and own, or of who wants to sleep with them.’324 She neatly encapsulates the essence of being a 
socially successful woman in Western culture: to be a frequent and diligent consumer of goods, and 
to make oneself sexually attractive at all times.  It is possible to argue that the individual style 
decisions women make are often, in fact, choices between a surprisingly limited selection of options 
collated for them by the media and the fashion and beauty industries as being ‘right’ for their 
particular body or face shape, in order that they remain visually acceptable to the wider male gaze. 
‘Individuality’ and ‘personal style’ ultimately become modular concepts, available to purchase by 
collating the appropriate items from the ‘right’ retailers: even in non-conformity, Western women 
must conform, or appear to be striving to conform, to one of a few ‘ideal’ types or else be deemed 
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unacceptable. However, Western society continues to at least pay lip service to the concept of 
personal style, and on the surface it appears that its women are very much at liberty to express 
themselves through their clothing and other styling choices.  
 
Veiling the face, with its rich history, religious significance and varied meanings, to some extent flies 
in the face of this type of categorisation. When veiled, the woman is identifiably a woman, and 
identifiably a Muslim, but it is difficult for the casual Western observer to deduce much more about 
her appearance. As noted earlier in the chapter, this is one of the reasons some women choose to 
wear complete veiling: they attract less male attention when out and about, and reserve the visual 
experience of their faces and bodies for their closest family. This is exemplified by the experiences of 
teenagers Shabina Begum and X, as discussed in Chapter 2, whose decision to begin wearing, 
respectively, a jilbab and a niqab, attracted so much negative attention. It is possible to argue that 
their apparent rejection of Western expectations toward their adolescent bodies were at least 
partially responsible for their schools’ lack of support and their subsequent defeat in court. 
 
Post-colonial feminism and veiling 
 
Mohanty, writing in 1986,325 was highly critical of the manner in which academics describe what she 
then termed ‘third-world’ women and their problems. She identified that Western academics in 
particular tend to compress these women into a single homogenous mass, and asserts that the 
issues are significantly more complex and nuanced than ‘all women in the developing world are 
oppressed and disadvantaged’. She also identified the existence of an assumption that all women 
share the common denominator of ‘being oppressed’, and argues that this is too narrow and vague a 
descriptor: Mohanty accepted that some groups of women are lacking in power, but not in equal 
measure. Specifically, whilst Western women tend to be characterised as ‘Other’, in the sense that 
they are not men, they are often more powerful, or have more access to power, than non-Western 
women: this is most particularly true in multicultural societies like Western Europe, in which Muslim 
women are ‘Other’ in terms of both their gender and their culture, putting them at a double 
disadvantage. With respect to face veiling and attempts to ban it, this type of stance reveals itself in 
the stereotype that Islamic women are forced by their fathers or husbands to veil their faces against 
their will, that this practice is oppressive and detrimental to them, and that given the choice they 
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would not veil. As earlier chapters have revealed, the reality is quite different: most Muslim women 
living in Europe veil of their own volition, often after considerable research into their religion. Their 
lives may become more difficult as a result: as discovered in the Belgian study, discussed above, they 
may have to tolerate the aggression and condemnation of strangers, or go against the wishes of 
close family to wear their veils. These findings do not suggest timid, oppressed, or subservient 
women, and yet proponents of bans on veiling (including Nicolas Sarkozy, Philip Hollobone, and Jack 
Straw, as previously discussed) maintain that such action is essential in order to liberate women 
from the impositions of their religion: these men appear to understand veiled Muslim women only 
as a homogenous group of one-dimensional Others, rather than individuals who happen to have 
consensus on a particular aspect of their religion. The tendency of the West to ‘Other’ women who 
veil their faces assumes both that the veil is a problem, and that it is their only problem: remove the 
veil, and the problem ceases. Homogenisation in this way ignores the fact that Muslim women living 
in the West suffer from the same range of problems encountered by white women, including 
domestic violence, lack of representation, gender stereotyping and pay inequality, to name a few. 
Mohanty went on to describe the use of ‘cultural Others’ as laziness, and recommends that care 
should be taken to examine the social and political significance of customs or traditions on the 
community as a whole rather than isolating individual customs or aspects of customs. This is highly 
relevant to the current debate over European bans on face-covering garments. Both the Ban and the 
debate focus on one very specific aspect of Islamic culture (veiling) which is not common to all 
Muslims and carries varying levels of meaning and significance to different branches, communities, 
and individuals within Islam. Mohanty described the universalism by which academics consider 
veiled Muslim women from different countries as ‘reductive’, noting that, whilst the veils themselves 
may look similar, the cultural heritage and the impetus for veiling varied considerably. 326 She 
illustrated this point by examining different reasons for veiling, comparing middle-class Iranian 
Muslim women who wore niqab in support of the working-class women of their community during a 
1979 revolution, with the Iranian government’s current insistence on full-body veiling. In this way, 
something that was once a symbol of feminine solidarity between classes, worn by women through 
their own volition, became a garment imposed upon them by a patriarchal regime and so altered its 
connotations.  Similarly, Muslim women living in Western Europe seem to adopt the niqab as part of 
a deeper engagement with their religion whilst in an environment where they are able to choose 
whether or not to cover their face. In this way, banning face veils by law is as repressive as requiring 
them to be worn, and as likely to stimulate discord amongst those affected.   
                                                          
326 Ibid at p347 
94 
 
Louise Rhodes 339971 
 
Finally, Mohanty was at pains to point out that the application of Western values to the cultures and 
societies of the developing world is inadvisable and liable to have a distorting effect.327 By applying 
this assertion to the ban on face-veiling, it should be reiterated that Christianity (the primary religion 
in Europe) currently makes no formal dress requirements of its adherents328 whereas most, if not all, 
branches of Islam insist upon modest dress for both men and women as a basic tenet of the faith. 
Further, the current largely secular character of Western Europe (most notably in France, with its 
constitutional secularity) means that overt dress requirements mandated by religion are, to many, 
an unfamiliar concept. Attempting to treat Western European women and Muslim women living in 
Europe identically in terms of dress, therefore, is foolhardy. The two groups have fundamental 
differences both in their manner of dress and in their reasons for choosing and wearing certain 
garments whilst rejecting others. Banning a garment associated primarily with one group, especially 
the group holding less societal power, demonstrates a disregard for the rights, wellbeing and private 
life of its members and risks damage to the relationship between the two groups. Because Muslim 
women in Europe are generally immigrants, or the children of immigrants, in many aspects of their 
lives they are at a disadvantage solely by dint of that status: for example, they are likely to be 
exposed to racist or prejudiced views, their socioeconomic position may well be weakened, and 
there is potential for a language barrier to make day-to-day communication more difficult. Bans on 
face veils will only emphasise these disadvantages, whilst at the same time offering little or no 
tangible benefit to the native population. 
 
Writing in 2002 to consider the tension between culture and the rights of the individual, Afshan 
Mallik329 references Andrea Baumeister’s opinion that the state is only legitimate as a far as it can 
secure willing assent from its citizens, and that obtaining this assent will depend on the state’s 
sensitivity to the beliefs of its citizens. It must therefore refrain from imposing its own perspective. 
This position supports Mohanty’s views about the inadvisability of applying native French values to 
the French Islamic community. Mallik is also uncomfortable with what she terms ‘the West’s dogged 
obsession with unveiling the Muslim woman’330, believing that such a pursuit reduces the common 
perception of Muslim women to nothing more than passive victims of oppression lurking behind 
veils.  
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In a bid to identify possible reasons for the West’s fixation with banning face veils, El Guindi331 and 
Scott332 both noted the way in which Western colonialists eroticised, even fetishized, the face veil. In 
particular, the French colonisation of Algeria in the mid-nineteenth century is exemplified by both 
authors as significant in informing Western attitudes toward veiled women. Scott identifies the way 
in which Algerian women were homogenised because of their veils, remarking ‘There were those 
who equated Arab women with prostitutes and those who envisioned them as slaves to their 
husbands and families.’333 She goes on to describe the many contradictions in the French 
interpretations of Islamic and Algerian cultural practices, most pertinently to this chapter noting that 
‘[t]he veil was a sexual provocation and a denial of sex, a come-on and a refusal.’334 El Guindi 
describes the way in which the French publicly and forcibly unveiled Algerian women in 1958,335 and 
identifies that, 
 
‘such tactics led Arabs to link the deveiling of Muslim women with a colonial strategy to 
undermine and destroy the culture. The effect was the opposite of that intended by the 
French – it strengthened the attachment to the veil as a national and cultural symbol on the 
part of patriotic Algerian women, giving the veil a new vitality.’336 
 
These attitudes seem to persist to the present day, whereby the French legislature felt that women 
wearing veils were both a threat to the country’s security and character, and suffered serious 
personal oppression from which they must be released. Similarly, young Muslim women living in 
Europe have embraced the niqab as a reassertion of their faith, in a climate where Muslims in 
general are often characterised as religious fanatics, terrorists or oppressed chattels. 
 
Mallik also describes how motivations for and reasons behind traditional or cultural practices can 
shift and evolve over time, citing the example of a ban on veiling in Iran during the 1930s, following 
which a number of wealthy families emigrated because at that time the burka was a symbol of status 
and affluence. Similarly, an article in the London Evening Standard in 2010337 spoke with a variety of 
Muslim girls and women about veiling, and received a wide variety of responses regarding their 
reasons for wearing hijabs and niqabs: an expression of identity, an accessory, enabling the wearer 
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to feel closer to God, something ‘that marks you out but makes you belong at the same time’338. As 
recently as the mid-1990s, academics identified a move towards a ‘new veiling movement’339 in 
Cairo, Egypt, by which educated middle-class working women embraced traditional Islamic dress. In 
doing so, they attached a new connotation, that of free choice rather than imposition and duty, to 
the garments, and simultaneously rejected the values of modern Western culture and subverted 
those of the traditional Islamic patriarchy. Again, this demonstrates the multiple meanings that can 
be ascribed to the practice of veiling, and illustrates how, for many women, it can be a symbol of 
freedom and identity. Examples like this highlight the problematic way in which the West employs 
women’s rights and gender equality as vehicles to support bans on veiling: it neglects to 
acknowledge the benefits and empowerment represented by veiling, instead imposing its own 
meaning upon the practice and assuming it has universal resonance. 
In her essay Visibility, Violence and Voice? Attitudes to Veiling Post-11 September, Alison Donnell 
surmised that the terrorist attacks carried out on the USA by Al-Qaeda on 11 September 2001 acted 
almost as a fulcrum in the West’s interpretation of the veil. She notes that, prior to the attacks, 
veiled women had been viewed as exotic objects of Oriental otherness: however, almost 
immediately afterward, they became ‘a highly visible sign of a despised difference’340 and sitting 
targets for Islamophobic harassment. Donnell also identifies the problematic way the West fixated 
upon the imposition of the burka on Afghan women by the Taliban. In doing so, she shrewdly argues, 
the veil was centralised as the core of the struggle faced by Afghan women, rather than just one 
facet in a landscape of oppression and abuse. Equally, the dogged and myopic focus on the burka 
served to fix Afghan women as victims in the eyes of the Western media and its audience.341  
Over 14 years on from the events of 11 September there is very little significant progress from this 
position. The notion that ’banning the burka’ (as trumpeted, inaccurately,  by the British tabloid 
press and far-right-wing political parties) will in some way ‘rescue’ or ‘liberate’ Muslim women from 
some perceived oppression is as nonsensical as imagining the prohibition of hoodies or baseball caps 
will, in isolation, eradicate anti-social behaviour. However, to continue to situate Muslim women 
who veil their faces as victims, lacking in voice or agency is to do them a disservice of some 
magnitude. It is impossible to ignore that, whilst Muslim women in Europe generally make a free and 
informed choice to cover their faces (local criminal law notwithstanding), in other parts of the world 
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choice may be sorely lacking in many aspects of a woman’s life. For instance, Afghan women 
suffered Taliban-sanctioned violence and girls were banned from attending school, thereby denying 
them rights seen as fundamental in the West. An obligation to cover their faces when outside could 
be described as a lesser problem, but the media’s presentation of the issue suggested that 
‘unveiling’ the Afghan women solved the larger part of their difficulties in a single gesture. However, 
attempting to prevent Muslim women living in Europe from covering their faces of their own volition 
solves precisely no issues facing women in Afghanistan, or any other country where human rights 
abuses are prevalent. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Both France and Belgium have indicated a desire to end, or at least alleviate, what they see as the 
subjugation of a defined group of women by the passing and enforcement of these laws. It may, in 
fact, be idealistic and glib to assume that every Muslim woman who takes the decision to habitually 
veil her face does so of her own volition: as Barbibay remarks, ‘it is a truism that numerous Muslim 
women wear religious garb as a direct result of patriarchal imposition.’342 In the press coverage 
surrounding the build-up to and imposition of France’s Ban, there is evidence that those who 
support the ban believe that the majority of women who cover their faces do so because of coercion 
or force.343 Conversely, those who oppose it feel that Muslim women invariably make a free and 
informed choice about whether or not to wear a face veil.344 Similarly, even the various Muslim 
communities do not reach consensus on the subject of veiling, and there is longstanding 
disagreement about the precise interpretation of the relevant verses of the Koran. A French Islamic 
feminist group, Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores Nor Submissives) believes that veiling is a 
patriarchal cultural tradition rather than a practice that is proscribed by Islam, and staged a 
demonstration in support of the Ban in 2010.345  
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It is, therefore, important to consider that not all Muslim women are in favour of veiling the face. 
However, in attempting to regulate what women of any culture may or may not wear, the law 
infantilises women to an unacceptable extent. It is indisputable that aspects of major world religions 
proscribe modesty in dress and appearance in their key texts, and that contemporary authorities on 
these religions often advocate modern interpretations which can serve to impose restrictions or 
obligations on the way women dress. However, to attempt to prohibit the wearing of garments 
associated with a particular religion is problematic. Instead of ‘freeing’ or ‘liberating’ women from 
the perceived confines of their religion, the law merely replaces one set of restrictions with another, 
intimating that women cannot be trusted to choose their own method and style of dress. Basing 
such restrictions on ill-conceived and under-evidenced notions of female oppression and fears for 
security is undesirable and should not be considered within states that are obliged to uphold the 
human rights of their citizens. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
On 15 March 2013, Dr Sarah Wollaston, MP for Totnes, Tweeted that she was in favour of banning 
the niqab ‘within schools and colleges; how on earth do they promote equality when they collude 
with making women invisible?’346 This thesis has explored the many and varied reasons why Muslim 
women in Europe choose to cover their faces, as well as their challenges to those who attempt to 
restrict them from doing so. Veiling appears to be an overwhelmingly positive and profound 
experience for them, often begun after much thought, research and consideration. During the 
research for this project, no sources were found to indicate that Muslim women believe they feel 
‘invisible’, in a negative sense, when wearing niqab. There are certainly anecdotes confirming that 
some women prefer to conceal their faces to deter unwanted attention from men, but this is likely 
not the type of invisibility Wollaston meant: instead, she is presumably concerned that the niqab is 
de facto oppressive, and that veiled women are isolated, disenfranchised and denied full access to 
society, stifling their voice as they cover their face. However, Wollaston is fundamentally mistaken in 
imagining that a niqab acts in the same way as a cloth thrown over a parrot’s cage. Women who 
wear niqab are no different, no better or worse, no stronger or weaker, no more or less vocal than 
any other women, and at the same time are as different from each other as any other human beings. 
Their niqabs are merely something they happen to have in common. Further, Wollaston’s concern 
about women becoming ‘invisible’ when wearing niqab fails to take into account that many people, 
men and women, Muslim or otherwise, appear to actively choose isolation in twenty-first century 
Britain. Whether an individual drowns out the clamour of public transport with earphones, deters 
unwanted social approaches when alone in public by occupying herself with a smartphone or a book, 
or chooses to remain within his home where at all possible, societal disconnection is not at all 
uncommon, nor is it generally an impetus for the introduction of overarching and draconian 
legislation. 
Throughout the chapters of this thesis, it has been clearly demonstrated that Muslim women choose 
to cover their faces for a spectrum of reasons, including a deeper understanding or less common 
interpretation of the requirements of their religion; a desire to outwardly display their own piety; a 
wish to conceal their faces and bodies from the general public, reserving them instead for their 
husbands and families; and the extremely human urge to feel a sense of belonging. These reasons 
appear entirely consistent with the exercise of the rights guaranteed to citizens by the European 
Convention on Human Rights, and do not suggest any pressing need for legal interference in the 
                                                          
346 https://twitter.com/sarahwollaston/status/379199657165197312  
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name of protecting or liberating women who cover their faces. However, France’s decision to issue a 
legal prohibition on veiling the face, based partially on those grounds, was successfully implemented 
and later approved by the European Court of Human Rights. It is difficult to see this situation as 
anything less than a manipulation of domestic and Community law to exert control over a growing 
Muslim population by making a small minority of its women into scapegoats. It is likely that the true 
impetus for the ban was a combination of historic distaste for the veil, dating back to the era of 
colonialism, and social and political disquiet over a growing Muslim population in France.  
Additionally, the author remains sceptical of the existence or extent of the mischiefs which both 
France’s ban on veiling and the ultimately unsuccessful Private Members’ Bill submitted to the UK 
Parliament were purported to correct. Both documents, and their surrounding publicity, generally 
indicate a wish to ‘liberate’ women from some perceived oppressive regime and make earnest 
pronouncements on the security risks of allowing people to conceal their faces in public. As 
discussed above, there is scant evidence to suggest that Muslim women living in Europe require 
politicians and law enforcement agencies to rescue them from their niqabs: even if evidence was 
found to suggest that oppression was a significant problem in this context, the fact that so few 
women actually veil their faces in Europe implies that support and education through community 
channels would be more effective and less divisive than criminalisation. Making veiling illegal is liable 
to marginalise the theoretical oppressed woman even further by either forcing her to go against her 
oppressor in order to go out unveiled, thereby leaving her vulnerable to potential domestic abuse, or 
forcing her to remain at home, marginalised from society.  
In terms of security considerations, it is important again to consider the numbers: Muslims represent 
a relatively small proportion of the populations of both France and the UK, and amongst them, 
women who veil their faces are fairly unusual – for France, the most generous estimate suggests 
only around 2,000 women nationwide. To ban by law a garment worn by a tiny segment of the 
population because of fears of, presumably, potential terrorist activity is both specious and likely to 
be highly ineffectual: if a group or individual did, in fact, plan to carry out terrorist activity using 
niqab as disguises, but found themselves thwarted because covering the face was illegal, it is at best 
naïve to imagine that this in itself would prevent the planned terrorist act. Finally, the ECtHR ruling 
in S.A.S. v France relied a great deal on the notion of ‘living together’, and the way in which the 
niqab impedes this concept. However, as discussed above, France could equally have banned iPods 
or smartphones in public places in order to achieve a similar end: Muslim women are not uniquely 
responsible for creating or upholding some sort of social utopia, in which strangers voluntarily 
engage with each other during their day-to-day business. Banning the niqab gave a clear signal to 
France’s Muslim citizens that they were tolerated, but not entirely welcome in the country. It also 
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served to fuel existing anti-Muslim attitudes amongst the white French population and tacitly 
authorised displays of intolerance and, at times, aggression, toward those women who felt unable to 
comply with the Ban. 
Increasingly, Western society and its media, in all formats, places stringent and often contradictory 
expectations on its women: they must be slim yet voluptuous; fashionable, but not slaves to fashion; 
impeccably well turned-out yet ‘natural-looking’; they are pilloried for showing signs of age, then 
ridiculed for undergoing cosmetic procedures to temper those signs; and most of all, they are 
encouraged to believe that the way they look, particularly to men, should be their primary concern.  
With this in mind, it is possible to argue that apparently liberated Western women are in fact subject 
to coercion and subjugation from external forces, which are potentially just as pervasive and 
insidious as the type of oppression presumed by some to affect Muslim women who wear niqab or 
other forms of face-covering veil. However, the UK government has not been troubled by calls to 
ban, for example, women’s magazines in order to cease their oppression of women, nor would such 
a ban automatically result in women becoming free from the demands of patriarchal standards of 
beauty.  
 
Similarly, to ban the niqab would represent a curtailment of the human rights of those women who 
actively choose to wear it, regardless of their reasons for doing so, and would not automatically 
liberate from oppression any woman who may be forced to wear it. In this sense, both the Ban as 
enacted in France and the calls for a ban in the UK are predicated on a set of assumptions that are at 
once paternalistic and overly simplistic: that Western women are ‘free’ and ‘liberated’ and Muslim 
women are not; that Muslim women would become ‘free’ and ‘liberated’ if they dressed in the same 
way as Western women, and would be eager to do so; that the Islamic veil, in its various forms, by 
definition suppresses Muslim women’s independence and they therefore need to be ‘rescued’ from 
it; and that Western governments can and should perform the job of ‘rescuing’ them. As discussed, 
the fact of whether Western women themselves are in fact ‘liberated’ in terms of dress and 
appearance is debatable: they are, in fact, often bound by the expectations and restrictions of the 
male gaze. Further, whilst there are almost certainly Muslim women in some parts of the world who 
suffer oppression and struggle for recognition of gender equality, with the expansion of Islamic State 
a prime example, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that Muslim women living in Europe 
face these problems to the same magnitude. Further, it is facile to assume that banning the niqab in 
Europe will have a positive effect: it will deny choice and agency to those women who decided to 
veil their faces of their own volition, and will stigmatise and marginalise any women who have in 
some way been compelled to veil. 
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To prohibit veiling places an unfair burden on the women who choose to express themselves by 
covering their faces, particularly when Western society ostensibly values and protects self-
expression through dress in many other ways. Whilst, as discussed in chapter 5, the concept of 
‘personal style’ for Western women may be more of a conceit, encouraging the freedom of self-
expression whilst ensuring conformity with the demands of the male gaze, there are currently no 
laws in the UK to restrict or proscribe what citizens may or may not wear.347  The UK legal cases 
challenging pupils’ right to wear religious or quasi-religious items with their school uniform, as 
discussed in chapter 2, did generally result in restrictions to the pupils’ self-expression: however, it is 
important to note that, despite the pupils’ lack of success in most of these challenges, the courts in 
each instance were working with little or no guidance, whether from precedent or statute. 
Subsequently, the Department for Education issued a comprehensive set of non-statutory guidelines 
to be followed by schools when devising or updating uniform policies. This development appears, at 
least for the time being, to have stemmed the flow of legal challenges to uniform policies, and, it is 
to be hoped, has informed a more tolerant and respectful attitude toward the sartorial 
manifestation of religious convictions within a school setting. 
 
The ruling in Eweida & Others demonstrated that the European Court of Human Rights takes a 
relatively liberal approach to the wearing of Christian symbols by adults within a workplace: it held 
that British Airways was incorrect in preventing Nadia Eweida from wearing a cross on a necklace 
with her work uniform, and although it dismissed Shirley Chaplin’s claim against the Royal Devon 
and Exeter NHS Trust for a similar issue, this was primarily a reflection of the overriding importance 
of health and safety considerations in Mrs Chaplin’s role as a nurse, than an attempt at stifling her 
religious expression. However, comparing this ruling with that of S.A.S. v France, in which the ECtHR 
held, by a majority of 15 to two, that France’s blanket ban on women veiling their faces in public is 
legitimate, it seems apparent that the religious expression of Muslims is of lesser importance to the 
Court than that of Christians. The dissenting opinion proffered in this case was critical of the dubious 
interpretation of Community law applied by the Court to permit France its own way on the subject, 
further illustrating the tenuous logic behind the Ban itself and indicating a determination on the part 
of the European Union to deny Muslim women the right to veil their faces, effectively using the 
bodies and faces of women to play out the ongoing debate on immigration. 
 
                                                          
347 The only exceptions to this statement are, as discussed in chapter 2, aimed at criminalising indecent 
exposure and other behaviours within the bounds of sexual assault. 
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As El Guindi remarked, ‘…the veil is a complex symbol of many meanings. Emancipation can be 
expressed by wearing the veil or by removing it. It can be secular or religious. It can represent 
tradition or resistance.’348 In twenty-first century Europe, where women remain covertly oppressed 
by the weight of expectation placed upon them by a culture which values them primarily for their 
appearance, it is vital that the meaning of a veil is determined by the individual wearer, not by media 
campaigns, nor government ministers, nor individual citizens to whom it is merely an object of 
curiosity. A blanket ban on face veils will potentially force women into making one of three 
undesirable choices: remaining indoors and potentially dependent on men, going out veiled and 
risking criminalisation, or abandoning her sincerely-held religious beliefs to go out unveiled. Any of 
these choices runs counter to what the ban attempts to achieve, namely liberating women who are 
perceived to be oppressed. Additionally, this outcome can only have an adverse effect upon the 
already strained relationship between white and Islamic communities in Europe, resulting in further 
polarisation and stifling social integration. The government, legislature, media, and general society 
of the United Kingdom must not give any further consideration to banning the niqab, but should 
instead strive to demonstrate and encourage respect for diversity, for individual expression, and for 
the basic right of individuals to express their beliefs using their own body, whether or not anyone 
else agrees with those beliefs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
348 El Guindi, ‘Veil’, 1999, p172 
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